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United States embargo against Cuba - Wikipedia

United States embargo against Cuba - Wikipedia


United States embargo against Cuba

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The National Capitol of Cuba in Havana was built in 1929 and is said to be modeled on the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C., 2014

The United States embargo against Cuba is an embargo preventing U.S. businesses and citizens from conducting trade or commerce with Cuban interests since 1960. Modern diplomatic relations are cold, stemming from historic conflict and divergent political ideologies. U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba are comprehensive and impact all sectors of the Cuban economy. It is the most enduring trade embargo in modern history.[1][2] The U.S. government influences extraterritorial trade with Cuba. The embargo has faced international criticism for its adverse impact on Cubans, including by the United Nations who have formally condemned it intermittently since 1992.

The U.S. government first launched an arms embargo against Cuba in 1958, with their energy and agricultural sectors targeted in 1960. The Cuban Revolution led to nationalization and a trade war with the U.S. that prompted seizure of American economic assets, including oil refineries. The U.S. retaliated with a total embargo on Cuban trade, with exceptions for food and medicine. Cuba held nuclear missiles for the Soviet Union during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which forced the U.S. to fully blockade the island. The embargo was loosened during the Cuban thaw from 2015 to 2017, tightening sharply thereafter over human rights in Cuba.

The embargo is enforced mainly through the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations of 1963, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Helms–Burton Act of 1996, and the Trade Sanction Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000.[3][4] Its legal framework reflects a complex mixture of federal law, entrenched and codified across multiple branches of government. Relations remain tense due to stark differences on immigration, counterterrorism, civil and political rights, human rights, electoral interference, disinformation campaigns, humanitarian aid, trade policy, financial claims, fugitive extradition and Cuban foreign policy.[5]

History

Eisenhower presidency

Cuban leader Fidel Castro, Washington, D.C., 1960

The United States imposed an arms embargo on Cuba on March 14, 1958, during the armed conflict of 1953-1959 between rebels led by Fidel Castro and the Fulgencio Batista régime.[6] Arms sales violated U.S. policy which had permitted the sale of weapons to Latin-American countries which had signed the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) as long as the weapons were not used for hostile purposes.[7] After the Castro socialist government came to power on January 1, 1959, relations were initially friendly between Castro and the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration but became strained after agricultural reform confiscated land owned by many American businesses and Cuba continued to sponsor revolutionary movements in other parts of the Caribbean.[8] By March 1960 the U.S. government began making plans to help overthrow the Castro administration.[8]

In April 1960, the U.S. Department of State issued a memorandum acknowledging majority support within Cuba for the Castro administration, the fast spread of communism within the country, and the lack of an effective political opposition.[9] In May 1960 the Cuban government began regularly and openly purchasing armaments from the Soviet Union, citing the U.S. arms embargo. In July 1960 the U.S. reduced the import quota of brown sugar from Cuba to 700,000 tons under the Sugar Act of 1948;[10] the Soviet Union responded by agreeing to purchase the sugar instead.[11]

In June 1960, Eisenhower's government refused to export oil to the island, leaving Cuba reliant on Soviet crude oil. Cuba and the Soviet Union signed a trade agreement according to which the Soviet Union would provide 900,000 tons of oil to Cuba.[12]: 40  The U.S. viewed the agreement as a provocation, and successfully urged Esso, Texaco, and Shell to refuse to process Soviet crude in their Havana and Santiago de Cuba refineries.[12]: 40  On June 29 and July 1, 1960, Cuba confiscated the refineries.[12]: 40  The U.S. responded by canceling its quota of sugar purchases from Cuba.[12]: 40 

On July 11, 1960, Eisenhower wrote a personal letter to the UK prime minister Harold Macmillan encouraging joint action in sanctioning Cuba. Eisenhower elaborates in the letter that the reason for the original diplomatic decline with Cuba was:

The story of the cancellation of elections, of the ascendancy of the Communist oriented group and purge of the moderates, of the executions and the hounding of all anti-Communists, of the abortive Cuban-supported efforts to overthrow various Caribbean governments, and of the shrill anti-American diatribes... We were directly affected when Castro, choosing the Agrarian Reform Law version advanced by the extremists, authorized the expropriation of extensive American properties without acceptable provision for compensation.

Eisenhower goes on to mention that despite these issues, he pursued a "policy of restraint" throughout 1959, but that the ultimate factor leading to a proactive approach against the Castro government in 1960 was:

...the degree to which Cuba had been handed over to the Soviet Union as an instrument with which to undermine our position in Latin America and the world.[13]

In response to sanctions, on August 30, 1960, the Cuban government nationalized three American-owned oil refineries as well as Compañía Cubana de Electricidad, the Cuban Telephone Company, and 36 sugar mills.[12]: 40  The refineries became part of the state-run company, Unión Cuba-Petróleo.[14] This prompted the Eisenhower administration to launch the first trade embargo—a prohibition against selling all products to Cuba outside of humanitarian aid.[9]

In October 1960, the Cuban administration responded by nationalizing all American businesses and most American privately owned properties on the island. Castro promised to separate Americans in Cuba from all of their possessions "down to the nails in their shoes".[9] Cuba's nationalization laws required the government to compensate the owners of seized property, but compensation was to be made in Cuban bonds, an offer rejected by American authorities.[9] Payments pursuant to the Cuban bonds were to be paid from the sale of Cuban sugar to the U.S., but the Americans had just canceled its purchases of Cuban sugar.[15]: 347  No compensation was paid. Other countries which had their assets nationalised, including Switzerland, Canada, Spain, and France, were more agreeable to Castro’s terms, seemingly convinced that they would not be able to get a better deal.[16]

The second wave of nationalizations prompted the Eisenhower administration, in one of its last actions, to sever all diplomatic relations with Cuba in January 1961.[9] The U.S. partial trade embargo with Cuba continued under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917.[17] The Cuban government's nationalization of U.S. owned property is the “largest uncompensated taking of American property by a foreign government in history.”[18] Assets seized, included vacation homes and bank accounts of wealthy individuals, but most seized property was owned by large American corporations, including sugar factories, mines and oil refineries.[16]

Kennedy presidency

Following the Bay of Pigs Invasion of 17 to 20 April 1961, an operation devised under Eisenhower but which President John F. Kennedy had approved preceding his presidency, Castro characterized the Cuban revolution and state as "socialist".[19][20][21] It aligned with the Soviet Union. On September 4, 1961, partly in response, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act, a Cold War Act that prohibited aid to Cuba and authorized the President to impose a complete trade embargo against Cuba. On January 21, 1962, Cuba was suspended by the Organization of American States (OAS), by a vote of 14 in favor, one (Cuba) against with six abstentions.[22] Mexico and Ecuador, two abstaining members, argued that the OAS Charter did not authorize expulsion. Multilateral sanctions were imposed by OAS, led by the U.S., on July 26, 1964, but were later rescinded on July 29, 1975. Relations between Cuba and the OAS have since warmed and the suspension was lifted on June 3, 2009.[23]

Kennedy extended measures by executive order, first widening the scope of the trade restrictions on February 8 and then again on March 23, 1962.[24] These measures expanded the embargo to include all imports of products containing Cuban goods, even if the final products had been made or assembled outside Cuba. On August 3, 1962, the Foreign Assistance Act was amended to prohibit aid to any country that provides assistance to Cuba. On September 7, 1962, Kennedy formally expanded the Cuban embargo to include all Cuban trade, except for the non-subsidized sale of food and medicines.[25] Following the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, Kennedy imposed travel restrictions on February 8, 1963, and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations were issued on July 8, 1963, again under the Trading with the Enemy Act, in response to Cuba hosting Soviet nuclear weapons. These measures froze Cuban assets in the U.S. and consolidated existing restrictions.[26]

Rapprochement with Cuba

The restrictions on U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba lapsed on March 19, 1977;[27] the regulation was renewable every six months, but President Jimmy Carter did not renew it and the regulation on spending U.S. dollars in Cuba was lifted shortly afterwards.[28][29] President Ronald Reagan reinstated the trade embargo on April 19, 1982, though it was now only restricted to business and tourist travel and did not apply to travel by U.S. government officials, employees of news or film making organizations, persons engaging in professional research, or persons visiting their close relatives.[29] This has been modified subsequently with the present regulation, effective June 30, 2004, being the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (31 C.F.R. Part 515).[30][31]

The current regulation does not prohibit travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba per se, but it makes it illegal for U.S. citizens to have transactions (spend money or receive gifts) in Cuba under most circumstances without a U.S. government Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued license.[32] Since even paying unavoidable airfare ticket taxes into a Cuban airport would violate this transaction law, it is effectively impossible for ordinary tourists to visit Cuba without breaking the monetary transaction rule.[33]

