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Military–industrial complex - Wikipedia

Military–industrial complex - Wikipedia

Military–industrial complex

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In his farewell address, President Dwight D. Eisenhower famously warned U.S. citizens about the "military–industrial complex".

The expression military–industrial complex (MIC) describes the relationship between a nation's military and the defense industry that supplies it, seen together as a vested interest which influences public policy.[1][2][3][4] A driving factor behind the relationship between the military and the defense-minded corporations is that both sides benefit—one side from obtaining war weapons, and the other from being paid to supply them.[5] The term is most often used in reference to the system behind the military of the United States, where the relationship is most prevalent due to close links among defense contractors, the Pentagon, and politicians.[6][7] The expression gained popularity after a warning of the relationship's detrimental effects, in the farewell address of President Dwight D. Eisenhower on 17 January 1961.[8][9]

In the context of the United States, the appellation is sometimes extended to military–industrial–congressional complex (MICC), adding the U.S. Congress to form a three-sided relationship termed an "iron triangle".[10] Its three legs include political contributions, political approval for military spending, lobbying to support bureaucracies, and oversight of the industry; or more broadly, the entire network of contracts and flows of money and resources among individuals as well as corporations and institutions of the defense contractors, private military contractors, the Pentagon, Congress, and the executive branch.[11]

Etymology[edit]

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Eisenhower's farewell address, January 17, 1961. The term military–industrial complex is used at 8:16. Length: 15:30.

President of the United States (and five-star general during World War II) Dwight D. Eisenhower used the term in his Farewell Address to the Nation on January 17, 1961:[12]

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction...

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society. In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists, and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals so that security and liberty may prosper together. [emphasis added]

The phrase was thought to have been "war-based" industrial complex before becoming "military" in later drafts of Eisenhower's speech, a claim passed on only by oral history.[13] Geoffrey Perret, in his biography of Eisenhower, claims that, in one draft of the speech, the phrase was "military–industrial–congressional complex", indicating the essential role that the United States Congress plays in the propagation of the military industry, but the word "congressional" was dropped from the final version to appease the then-currently elected officials.[14] James Ledbetter calls this a "stubborn misconception" not supported by any evidence; likewise a claim by Douglas Brinkley that it was originally "military–industrial–scientific complex".[14][15] Additionally, Henry Giroux claims that it was originally "military–industrial–academic complex".[16] The actual authors of the speech were Eisenhower's speechwriters Ralph E. Williams and Malcolm Moos.[17]

Attempts to conceptualize something similar to a modern "military–industrial complex" existed before Eisenhower's address. Ledbetter finds the precise term used in 1947 in close to its later meaning in an article in Foreign Affairs by Winfield W. Riefler.[14][18] In 1956, sociologist C. Wright Mills had claimed in his book The Power Elite that a class of military, business, and political leaders, driven by mutual interests, were the real leaders of the state, and were effectively beyond democratic control. Friedrich Hayek mentions in his 1944 book The Road to Serfdom the danger of a support of monopolistic organization of industry from World War II political remnants:

Another element which after this war is likely to strengthen the tendencies in this direction will be some of the men who during the war have tasted the powers of coercive control and will find it difficult to reconcile themselves with the humbler roles they will then have to play [in peaceful times].[19]

Vietnam War–era activists, such as Seymour Melman, referred frequently to the concept, and use continued throughout the Cold War: George F. Kennan wrote in his preface to Norman Cousins's 1987 book The Pathology of Power, "Were the Soviet Union to sink tomorrow under the waters of the ocean, the American military–industrial complex would have to remain, substantially unchanged, until some other adversary could be invented. Anything else would be an unacceptable shock to the American economy."[20]

U.S. military presence around the world in 2007. As of 2018, the United States still had many bases and troops stationed globally.

In the late 1990s James Kurth asserted, "By the mid-1980s... the term had largely fallen out of public discussion." He went on to argue that "[w]hatever the power of arguments about the influence of the military–industrial complex on weapons procurement during the Cold War, they are much less relevant to the current era".[21]

Contemporary students and critics of U.S. militarism continue to refer to and employ the term, however. For example, historian Chalmers Johnson uses words from the second, third, and fourth paragraphs quoted above from Eisenhower's address as an epigraph to Chapter Two ("The Roots of American Militarism") of a 2004 volume[22] on this subject. P. W. Singer's book concerning private military companies illustrates contemporary ways in which industry, particularly an information-based one, still interacts with the U.S. federal and the Pentagon.[23]

The expressions permanent war economy and war corporatism are related concepts that have also been used in association with this term.[citation needed] The term is also used to describe comparable collusion in other political entities such as the German Empire (prior to and through the first world war), Britain, France, and (post-Soviet) Russia.[citation needed]

Linguist and anarchist theorist Noam Chomsky has suggested that "military–industrial complex" is a misnomer because (as he considers it) the phenomenon in question "is not specifically military".[24] He asserts, "There is no military–industrial complex: it's just the industrial system operating under one or another pretext (defense was a pretext for a long time)."[25]

Post-Cold War[edit]