Increasing legislation

The embargo was reinforced in October 1992 by the Cuban Democracy Act and in 1996 by the Cuban Liberty and Democracy Solidarity Act (known as the Helms–Burton Act) which penalizes foreign companies that do business in Cuba by preventing them from doing business in the U.S.[34] The Helms-Burton Act further restricted U.S. citizens from doing commerce in or with Cuba, and mandated restrictions on giving public or private assistance to any successor government unless and until certain claims against the Cuban government were met. The key sponsor of the Cuban Democracy Act, Democrat Robert Torricelli, stated that the legislation would "wreck[sic] havoc on that island."[34][unbalanced opinion?] Justification provided for these restrictions was that these companies were trafficking in stolen U.S. properties, and should thus be excluded from the United States.[citation needed] The European Union criticized the Helms-Burton Act because it felt that the U.S. was dictating how other nations ought to conduct their trade and challenged it on that basis. The E.U. eventually dropped its challenge in favor of negotiating a solution.[35]

After the Cuban military shot down two airplanes operated by Hermanos al Rescate (Brothers to the Rescue) in 1996, killing three Americans and a U.S. resident, a bi-partisan coalition in the U.S. Congress approved the Helms–Burton Act.[36] The Title III of this law also states that any non-U.S. company that "knowingly traffics in property in Cuba confiscated without compensation from a U.S. person" can be subjected to litigation and that company's leadership can be barred from entry into the United States. Sanctions may also be applied to non-U.S. companies trading with Cuba. This restriction also applies to maritime shipping, as ships docking at Cuban ports are not allowed to dock at U.S. ports for six months. This title includes waiver authority, so that the President might suspend its application. The waiver must be renewed every six months and traditionally was until U.S. President Donald Trump in 2019.[37]

In response to pressure from some American farmers and agribusiness, the embargo was relaxed by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act, which was passed by Congress in October 2000 and signed by President Bill Clinton. The relaxation allowed the sale of agricultural goods and medicine to Cuba for humanitarian reasons. Although Cuba initially declined to engage in such trade (having even refused U.S. food aid in the past, seeing it as a half-measure serving U.S. interests),[38] the Cuban government began to allow the purchase of food from the U.S. as a result of Hurricane Michelle in November 2001.[39] In some tourist spots across the island, American brands such as Coca-Cola can be purchased. Ford tankers refuel planes in airports and some computers use Microsoft software.[40] The origin of the financing behind such goods is not always clear. The goods often come from third parties based in countries outside the U.S., even if the product being dealt originally has U.S. shareholders or investors.[41]

Cuban thaw

Barack Obama and Raúl Castro at the Palace of the Revolution in Havana, 2016

In April 2009, President Barack Obama first attempted to warm relations by easing the U.S. travel ban, allowing Cuban-Americans to travel freely to Cuba.[42][43] Ana Cecilia became the first officially approved ship to sail in July 2012 from Miami to Cuba.[44][45] Two years later, in 2014, the Obama administration announced its intention to formally re-establish relations with Cuba and later completed a prisoner exchange.[46][47][48] President Obama and First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba Raúl Castro met on April 11, 2015, the first meeting in over 50 years.[46][49][50] On May 29, 2015, the U.S. removed Cuba from its designated list of state sponsors of terrorism on May 29, 2015, later re-adding it on January 12, 2021.[51][52][53][54] U.S. banks then were temporarily allowed to open accredited accounts in Cuban banks.[55][56]

Relations officially established on July 20, 2015, with increased travel licenses, amended civil aviation and commercial passenger aircraft regulations, and normalized import-export license requirements announced in September.[57] In February 2016, the U.S. agreed to allow two American men to build a $5-10 million tractor factory.[58] The deal was later disallowed by Cuban authorities because one of the invesetors was a Cuban permanent resident and Cuba does not allow large investments by Cubans who live on the island.[59][60] In his final eight days in office, Obama formally discontinued the wet feet, dry feet policy, halting all illegal immigration from Cuba in an effort to promote legal alternatives.[61][62][63]

Renewed embargo

On November 8, 2017, it was announced that President Trump's administration had enacted new rules which would re-enforce the business and travel restrictions which were loosened by the Obama administration and would go into effect on November 9.[64][65] In 2019, ExxonMobil, the largest American energy producer, sued the Cuban government for their theft of U.S. oil assets in the 1960s.[14] In September 2019, the U.S. tightened restrictions on Cuba by limiting U.S. remittances to Cuba and further closing the country's access to the U.S. financial system.[66] Immediately following Cuba's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in January 2021, the State Department launched new political sanctions against Cuba's support of Venezuela and their president, Nicolás Maduro.[67] That month the U.S. Treasury additionally sanctioned the Cuban Ministry of Interior for human rights abuse in Cuba.[68]

A protest against the Cuban government and in support of the U.S. embargo in Naples, Florida, 2021

In July 2021, under President Joe Biden, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Cuba's domestic police force and on two of Cuba's leaders in response to political violence related to the 2021 Cuban protests.[69] Cuba attempted to embargo the U.S. by banning U.S. cash deposits at Cuban banks in 2021 but had to reverse the ban due to economic distress in 2023.[70] The U.S. government eased select financial sanctions against companies that serve Cuban interests but have no link to the Cuban government in 2024.[71] President Biden authorized additional sanctions against Cuba during the 2024 Cuban protests which caused further diplomatic strain with First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba Miguel Díaz-Canel.[72] First Secretary Díaz-Canel was joined by former First Secretary Raúl Castro in a protest with "tens of thousands of Cubans" against the U.S. embargo in December following the re-election of President Trump.[73]

"Total pressure" embargo

The U.S. government significantly tightened its economic sanctions against Cuba in January 2025, orienting around a "total pressure" or "maximum pressure" strategy.[74][75] In addition to re-designating the island as a state sponsor of terrorism for a third time, the State Department announced further sanctions against Cuban military contractors and further restricted Cuba's access to the U.S. dollar.[76] U.S. Homeland Security and Coast Guard soon thereafter restricted immigration of economic refugees from Cuba, along with Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.[77] The U.S. re-activiated Title III of the Helms–Burton Act, an international deterrent against foreign investment in Cuba.[78][79] The U.S. government halted foreign aid funding, expanded visa restrictions, and formally cautioned against Cuban forced labor in February.[80][81] President Trump issued a presidential directive in July for greater enforcement of the Cuban travel ban, further isolating the tourism industry of Cuba.[82] The U.S. government banned First Secretary Díaz-Canel along with two ministers from entering the U.S., later restricting access to the Cuban luxury real estate sector.[83]

Impact

Economic impact

Cuban oil production and consumption remained depressed from 1991 to 2000 during an extended period of economic distress.

The economic impact of the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba is comprehensive and impacts all sectors of the Cuban economy.[84] The United Nations estimated in 2023 the total economic damage to the Cuban economy to be in the "trillions of dollars" since inception.[85][86] A 2015 report in Al Jazeera estimated that the embargo had cost the Cuban economy $1.1 trillion in the 55 years since its inception, once inflation is taken into account.[87] The Cuban government assessed the cost in 2018 to be around $933 billion since inception.[88] In 2009, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimated that the embargo costs the U.S. economy $1.2 billion per year in lost sales and exports, while the Cuban government estimates that the embargo has cost the island itself $753 million annually.[89][90] In 2001, the U.S. International Trade Commission found that, from 1996 and 1998, without the embargo, Cuban imports to the U.S. would be worth $658 million.[91] In 2002, the U.S.-based, anti-embargo Cuba Policy Foundation estimated that the embargo costs the U.S. economy $3.6 billion per year in economic output.[92] The U.N. assessed the damage to the Cuban economy from 2022 to 2023 to be at $4.87 billion.[85]

The U.S. government has pursued extraterritorial measures to enforce its embargo. Cuban ambassador Ricardo Alarcón cited 27 recent cases of trade contracts interrupted by U.S. pressure to the U.N. in 1991. British Petroleum was seemingly dissuaded by U.S. authorities from investing in offshore oil exploration in Cuba despite initially expressing interest. In 1992, the U.S. State Department discouraged firms like Royal Dutch Shell and Clyde Petroleum from investing in Cuba.[93] In 1998, U.S. officials attributed Cuba's economic penury not as a result of the embargo, but instead its unwillingness to liberalize its own economy and substantial debts owed to its Japanese, European, and Latin American trading partners.[94]

After the formal implementation of the embargo and the passage of Proclamation 3355, there was a 95% decrease in Cuba's sugar quota, which canceled roughly 700,000 tons of the 3,119,655 tons previously allotted to the United States.[95] A year later, Cuba's sugar quota was reduced to zero when President Eisenhower issued Proclamation 3383.[95] This substantially affected Cuba's total exports, as Cuba was one of the world's leading sugar exporters at the time.[95]

In 1989, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Cuba witnessed its most devastating economic crises. Cuba's GDP plummeted 34% and trade between the nations apart from the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) declined by 56%.[95] Between 1989 and 1992 (the Special Period), the termination of trade partnerships with the Soviet bloc caused the total value of Cuba's exports to fall by 61% and imports to drop by approximately 72%.[96] International economists believed the Cuban government would fall along with the Soviet Union but Cuba instituted a campaign of macroeconomic adjustment and liberalization instead, which provided significant economic recovery.[95] As of 2024, Cuba was experiencing its worst economic crisis in 30 years due to increased sanctions, the challenges of economic reforms, and the COVID-19 pandemic.[97][98]

Financial impact

The U.S. government has implemented significant restrictions on financial activity within Cuba. The U.S. Treasury holds over $6 billion worth of financial claims against the Cuban government according to the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.[99][100] There are over 6,000 financial claims against the Cuban government by American companies valued at around $2 billion.[101] The Cuban government is required to pay cash for all food imports from the U.S., as credit is not allowed.[102] Cuba is heavily dependent on U.S. remittances from family members and access to U.S. dollar deposits influences financial decision-making on the island.[103] Limited access to the U.S. dollar and financial system has exacerbated wealth inequality in Cuba and forced involuntary dollarization on the island.[103] Cuban banks are banned from operating within the United States.[104] U.S. investors are prohibited from owning and trading Cuban sovereign debt.[101]

Cuba conducts international financing with many countries, including many U.S. allies; U.S.-based companies, and companies that do business with the U.S. which trade in Cuba do so at the risk of U.S. sanctions.[105][106] The U.S. has threatened to stop financial aid to other countries if they trade non-food items with Cuba. The U.S.'s attempts to do so have been vocally condemned by the United Nations General Assembly as an extraterritorial measure that contravenes "the sovereign equality of States, non-intervention in their internal affairs and freedom of trade and navigation as paramount to the conduct of international affairs".[107]

Humanitarian impacts

The embargo has been criticized for its effects on food, clean water, medicine, and other socioeconomic needs of the Cuban population.[108][109] Criticism has come from both Fidel Castro and Raúl Castro, citizens and groups from within Cuba, and international organizations and leaders. U.S. diplomat Lester D. Mallory wrote an internal memo on April 6, 1960, arguing in favor of an embargo to "(make) the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government".[110][111]

The embargo has been linked to shortages of medical supplies and soap which have resulted in a series of medical crises and heightened levels of infectious diseases.[112][113] Medical scholars have also linked the embargo to epidemics of specific diseases, including neurological disorders and blindness caused by poor nutrition.[112][114] An article written in 1997 suggests malnutrition and disease resulting from increased food and medicine prices have affected men and the elderly in particular, due to Cuba's rationing system which gives preferential treatment to women and children.[113] In 1997, the American Association for World Health stated that the embargo contributed to malnutrition, poor water access, lack of access to medicine and other medical supplies and concluded that "a humanitarian catastrophe has been averted only because the Cuban government has maintained a high level of budgetary support for a health care system designed to deliver primary and preventative medicine to all its citizens."[87][108] The AAWH found that travel restrictions embedded in the embargo have limited the amount of medical information that flows into Cuba from the United States.[109] Since 2000, the embargo has explicitly excluded the acquisition of food and medicines.[115]

Political impact

U.S. Defense Sectary Pete Hegseth aboard a ship on Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 2025

The severe effects of the U.S. embargo on the economic activity and political affairs of Cuba has led political scientists to classify the effort as a full-scale "blockade".[116] They claim that violations of the embargo are too harsh, citing the fact that violations often lead to severe sanctions.[116] Academic Nigel White writes, "While the U.S. measures against Cuba do not amount to a blockade in a technical or formal sense, their cumulative effect is to put an economic stranglehold on the island, which not only prevents the U.S. intercourse but also effectively blocks commerce with other states, their citizens and companies."[11] Political economist Jorge Antonio stated in 2000 that the effects of the embargo on the development of Cuba are likely negligible.[117] His research concluded: "Under the real world of Castroism, however, the answer must be a terse one: none. The embargo has not harmed the Cuban economy. Cooperation between the U.S. and Cuba would have been impossible from the very beginning of the Revolution for legal, political, ideological, strategic, and economic reasons, not to mention others of a philosophical or moral character."[117]

Former Central Bank of Cuba economist Pavel Vidal said "Reforms in Cuba do not depend on the embargo, and the embargo should be eliminated unilaterally, independently from reforms in Cuba. Both cause problems".[118] A 2009 report by Amnesty International found that the "Cuban embargo has had an adverse effect on human rights" and said that "states must take into account the effects that [imposed] sanctions may have on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights in the country affected".[119] In Cuba, the embargo is commonly called el bloqueo (the blockade), especially by the government and its supporters.[120]

Food and medicine

Since the Trade Sanction Reform and Export Enhancement Act was enacted in 2000, the trade of food and medicine goods is excluded from the embargo. Complex licensing and regulatory requirements severely limit export of medicines, medical equipment and supplies, which contain anything produced or patented by the United States, to Cuba.[121][122] In 2020, $176.8 million worth of goods were exported to Cuba from the U.S. and $14.9 million imported to the U.S. from Cuba.[123]

Travel restrictions

Cuba is 90 miles (145 kilometers) south of Florida, 2006

The U.S. embargo has included travel restrictions for American tourists visiting the island since 1961. The U.S. government maintains a Level II Travel Advisory Alert for the island, cautioning citizens against legally traveling through Cuba due to crime.[124] Federal law requires persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to obtain a license to engage in any travel-related transactions pursuant to travel to, from, and within Cuba.[125] Transactions related solely to tourist travel are not licensable.[125] The U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) considers any visit of more than one day to be prima facie proof of violation.[126] OFAC also holds that U.S. citizens may not receive goods or services for free from any Cuban national, eliminating any attempts to circumvent the regulation based on that premise.[126]

Spurred by a burgeoning interest in the assumed untapped product demand in Cuba, a growing number of free-marketers in Congress, backed by Western and Great Plains lawmakers who represent agribusiness, have tried each year since 2000 to water down or lift regulations preventing Americans from traveling to Cuba.[127] President George W. Bush threatened to veto such efforts which stalled the legislation during the 2000s.[127]

Violations

U.S. nationals have circumvented the ban by traveling to Cuba from a different country, such as Mexico, The Bahamas, Canada, or Costa Rica.[128] The practice opens U.S. citizens to a risk of prosecution and fines by the U.S. government if discovered.[128] In 2006, the U.S. announced the creation of a task force that will more aggressively pursue violations of the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba, with severe penalties.[129] Criminal penalties for violating the embargo range up to ten years in prison, $1 million in corporate fines, and $250,000 in individual fines; civil penalties up to $55,000 per violation.[130]

Criticism

International

A poster in Havana, depicting a Cuban soldier defying Uncle Sam, with the inscription, "Mister Imperialists, we are not afraid of you at all!", 2005

The embargo is formally opposed by multiple international organizations including: Amnesty International,[131] Human Rights Watch,[132] and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,[133] among others around the world.[131]

The Helms-Burton Act has been the target of criticism from Canadian and European governments in particular, who object to what they say is the extraterritorial pretensions of a piece of legislation aimed at punishing non-U.S. corporations and non-U.S. investors who have economic interests in Cuba. The European Council has criticized the embargo as being extraterritorial and indirectly impacting the economic growth of European countries that have ties to Cuba, recommending WTO dispute settlement.[134]

Domestic

The embargo has also faced criticism from a select faction of international trade advocates and business leaders.[135] Cato Institute's Daniel Griswold called the embargo a failure, saying the economic sanctions have impoverished Cubans and "deprived Americans of their freedom to travel and has cost US farmers and other producers billions of dollars of potential exports."[136] Business leaders who have opposed the embargo include: James E. Perrella, Dwayne O. Andreas, and Peter Blyth, according to Foreign Affairs.[137]

It has faced criticism from a variety of U.S. political figures since inception.[138] President Jimmy Carter called for an end to the embargo in 2002 saying the U.S. and Cuba were "trapped in a destructive state of belligerence."[139] George Shultz, who served as Secretary of State under Reagan, called the embargo "insane" in 2005.[140] Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez criticized the embargo in 2009 calling it a "great farce" later stating that the "U.S. empire [is] alive and well, threatening us."[141] During this time U.S. President Barack Obama discussed easing the embargo during his 2008 campaign for president,[142] though he promised to maintain it.[143][144] Secretary of State Hillary Clinton publicly shared the view that the embargo helps the Castros stay in power by enabling an anti-American narrative.[145] The Latin America Working Group argues that pro-embargo Cuban-American exiles, whose votes are crucial in the U.S. state of Florida, have swayed many politicians to adopt views similar to their own.[146] In June 2011, George McGovern, the Democratic nominee for president in 1972, blamed "embittered Cuban exiles in Miami" for keeping the embargo alive.[147] Political scientist William LeoGrande opined in 2015 that the embargo "has never been effective at achieving its principal purpose: forcing Cuba's revolutionary regime out of power or bending it to Washington's will.'[148]

Humanitarian opposition of the embargo has persisted since the 1970s due to the strict restrictions the embargo imposes on Cubans. Pope John Paul II criticized the embargo during his 1979 pastoral visit to Mexico.[149] Patriarch Bartholomew I called the embargo a "historic mistake" while visiting the island in 2004.[150] Reverends Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton as well as minister Louis Farrakhan have also publicly opposed the embargo. The U.S. bishops called for an end to the embargo on Cuba, after Pope Benedict XVI's 2012 visit to the island.[151]

Film director Michael Moore challenged the embargo by bringing 9/11 rescue workers in need of healthcare to Cuba to obtain subsidized health care.[152]

United Nations

Every year since 1992, except for 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic,[153][154] the UN General Assembly has passed a non-binding resolution that condemns the ongoing impact of the embargo and declares it in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law.[154][153] Israel is the only country that routinely joins the U.S. in voting against the resolution.[155] Other countries that voted against the resolution in the past include Romania in 1992, Albania and Paraguay in 1993, Uzbekistan from 1995 to 1997, Marshall Islands from 2000 to 2007, Palau from 2004 to 2009 then once in 2012, and Brazil in 2019. 187 countries voted in favor of the resolution in 2024, with only the United States and Israel voting against it and Moldova abstaining.[156][157]

Public opinion in the U.S.

Cuba continues to play a destabilizing role in the Western Hemisphere, providing a communist foothold in the region and propping up U.S. adversaries in places like Venezuela and Nicaragua by fomenting instability, undermining the rule of law, and suppressing democratic processes. The U.S. government has made a strategic decision to reverse the loosening of sanctions and other restrictions on the Cuban regime. These actions will help to keep U.S. dollars out of the hands of Cuban military, intelligence, and security services.

—United States Department of the Treasury, on U.S. embargo implementation, June 2019[158]

A 2008 USA Today/Gallup Poll indicated that Americans believed that diplomatic relations should be re-established with Cuba, with 61% in favor and 31% opposed.[159] In January 2012, an Angus Reid Public Opinion poll showed that 57% of Americans called for ending the U.S. travel ban with Cuba, with 27% disagreeing and 16% not sure.[160]

The Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University has conducted thirteen polls (from 1991 to 2020) of Cuban Americans in Dade County, Florida.[161] In 1991, support for the embargo was 67.9% (5.5% don't know) shortly after the end of the Cold War, bottoming out at 31.6% (9.4% don't know) in 2016 during the Cuban thaw, and back up to 54% (8% don't know) in 2020 after relations with Cuba deteriorated.[161] In 2024, the Cuban Research Institute found high levels of support for the embargo among Cuban-American voters in southern Florida, reporting that 55% of Cuban-American voters were in favor of the embargo's continuation with 43% preferring a more humanitarian sanctions program.[162]

See also

References

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The Arduous Paths of Political Transitions: A Comparison of Cuba, China and Vietnam - ASCE

The Arduous Paths of Political Transitions: A Comparison of Cuba, China and Vietnam - ASCE


The Arduous Paths of Political Transitions: A Comparison of Cuba, China and VietnamEnrique S. Pumar


Notes1

One of the foremost concerns in the mind of policymakers, pundits, and academics in recent years is the prospects for liberal reforms in developing nations that have experienced social revolutions. To some extent, the pace of reforms put into operation frames their domestic and international identity and builds political capital. The capacity to legislate liberalizing reforms could appease any potential opposition as well as the skeptics of the regime. It might also quiet down more moderate members of the revolutionary ruling coalition who have identified with wide-ranging revolutionary goals and undo the corruption and illegitimacy associated with the deposed regime, for those not prepared to concede other more radical positions to fellow coalition members. Reforms can also keep the spirit of the revolution alive among younger generations over time. For those who did not experience the ill-conceived policies and structural conditions that gave way to the revolutionary transition, reforms have a conversion effect. The more reformed minded the regime, the more the younger generations will show allegiance to revolutionary policies, mobilization strategies, and rhetoric.

Externally, the situation is not much different. Often, the international community judges the success of revolutions by their willingness to reform. Reformist revolutionary leaders are perceived as sensible, pragmatic, astute heroes who sacrificed all for their country. Moreover, international policy accords often reward revolutionary governments willing to commit to change. Reforms also spur a sense of bilateral trust in what otherwise could be an anarchical international society. By contrast, revolutionary antidotes, like Pol Pot or Kim Jong Il, hardly inspire much confidence and are usually bemired as international outcasts. Finally, scholars and policy-makers increasingly believe that reform minded regimes will not fight each other.2

Drawing inferences from a comparative study of three Communist regimes in the developing world, this paper questions the prospects for reforms in one party states. First, if there are so many domestic and international incentives to undertake reforms, why do revolutionary elites fail to embrace more market and political liberalization? Second, what conditions lead to more reformist policies in some post-revolutionary societies as compared to others? And, third, why do Caesarian revolutionaries like Castro, Mao, Ho Chi Minh, or more recently those governing Iran and North Korea, concentrate on stalling rather than promoting liberal reforms?
METHODOLOGY

To formulate a proposition to these questions, I propose to compare recent Cuban policy initiatives with reforms undertaken in Vietnam and China.3 These countries have experimented with different versions of market socialism since the 1980s. The three societies share similar experiences related to their condition as developing nations that underwent revolutionary transformations to rid themselves of illegitimate autocratic governments. Moreover, the three have toyed with their own ideological brand of Marxism-Leninism. Notwithstanding different epochs and distinct political cultures, these three nations have all formulated policies designed to re-insert themselves in the world economy amidst their nationalist political culture. Yet despite these congruencies, each has instituted different paths and degrees of liberalizing reforms. The evidence I examined suggests that with respect to economic, social, and even political spheres, China is ahead of Vietnam and Cuba, the least reformist of the pack, in terms of the number of reforms instituted. Why are the two Asian autocracies ahead of Cuba?

One motivation for researching reform changes among these developing nations is that in many ways, each of their recent development paths defies logic. Smaller dependent market economies, like Cuba and Vietnam, should embrace more rapid rates and meaningful reforms from the outset to compensate for limited market size and restricted demand. A country like Cuba, whose political culture was not touched by Confucianism and underwent a short but nonetheless competitive democratic experience not long before the revolution, should be in the forefront of political openness. Ideologically, the Chinese seem to have been far more successful articulating their brand of Marxism. They also experienced a much longer period of isolation and self-reliance. Yet they have moved further ahead in terms of instituting market based socialist policies. This paradoxical situation invites further research.

This paper is part of a larger project that discerns postrevolutionary societies in the developing world and their capacity to reform. The next steps will be to test my conclusions by expanding the number of cases. While my method was inspired by Skocpol’s (1979, 1984) analysis of social revolutions, it departs from this version of the comparative historical analysis in terms of the number of cases and time dimensions— while her research spanned across centuries, mine encompasses decades. My approach also follows Ragin’s (1987, especially pp. 19–30) work on “conjunctural causation.” In this paper, however, I shall argue that specific causal patterns from various contexts—i.e., the dynamics of liberal vs. conservative coalitions— usually lead to different rates of policy reforms despite the fact that the path to reforms in post-revolutionary societies in the developing world is fairly consistent, incrementally moving from cosmetic to more meaningful changes.
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL ELITES

The evidence from these cases suggests that the longer the autocratic revolutionary leader and his closest associates are out of power, the more likely new generations of rulers will manage to implement reforms. I define an autocratic revolutionary leader as the leader or group of individuals who led an insurgency and managed to capture power thereafter. For some, the psychological aberrations of revolutionary leaders explain their reluctance to change once in power.4 This explanation fails to account for the origins and sustained steadfast disdain for reforms over time despite changing domestic and international political interests. The fact that new generations of leaders rally in support of policy reforms was partly explained by Ortega y Gasset (1957: 93) in one of his keen observations close to a century earlier:

A generation lasts about thirty years. But its activity divides into two stages and takes two forms: during approximately one half, the new generation carries out the propaganda of its ideas, preferences, and tastes, which finally arrive at power and are dominant in the second half or its course. But the generation educated under its sway is already bringing forward other ideas, preferences and tastes which it begins to diffuse in the general atmosphere. When the ideas, preferences, and tastes of the ruling generation are extremists, and therefore revolutionary, those of the new generation are anti-extremists and anti-revolutionary…

Nonetheless, a comparative case study of Cuba, China and Vietnam reveals several reasons for why the revolutionary generations do not give way to reforms easily besides the organic generational progression assumed in Ortega’s work. First, revolutionary leaders have tremendous personal stake on the implementation of revolutionary policies. Second, these leaders usually see reality in terms of a furious battle between themselves and their adversaries. Third, any lingering legitimacy after the institutionalization of the revolutionary process is rooted in an inflated nationalistic rhetoric which is anti-reformist in tone and substance. Finally, revolutionary leaders often adopt a messianic operational code concerning their own role in managing the state. A study of the pace of reforms in Cuba, China and Vietnam supports the axiom that the longer autocratic revolutionary leaders and their ruling coalition are away from holding power, the more dramatic an opening the country will experience. This factor alone seems to explain why the fourth wave of reforms in China, which began in 1992, were implemented sixteen years after Mao’s death and why it took eleven years after Ho Chi Minh’s death for the Sixth Party Congress in Vietnam to pass the initial wave of Doi Moi, but twenty seven years to witness the deepening of this policy strategy. In Cuba, however, the lingering control by the Castro brothers has made the prospects for substantial policy reforms all but uncertain.

This discouraging conclusion has far reaching implications for domestic and international actors, the political economy of national development, and adversaries of these regimes whose ambition is to steer the path of reforms. It suggests some support for a prudent policy, rather than containment or destabilization, for state transformations among post-revolutionary societies. Before I proceed to elaborate the reasoning behind my conclusion, I shall discuss how the term reform is utilized in the paper and then I will review some prominent positions associated with the literature on policy formulation and dictatorial politics.
LIBERALIZING REFORMS AND CHANGE IN SINGLE PARTY AUTOCRATIC REGIMES

The fact that autocratic single party regimes like Cuba, Vietnam and China do not easily embark on liberalizing reforms when autocratic revolutionary elites continue to hold the reigns of power does not mean that the character and policy initiatives of these regimes remain unaltered over the years. In fact, if one examines the legislative history of these regimes it is quite copious. In this paper, I refer to these unsustainable and cosmetic legislative swings as policy adjustments.5 In the case of China, one can simply compare the first phase of reforms from 1978 to 1984 with those that followed. In Cuba, the government position regarding reforms has been less than consistent often shifting back and forth between short periods of relative openness only to resort back to hard line rectification campaigns shortly after. The government of Hanoi, on the other hand, did not deviate much from Ho Chi Minh’s political economic doctrines of state control and self-reliance, which served as guiding principles for policies during the aftermath of the revolution until 1986. Even then, it took a new cadre of Vietnamese leaders to spearhead further economic changes aimed at decentralizing the economy and gradually instituting moderate market reforms starting in 1988.

It is usually the case that revolutionary leaders shift policies and the appointments of apparatchiks in an effort to portray a public façade for reformed minded changes and keep the state bureaucracy under control. In the end, state adjustments have the intended effects: to reassert political allegiance for autocratic dictators rather than creating opportunities for change. Moreover, unsustainable policy adjustments usually follow lofty revolutionary ideals that are executed according to the discretion of autocratic revolutionary leaders. This environment of intimidation and political cronyism is not conducive to bold liberalizing reforms. On the contrary, they seem to back the steadfast convictions of regimes to continue with a narrow authoritarian policy course of action.

Liberalizing reforms, on the other hand, depict political developments that are aimed at the incremental transformation of state policies and its commanding control over state-society relations. These reforms, like the Vietnamese second wave of “doi moi” starting in 1988, refer to a comprehensive program or set of sustainable policy initiatives that are designed to modify the Communist roots of these three regimes. Reforms often take place in any realm of public policy and administration, but the argument of this paper singles out the political and economic spheres since they are more controversial and contentious. Autocratic revolutionary leaders, on the other hand, are the generation of cadres who shared a common experience of fighting an insurgency together and later cliqued to steer the institutionalization of the revolutionary process. This political circle, to which Cesarean leaders also belong, experience other similar generational events and socialize over a period of time to the point that they form a close web of personal contacts. Although some in this group may be more hard liners than others, they all publicly defend the role and policies of the revolutionary leader and never air any discords or cleavages which would undermine the ideals for which they fought. In the social network perspective, autocratic revolutionary leaders and their cliques formed a tightly- bound knit of dense solidarity.6

Nowhere is the intransigence of this cadre of revolutionary leaders more evident than in today’s Iran. Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a member of one of the revolutionary student groups who helped deposed the Shah in 1979, has spearheaded a domestic campaign of repression against dissidents while realigning himself ideologically with the most conservative factions of the Islamic Republic. Abroad, Mr. Ahmadinejad has followed a more confrontational foreign policy than any of his predecessors, insisting on Iran’s right to enrich uranium at home.7 Iran is also building an internationalist foreign policy much like previous revolutionary regimes before it. For instance, in a recent report in the International Herald Tribune, Tehran was said to be collaborating with the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah to fill the power vacuum in Lebanon left behind by Syrian withdrawal.8 In the case of Vietnam, hard liners such as Tón Dúc Tháng and Nguyên Hûu Tho could also be considered as intransigent.

Among social scientists, the controversy around the prospects for reforms in post-revolutionary regimes has not subsided since the outbreak of the Chinese revolution. One popular argument, especially among instrumentalist observers of Communist regimes, is that revolutionary leaders betrayed moderate supporters by radicalizing the revolutionary process after they firmly control the reigns of power. This behavior insinuates that many who support armed insurgencies in developing nations do so because they believe in lofty goals and proclamations articulated by revolutionary leaders with regards to nationalism and development. Proponents of this position argue that revolutionary leaders hide their true radical sentiments to secure wide broad backing and accumulate stocks of political capital. Once in power, these leaders simply uncover policies they privately held all along. Hence, the tendency or disinclination from the part of revolutionary leaders towards substantial policy reforms once in power is a reflection of hidden ideological interests.

One of the major shortcomings of this interpretation is that it overemphasizes subjective intentions that are very difficult to support with verifiable evidence. There are plentiful reasons for revolutionary leaders not to show their more benign side publicly when they are trying to gather widespread support for their fighting. Yet, who is to say there are not other possible reasons for these leaders’ radicalization besides a calculated strategy of deception? For instance, it is possible that during the insurgency process, revolutionary leaders become radicalized as they confront indiscriminative state repression, and they count their closest allies and collaborators among their fatalities. When revolutionary leaders forgo opportunities to support reforms, another argument discerns that it is because these leaders are responding to deep-seated crises or unanticipated conditions. Revolutionary leaders, after assuming power, get to realize the extent of the social deterioration and economic mismanagement that prevails their country. More importantly, by underlying unsupported arguments about intentions, proponents of the various betrayal perspectives often underemphasize how conditions create opportunities that shape state policy and actions.

Another interpretation is rooted in the nature of inter- group rivalries. As this reasoning goes, former allies of the incumbent regime often mobilize in neighboring countries to organize transnational advocacy groups with the sole purpose of escalating any disaccording incidents into potential adversarial crises in order to destabilize or curtail revolutionary legislative initiatives and policies. When this occurs, revolutionaries and their adversaries face a downward spiral of relations which lead the former to adopt a more autocratic position to safeguard their own legitimacy at home and qualm the expectations of domestic political supporters. Orthodoxy promotes international provocations that escalate to confrontation. Following this group interactionist position, orthodoxy is the natural end from a series of uncontrollable tactical moves.

The behavioralist argument contradicts the group interaction position. If the former was too voluntaristic, the latter is more deterministic. Interactionists undermine any assertion that attempts to demonstrate the inter-subjective capacity of decision-makers to resolve differences and find common interests. In addition, they put too much weight on the actions of disenfranchised groups and their ability to mobilize international public opinion against revolutionary leaders. Finally, it seems that the possibility of any discord between revolutionaries and their external adversaries is conditioned by the structural configuration of the world politics—where it is assumed that anarchy prevents adversaries from building collaborative trusting relations. As many international relations scholars, Kenneth Waltz (2000) among them, have pointed out, during periods of tensions in a bipolar world, radical changes caused more of a stir among allies and former allies than under any other structural conditions. Hence to make the general assertion that revolutionary leaders are “pushed” by outsiders to adopt authoritarian convictions could be a mistake unless one takes into account the effects of the specific structural configurations in the international environment.

Even international structural conditions alone should be considered with caution in any attempt to explain the domestic policy swings. In many cases, the structuralist argument forecasts overly optimistic predictions about the level of commitment and durability of new policy predicaments. In fact, as the cases of Vietnam and China clearly indicate, the leader of either nation did not perceive the end of the Cold War as an immediate opportunity for reforms, as they jumped started state liberalization policies well before the end of this period. In the case of Cuba, on the other hand, international events do not seem to affect the course of policy reforms one way or another.

Social scientists have been more persuasive when they interpret policy hard line or a propensity to reform by reverting to the nexus between internal regime dynamics and structural conditions. For example, in a meticulous study of how intellectuals depict Chinese and Vietnamese reforms, Alexander Woodside (1998) illustrates how despite sharing a Mandarin vision, intellectuals in these two nations do not study each other’s reforms, resulting in a different pace of development. In the case of Cuba, reference to Fidel and his inner circle’s inclination for gamesmanship has also been noted as another consideration why this group turned to Marxism-Leninism to legitimize their control over the state and the direction of the revolutionary process. Proponents of the elite position I support in this paper often cite such factors as the style and substance of political leadership, the personal stake of leaders, the elite’s perception of deepening economic crises and their consequences, any shared common experiences, or the ideological clouds periling over social ills in developing nations to explain the hard line often subscribed to by autocratic revolutionaries.
POLICY REFORMS AND ADJUSTMENTS IN CUBA, CHINA AND VIETNAM

In this section, I discuss some development indicators to document the extent of reforms in Cuba, China and Vietnam, with emphasis on the first. My purpose is to illustrate the recent political economic unfolding in these three countries and to compare their development performance. This discussion is relevant because as I argue at the conclusion of the section, development performance indicators help us explain, at least partially, how a country like Cuba that has only undertaken tentative policy adjustments at best, has been able to endure without knuckling under the recent wave of market and political liberalization.

The data in Table 1 supports the assertion I put forth earlier that revolutionary single party states tend to embark on political and economic reforms when considerable time has passed after the demise of the revolutionary leadership. China and Vietnam are further along the path of liberalization than Cuba. Also the revolutionary leadership is further away from the reigns of power in these two nations. Later in the paper I will offer some tentative conclusions that support this anomaly. For now, I will limit my discussion to comparing the extent of reforms in these nations.

Table 1 also shows that China and Vietnam continue to incrementally affirm their own interpretations of a socialist-oriented market political economy. As China became the world’s third largest trading nation in 2005, the country completed another leadership transition, trimmed its average tariff rates by half, and changed its FDI (foreign direct investment) regime to open the retail and distribution sector to foreign owned companies while other direct investments are still subjected to state control. The Chinese government recently loosened restrictions to permit foreign insurers and banks to operate throughout the country.
Table 1. The Extent of Political Economic Reforms



Vietnam followed behind the Chinese path but with more modest economic decentralization reforms. Since 2001, top Vietnamese leaders also lowered trading barriers by roughly 4% and simultaneously signed bilateral trading pacts with the United States, China, Australia, Japan and South Korea. In the areas of FDI and employment, the country is well behind China with multiple restrictions and state controls. At the 10th Party Congress in April 2006, the party proposed an export led development strategy as the centerpiece to promote growth. At about the same time, the International Herald Tribune quoted Adam Sitikoff, the Executive Director of the American Chamber of Commerce, saying that Vietnam is seeking to move into a second wave of investment, exporting higher level of manufacturing, including electronics, rather than to “remain ‘the world’s best maker of socks and towels.’”9 In the same article, Jonathan Pinkus, the country representative for the UN Development Program, said “you’ll find tremendous enthusiasm among the foreign community for Vietnam as the next rising star.”10

By all accounts, Cuba seems to be moving in the opposite direction. While the first two nominally Communist nations experiment with their own brand of market economy socialism, Havana is centralizing and regulating its economy, in effect rolling back the meager adjustments it implemented to generate employment during the Período Especial in the 1990s. This trend was recently authenticated by Carmelo Mesa- Lago (2005), among others, in one of his annual overviews of the Cuban economy where he concluded that, “Castro launched a process of recentralization of decision making in 2004–2005 that has reversed most advances made by the modest market oriented reforms implemented in 1993–1996” (p. 13). Some of the noteworthy policy measures Mesa-Lago identifies as being more centralized since 2005 include: (1) banning state enterprise from conducting transactions and from providing some services in hard currency; (2) tightening controls on currency deposits and transactions by foreign owned businesses and join ventures; (3) imposing tight controls on all tourist personnel; (4) a value added tax on currency imports; (5) a ban on the dollar transaction and new exchange fees on currency conversions; and (6) halting permits for about 40 self-employment activities.

Politically, Cuba also lags behind its counterparts. Perhaps one of the most significant electoral changes in recent years was the decision by the Fourth Party Congress to pick municipal delegates through direct elections by their constituents. However, electoral campaigns and debates are still banned. There were also some changes to the statutes of the Party (Partido Comunista de Cuba, PCC) to make it more inclusive nationwide. Yet, the legislative bodies continue to lack real power and there is still no direct election or rotation among top leaders.11 In the area of individual liberties, Cuba continues to systematically repress any voices of dissent, as was most recently demonstrated with the incarceration and sentencing to long prison terms of seventy five prominent opposition leaders and activists.12 Finally, the island does not afford public space to any organized political opposition. When the Varela Project presented the government a plebiscite, with the required number of signatures, demanding a referendum—as is guaranteed constitutionally —officials simply responded with a plebiscite of their own in support of the regime. The difference with regards to freedom of expression between Cuban, China, and Vietnam may be one of degrees but nonetheless it is important because this fluctuation adds more evidence to support the assertion that countries still ruled by revolutionary leaders are less willing to entertain any notion of reforms.13

This quick overview of the recent political and economic developments in these nations provides evidence to support my contention that the reforms in China and Vietnam, despite the disputable policy depth, are further along than those in Cuba. This is not to say that the former are free nations or are ideal states to emulate. In fact, both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch continue to list China and Vietnam among the world’s most repressive regimes— Cuba also appears prominently in the list.14 The point is that the distance between newly elected leaders and the revolutionary leadership in the two Asian nations seems to give way to a more comprehensive process of reforms, however meager, than in Cuba. This trend is likely to continue at least into the near future. Given the regional support they now enjoy from newly elected left of center governments throughout Latin America, especially in the case of Venezuela, who is willing to subsidize the Cuban economy with very favorable energy trade arrangements, the revolutionary leadership in Havana is unlikely to reverse the ongoing recentralization process.

When one compares the data from Table 1 and Table 2, a logical question is how does Cuba fare so much better in terms of social safety net indicators than both China and Vietnam? Considering this question is relevant to this paper because, discounting demographics, it is evident that Cuba defends its social gains publicly to legitimize its lack of desire for structural reforms. The Cuban regime often frames these health and educational gains in terms of unparalleled achievements by the revolution, as something no other nation can emulate, or as benefits the Cuban people could easily lose if the course of the revolution is derailed, overturned, or halted. For example, in a May 11, 2006 front page article on the online version of Granma International, the official representative of the Party announced that Cuba has the largest number of children receiving electronic hearing implants in the world and reminded its readers that this is an unprecedented revolutionary achievement. The same newspaper in its April 7, 2006 edition flatly declared that before the revolution, “poliomyelitis was the cause of quite a few deaths, and paralyzed an average of 300 children per year. Cuba was the first country in the Americas to eradicate polio in 1962.” Therefore, the publicizing of Cuba’s health policies can also be seen as an attempt to build political capital to support the conventional position espoused by ruling revolutionary leaders.
Table 2. Basic Human Development Indicators



Table 3 summarizes the progression of political coalitions and market reforms in the three post-revolutionary states I compare in this paper. As the table illustrates, two conditions are needed for postrevolutionary states among developing nations to alter their patterns of development policies and embrace market liberalization. The first is that the autocratic revolutionary leader and his closest associates must have cleared the way for a new generation of leaders to initiate pragmatic policies that would reverse the dismal economic performance of these command economies. The second socio-political condition is that a new generation of reformists needs to coalesce together in support of reforms.

These two factors also explain the incremental path to reforms in both China and Vietnam and the lack of similar policy changes in Cuba. In Cuba, the current leader was not only appointed by the former revolutionary leader, and is obviously close to him, but Raúl Castro also chose to associate with old hard liners closely identified with dogmatic policies during the early years of the revolution. The redefinition of legal and regulatory frameworks and the role and function of the government in China seems further ahead than in Vietnam15 because the hard liners left behind by Ho Chi Minh after his death, some seven years before Mao, retained some degree of power and control until around 2000 when President Le Duc Anh and former premier Vo Van Kiet advised the party’s Central Committee that the old guard of the party must step down. This led the way for the Central Committee to name reformed minded National Assembly Chairman Nong Duc Manh as the new party leader in December 1997 to replace the more conservative general Le Khan Phieu.16
Table 3. Ruling Coalitions and Political Reforms


AUTHORITARIAN INTRANSIGENCE VS. REFORM MINDED LEADERS

Thus far, I have argued that the social distance between the new generation of leaders and the experience of the revolutionary insurgency seems to explain, at least partially, the predisposition for reforms among leaders in China and Vietnam as opposed to Cuba. In this final section of the paper, I present five plausible reasons in support of this assertion.

First, evidence gathered from case studies reveals a striking conclusion. Revolutionary leaders cannot resist the impulse to publicly carve a personal affinity between their role as leaders and the revolutionary process. The social origins of these aberrations are very complex. On the one hand, the mysticism surrounding the identity of these leaders as saviors who rescued the nation from the excesses of previous regimes is often a necessary condition to rally support to consolidate the revolutionary process. Revolutions are highly contested political processes and it is often the case that the charismatic authority of revolutionary leaders serves as a rallying point to mobilize popular support for radical measures.

Since many of these leaders have a lot of personal capital invested in the revolutionary process and tensions between political factions in the revolutionary coalition are likely to erupt over time, revolutionary leaders develop a sense of indispensability and personal affinity with the goals of the revolutionary process which lead them to believe that they are the personal reincarnation of the nation and the polity. Subordinates who are either expected to demonstrate allegiance or are coerced to adulate the personality of these leaders reinforce this personal stake. In these autocratic situations, more often than not, it is the case that attempts to implement reforms by anyone other than the leader’s inner circle or the leaders themselves, is perceived as a threat to the leader. The revolution, the nation, and the leader become in the eyes of the beholder one and the same. The omnipotent view of authority is not new—in fact it has been well discussed by observers of several European upheavals since the French Revolution. Bonald’s theory of authority, for instance, draws attention to how socializing effects on political authority led leaders to exclude intermediate association after the French Revolution.17

Second, one of the most frequent communication tactics crafted by revolutionary leaders to mobilize and control is to frame policy along confrontational views—“us against them.” This perspective has multiple functions to consolidate autocratic authority. It reduces the complex reality of political alternatives to an unambiguous choice between supporters and detractors, imposing limited political options on the population and cutting down alternative oppositional discourses. In addition, since the common enemy is usually depicted as an outsider, the implicit connotation is that only the actions of the revolution are legitimate. 18 Furthermore, revolutionary leaders veil their confrontational view in nationalistic rhetoric and tactics. This is one of the reasons why Mao, Minh and Castro toyed around with self-reliance development strategies while they held power.

Third, the language supporting political activities, including policy discourses, is full of militaristic overtones and insinuations in revolutionary regimes. This strategy of articulation has the effect of reminding citizens of a state of belligerence where the revolution is almost always victimized. In addition, it attempts to forge an organic collective identity where citizens and leaders are united for the public good and against a common enemy. Various illustrations of this rhetorical strategy can be seen in Ho Chi Minh’s declaration of Vietnam’s right to independence in 1945, in many of Castro’s revolutionary proclamations, or in Mao’s Great Leap Forward. Authority is an essential capital to execute political discretion in the policy realm. As Carl J. Friedrich (1972:74) argued persuasively some time ago, “discretion without authority will appear arbitrary and generate resistance; this is likely to be destructive of organizations and create chaos….”

Fourth, notwithstanding the effects of political rhetoric, another basis for the autocracy of revolutionary leaders is the idiosyncrasies of their own operational code. Social psychologists note that the code comprises the vision, values and norms that sustain political action (George 1969). In the case of revolutionary leaders like Mao and Castro, they view the modernization of the nation as a constant struggle to perfect socialism. They assume that the revolution can manage to modernize society and has the capacity to perform this function more just and effectively than any other capitalist development path. For this reason, Castro justifies his recurrent “rectification campaigns” in the name of combating corruption and other ills he perceives embedded in liberal reforms and follows a Rosseauian reasoning favoring the purity of the revolution against the threat of extraneous forces. Mao also justified his cultural revolution in much of the same terms. The findings from research conducted by Erin Ennis (2002), empirically supports Ortega y Gasset’s assertion that the operational code of authoritarian leaders moderates as the social distance between the cliques of revolutionaries and new generations of authoritarian leaders who succeed them widen; hence, the tendency to attempt to foster modernity with liberal market reforms by current Chinese and Vietnamese leaders but less so by Cubans.

Finally, the process of institutionalization of revolutionary regimes in developing societies tends to devise powerless political institutions that mainly present a facade of pluralistic democracy. Meaningless institutional arrangements leave autocratic leaders unchallenged. These leaders arbitrarily retain control over high-level political appointments and have a tendency to conceal real political power among trusted old cadres resulting in masking real political leverage in the informal networks of friendships they cultivate, not from the public figures they appoint. Since these associates have no real incentives for change, they often discourage or block any attempts to implement sustainable reforms that depart from their own intrinsic interests.19
CONCLUSION

If the findings derived from my observations of the Cuba, China, and Vietnam post revolutionary developments are correct, the best hope for political and market reforms after revolutions among developing nations will come after a leadership change precipitates the demise of the revolutionary leadership. When a new generation of leaders who did not experience the tragic contention leading to revolutions comes into the political scene, new opportunities for reforms arise. This is the case because the anti-extremist generation has less vested in the personal experiences and tolling social meanings associated with any struggle for change. With social distance comes a more rational consideration for political and economic choices and alternatives.

This conclusion has profound implications for the policy-making community. Policy makers should consider inducing reforms from revolutionary leaders through complex negotiations even if these relations yield minor but significant outcomes over time. The negotiations may not work immediately, but they will build confidence and engage reluctant, highly ideological leaders in some form of reciprocity. Frank negotiations also have positive demonstration effects for future up and coming leaders. Pressures, containment, and embargos have not worked with revolutionary leaders in Hanoi, Beijing, or Havana. On the contrary, they dared revolutionaries to continue to hide their own intransigence behind confrontational perceptions of reality. In sum, the most effective strategy in these situations seems to be serenity and fortitude.
REFERENCES


FOOTNOTES

1. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 103rd Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, August 1–4, 2008, Boston; The Research Circle Colloquium, sponsored by the Department of Sociology, at William Paterson University of New Jersey; and the “Cuba: In Transition? Pathways to Renewal, Long-Term Development and Global Reintegration Conference,” sponsored by The Bildner Center for Western Hemisphere Studies, the Graduate Center, City University of New York, March 30–31, 2006. I would like to acknowledge the comments and suggestions from Maboud Ansari, Gabe Wang, Jorge Sanguinetty, and, especially, Erin Ennis, a former graduate student who researched many of these issues under my supervision, none of whom bear any responsibility for my arguments.
2. For a critical discussion on the idea of democratic peace, see the exchange between Sebastian Rosato, Michael W. Doyle, Michael Kinsella, Branislav L Slantchev, Anna Alexandrova, and Erik Gartzke (2005).
3. In March 2006, the Cuban daily Granma reported in its online edition that the Department of Economics at the University of Uruguay was hosting a symposium on economic reforms and development in Cuba and Vietnam. The conference was attended by Alfonso Casanova, Vice Minister of Economic and Planning, and Rogelio Martínez, Vice Minister of Finance, on the Cuban side and by Nguyen Ngoc Dien, the Vietnamese Ambassador to Argentina, Le Anh Son, Vice President of the Development Strategy Institute in Hanoi, and Thia Dian Tun Director General of the Department of Commerce and Services in the Ministry of Planning and Investment. The high level delegations on both sides attending this meeting may indicate that there is some interest in Cuba to at least study the Vietnamese model of reforms. See Granma, March 20, 2006.
4. For a classic exposition of this argument see Lerner (1958).
5. In the original version of this paper, I called unstructured policy changes “cosmetic reforms.” I thank Jorge Sanguinetty for pointing out to me the advantages for using the term adjustment.
6. For the significance of dense solidarity in social action, see Dixon, Roscigno and Hodson (2004).
7. “In Iran, a split developing over country hard-line stance,” International Herald Tribune, on-line edition, March 15, 2006.
8. “Iran moves into Lebanon vacuum,” International Herald Tribune, on-line edition, March 13, 2006.
9. Mydans (2006), http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/26/news/vietnam.php
10. Ibid.
11. For a recent overview of electoral politics in Cuba, see William M. LeoGrande (2002).
12. Just few days ago, four youngsters were arrested and later intimidated by security forces simply because they were thought to be responsible for displaying an anti-governmental sign in a public park in the city of Bayamo. Cubanet, online, May 15, 2006.
13. In another example of the degree of freedom between these countries, The New York Times reported about China’s order to remove some avant-garde paintings from galleries during the Dashanzi International Art Festival, but stated that collectors and gallery owners expressed surprise about the government actions and said they did not expect a broader crackdown. See, “China Orders Galleries to Remove Art,” The New York Times, May 13, 2006, B16.
14. In the case of Cuba, the 2006 Human Rights Watch country report summarizes the current state for freedom in the island in the following terms: “Cuba remains a Latin American anomaly: an undemocratic government that represses nearly all forms of political dissent. President Fidel Castro, now in his forty-seventh year in power, shows no willingness to consider even minor reforms. Instead, his government continues to enforce political conformity using criminal prosecutions, long- and short-term detentions, mob harassment, police warnings, surveillance, house arrests, travel restrictions, and politically motivated dismissals from employment. The end result is that Cubans are systematically denied basic rights to free expression, association, assembly, privacy, movement, and due process of law.” Human Rights Watch, online edition, 2004.
15. Keen observer Dollar (2002:15) has concluded “in terms of regulatory framework for business and government effectiveness in providing services, Vietnam also lags significantly behind China and India.” He concludes, moreover, that the tentative pace of reforms in Vietnam accounts for the persistence of poverty despite the implementation of liberal reforms.
16. Asian Political News, April 23, 2001.
17. Nisbet (1978): 91–97.
18. For a discussion on how outsiders are framed to legitimize the status quo, see Becker (1963).
19. Diamond, Hartlyn and Linz (1999:33) state: “the style of political leaders is quite crucial. A flexible, accommodative, consensual leadership style is more successful in developing and maintaining democracy than a militant, uncompromising, confrontational one.”

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The Times' Lazy Vietnam-Cuba Comparison - nathan’s Substack

The Times' Lazy Vietnam-Cuba Comparison - nathan’s Substack

The Times' Lazy Vietnam-Cuba Comparison
The NYT minimizes U.S. genocidal policy in Cuba in an article urging Cuba to replicate Vietnamese-style reforms

nathan
Aug 30, 2025





Last Wednesday, the New York Times published an article looking at a Vietnamese donation campaign for aid to Cuba. The campaign, started by the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Red Cross Society, swept across social media, attracting more than $13 million in donations during its first week. Vietnam has shared a long friendship with Cuba, with Cuban barbudos long admiring the Viet Cong.

Cuba was the first country to recognize the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and the only country to ever appoint an ambassador to South Vietnam’s liberated zones. Later on, Cuban pilots are thought to have fought alongside the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam War. In 1973, amid active U.S. bombing campaigns, Castro became the only world leader to visit a Viet Cong stronghold when he went to Quang Tri and declared, “For Vietnam, we are even willing to give our own blood.” The friendship between Cuba and Vietnam has been truly special and mutual, with Vietnam also assisting Cuba in developing its rice production and achieving greater food security. What could have been a story examining this mutual solidarity instead was an attempt to condemn Cuban socialism without offering much-needed context.

Movie poster for Cuban film 79 Primaveras (“79 Springs”), which honors Ho Chi Minh by examining his influence on worldwide social movements.

The story uses the campaign to explore the differing economic approaches of Cuba and Vietnam since the Cold War’s final act. Vietnam opted to implement economic liberalization reforms (known as the Đổi Mới process) while Cuba mostly kept to its Communist model. Not entirely, though.

Cuba has implemented an array of market reforms since the fall of the USSR. During the Raúl Castro era, the state began leasing unused agricultural land to private farmers and later enacted comprehensive market-oriented agricultural reforms in 2010. The reforms drew comparisons to Vietnam, but results were limited: Critics argue the reforms failed because of the refusal of the Cuban Communist Party to relinquish political control. Vietnam, however, continues to be a one-party state ruled by the Vietnamese Communist Party.

So, why can’t Cuba replicate the Đổi Mới process? The U.S. would never let it. Cuban exile communities are not interested in a Cuban economic resurgence unless the CPC is ousted. Outdated, hardline policy on Cuba by influential actors and organizations in U.S. politics would not be satisfied with anything short of regime change. This regime change would likely have the same destabilizing effects U.S. regime change has had in its century of regional hegemony: an increase in the wealth gap, a more unequal exchange between it and more industrialized economies, the destruction of whatever domestic manufacturing sector remains, and the overall withering away of state functions. The blueprint has been applied relentlessly in countries with nationalized industries, whether it be the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia or Western intervention against the Ba’athist regimes in Syria and Iraq, among many more. In each of the aforementioned cases, the U.S. began with economic warfare to destroy a country, followed by either one-sided, exaggerated, or outright fabricated accusations of human rights violations. Finally, a brutal campaign of destabilization ensues, opening up markets for Western firms and obliterating any industrial capacity the country had. Free markets, baby.

In order to complete the reapproachment process with the U.S., Vietnam had to pay back loans left unpaid by South Vietnam totaling $145 million. No doubt, even after more comprehensive market liberalization reforms, Cuba would be forced into a “debt” repayment agreement that would make Vietnam’s look like chump change. Additionally, because of its proximity to the U.S. and weakened state structures resulting from the blockade, opening Cuban markets to Trans National Corporations would turn

Cuba into injured roadkill, soon to be pounced on by a swarm of bald eagles. No beach would go unprivatized, no bank denationalized, and any remaining safety net ripped until it catches not even the most needy.

The New York Times can save its criticism of the Cuban regime’s stubbornness if it refuses to meaningfully address the more than 60-year assault on Cuba perpetrated by the U.S. Of course, the blockade should not be taken as the only factor holding Cuba back. Corruption is real, and remedial efforts to address worsening conditions have often prioritized tourist-dense areas over more peripheral neighborhoods/regions. A critique of the CPC's dialogue with the Cuban public has been dismal. Nevertheless, no American should speak of Cuba’s need to embrace the free market while the U.S. continues its attempt to cut Cuba off from the world.


Cuba and China-Vietnam, two socialist economic models: Which is more efficient? - Latinoamérica 21

Cuba and China-Vietnam, two socialist economic models: Which is more efficient? - Latinoamérica 21
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20 March, 2024

Ideologies

Cuba and China-Vietnam, two socialist economic models: Which is more efficient?


Cuba is experiencing the worst economic and social crisis since the revolution. Why the success of the Sino-Vietnamese model that keeps the Communist Party in power has not been followed by Cuba’s government?
Carmelo Mesa-Lago




After the collapse of communism in the USSR and Eastern European countries, five socialist economic systems have remained in the world under the control of the Communist Party: China, North Korea, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. Excluding North Korea and Laos, for the lack of statistical information, we are left with three countries with two different economic-social models. One is the central plan of Cuba and of large state-owned enterprises dominating the market and private property, with timid and incomplete market-oriented reforms that have been incapable of generating economic growth. Quite the contrary, North Korea follows this model but without reforms. The other model is the Sino-Vietnamese “market socialism” where small, medium, and some large private businesses and the market predominate under a decentralized plan (a sort of road map for development), while the state regulates the economy and controls the larger companies (Laos also follows this model). In this framework, the share of the state sector in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has decreased significantly in China and Vietnam: 27% and 31% in 2019 respectively, but in Cuba, it remains at 91%.

In order to make an adequate comparison between the two models (and the three countries), it is first necessary to attack the problem of diverse characteristics that could impede such a comparison. For example, China’s territory is 86 times the size of Cuba’s and its population is 123 times that of Cuba. In addition, the U.S. embargo against Cuba has been longer than that suffered by Vietnam. However, when one examines numerous indicators, including demographics, Human Development Index, etc., one finds that most of them are similar in the three countries.

Moreover, small countries, both in area and population, such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Estonia have succeeded in achieving very high levels of human development despite having a land area less than half that of Cuba. Finally, under the U.S. embargo, Vietnam began the reform process. It can be concluded that divergent indicators are not an obstacle and, therefore, the models and countries are comparable.

The main economic policies

The five main economic policies of the two models are ownership of the means of production and the role of the market versus the plan; land reform; the industrialization process; employment and unemployment; and monetary and exchange unification. A detailed comparative analysis shows that Sino-Vietnamese policies have been more effective than Cuban policies.

For example, the land reform in China and Vietnam gave freedom to agricultural producers to produce whatever they wanted, sell to whomever they wanted, and set prices by supply and demand. This eliminated frequent famines in China and made China virtually self-sufficient in food. Vietnam turned from a food importer to a food exporter, and today is the world’s second-largest rice exporter.

In Cuba, on the contrary, the state influences which crops to produce, forces agricultural producers to sell part of the harvest (up to 70%), and fixes the selling price below the market price. As a result, Cuban agricultural production has plummeted, and the island has to import US$2 billion worth of food and suffers acute shortages.

Another similar effect has been the monetary and exchange unification that in China-Vietnam was done in a relatively short period and soon reduced inflation and expanded exports. While in Cuba unification has caused inflation between 500% and 1,000% — with an increasing trend — and a drop in exports of 59% between 2013-2022. When ranking the three countries concerning the five policies, Cuba always lags behind China and Vietnam.

A measurement of the economic-social performance of the two models and the three countries using the 20 most relevant and comparable indicators (10 economic and 10 social), shows that the China-Vietnam model has had a remarkable positive effect while Cuba’s has led to economic crises and social deterioration. Between 2009 and 2020, GDP grew at an annual average of 7.4% in China, 5.9% in Vietnam, and 0.9% in Cuba.

The effect of the two economic models on social protection (contributory pensions, health care, and social assistance) in the three countries, based on the principles of social security elaborated by the International Labor Organization, results in a ranking equal to the previous ones: China, Vietnam, and Cuba.

The development index

The results analyzed are even more relevant when it is considered that, at the time of their revolutions, the two Asian countries had a much lower level of economic-social development than Cuba. This gap required China and Vietnam to make a greater effort to match and surpass Cuban achievements. Cuba developed social security much earlier, faster, and more expansively than it could financially sustain, which has made it unsustainable in the long term, especially given its poor economic performance.

In contrast, China’s and Vietnam’s social security developed gradually and is backed by successful economic performance, making it more financially sustainable. Finally, Cuba’s accelerated aging has adversely affected the financial sustainability of the social security system, while it is beginning to impact China, but not yet Vietnam.

Why the success of the Sino-Vietnamese model that keeps the Communist Party in power has not been followed by Cuba’s government? It is impossible to give a definitive answer, but Cuba’s history under the revolution suggests two explanations. The first would be that the Cuban leadership is reluctant to delegate economic power to the non-state sector because it considers that this implies ceding political power (although in China and Vietnam the Communist Party remains in power). Second, Cuban leaders are also afraid of implementing Sino-Vietnamese style structural reforms because they would generate a dynamic that would make it unstoppable, like the simile of the snowball rolling down the mountain.

Cuba is suffering the worst economic and social crisis since the revolution. In the last two years, it has been moving toward the Russian model of oligarchic capitalism. However, Russia’s GDP per capita is much lower than that of most Central and Eastern European countries that were under Soviet rule. The solution for Cuba would be to take the path of the Sino-Vietnamese model adjusting it to its own characteristics. I would prefer the model of the Scandinavian countries with excellent socio-economic success and democracy, but which would be politically more difficult to implement.

This article is based on the author’s forthcoming book “Comparison of Economic Models and Social Security Performance in Cuba and China-Vietnam” (University of Pittsburgh Press, in press 2024). The statistics used are the official statistics of the three countries up to 2022.

*Translated by Janaína Ruviaro da Silva from the original in Spanish.




Carmelo Mesa-Lago
Otros artículos del autor


Professor Emeritus of Economics and Latin American Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. Former President of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA). He has been an advisor to various areas and UN agencies in all Latin American countries.

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