United States Defense Spending 2001–2017

At the end of the Cold War, American defense contractors bewailed what they called declining government weapons spending.[26][27] They saw escalation of tensions, such as with Russia over Ukraine, as new opportunities for increased weapons sales, and have pushed the political system, both directly and through industry groups such as the National Defense Industrial Association, to spend more on military hardware. Pentagon contractor-funded American think tanks such as the Lexington Institute and the Atlantic Council have also demanded increased spending in view of the perceived Russian threat.[27][28] Independent Western observers such as William Hartung, director of the Arms & Security Project at the Center for International Policy, noted that "Russian saber-rattling has additional benefits for weapons makers because it has become a standard part of the argument for higher Pentagon spending—even though the Pentagon already has more than enough money to address any actual threat to the United States."[27][29]

Eras[edit]

Some sources divide the history of the military–industrial complex into three distinct eras.[30]

First era[edit]

From 1797 to 1941 the government only relied on civilian industries while the country was actually at war. The government owned their own shipyards and weapons manufacturing facilities which they relied on through World War I. With World War II came a massive shift in the way that the American government armed the military.

With the onset of World War II President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the War Production Board to coordinate civilian industries and shift them into wartime production. Throughout World War II arms production in the United States went from around one percent of the annual GDP to 40 percent of the GDP.[30] Various American companies, such as Boeing and General Motors, maintained and expanded their defense divisions.[30] These companies have gone on to develop various technologies that have improved civilian life as well, such as night-vision goggles and GPS.[30]

Second era[edit]

The second era is identified as beginning with the coining of the term by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. This era continued through the Cold War period, up to the end of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1993 the Pentagon urged defense contractors to consolidate due to the collapse of communism and shrinking defense budget.[30]

Third (current) era[edit]

In the third era, defense contractors either consolidated or shifted their focus to civilian innovation. From 1992 to 1997 there was a total of US$55 billion worth of mergers in the defense industry, with major defense companies purchasing smaller competitors.[30]

A pie chart showing global military expenditures by country for 2018, in US$ billions, according to SIPRI

In the current era, the military–industrial complex is seen as a core part of American policy-making. The American domestic economy is now tied directly to the success of the MIC which has led to concerns of repression as Cold War-era attitudes are still prevalent among the American public.[31]

Shifts in values and the collapse of communism have ushered in a new era for the military–industrial complex. The Department of Defense works in coordination with traditional military–industrial complex aligned companies such as Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. Many former defense contractors have shifted operations to the civilian market and sold off their defense departments.[30]

Benefits[edit]

Benefits of the Military Industrial Complex of the United States include the advancement of the civilian technology market as civilian companies benefit from innovations from the MIC and vice versa.[32]

Military subsidy theory[edit]

According to the military subsidy theory, the Cold War-era mass production of aircraft benefited the civilian aircraft industry. The theory asserts that the technologies developed during the Cold War along with the financial backing of the military led to the dominance of American aviation companies. There is also strong evidence that the United States federal government intentionally paid a higher price for these innovations to serve as a subsidy for civilian aircraft advancement.[33]

Current applications[edit]

Share of arms sales by country. Source is provided by SIPRI.[34]

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, total world spending on military expenses in 2018 was $1822 billion. 36% of this total, roughly $649 billion, was spent by the United States.[35] The privatization of the production and invention of military technology also leads to a complicated relationship with significant research and development of many technologies. In 2011, the United States spent more (in absolute numbers) on its military than the next 13 nations combined.[36]

The military budget of the United States for the 2009 fiscal year was $515.4 billion. Adding emergency discretionary spending and supplemental spending brings the sum to $651.2 billion.[37] This does not include many military-related items that are outside of the Defense Department budget. Overall the U.S. federal government is spending about $1 trillion annually on defense-related purposes.[38]

In a 2012 story, Salon reported, "Despite a decline in global arms sales in 2010 due to recessionary pressures, the United States increased its market share, accounting for a whopping 53 percent of the trade that year. Last year saw the United States on pace to deliver more than $46 billion in foreign arms sales."[39] The defense industry also tends to contribute heavily to incumbent members of Congress.[40]

Similar concepts[edit]

A thesis similar to the military–industrial complex was originally expressed by Daniel Guérin, in his 1936 book Fascism and Big Business, about the fascist government ties to heavy industry. It can be defined as, "an informal and changing coalition of groups with vested psychological, moral, and material interests in the continuous development and maintenance of high levels of weaponry, in preservation of colonial markets and in military-strategic conceptions of internal affairs."[41] An exhibit of the trend was made in Franz Leopold Neumann's book Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism in 1942, a study of how Nazism came into a position of power in a democratic state.

Within decades of its inception, the idea of the military–industrial complex gave rise to other similar Industrial complexes, including the animal–industrial complex, prison–industrial complex, pharmaceutical–industrial complex, entertainment-industrial complex, and medical–industrial complex.[42]: ix–xxv  Virtually all institutions in sectors ranging from agriculture, medicine, entertainment, and media, to education, criminal justice, security, and transportation, began reconceiving and reconstructing in accordance with capitalist, industrial, and bureaucratic models with the aim of realizing profit, growth, and other imperatives. According to Steven Best, all these systems interrelate and reinforce one another.[42]

The concept of the military–industrial complex has been expanded to include the entertainment and creative industries as well. For an example in practice, Matthew Brummer describes Japan's Manga Military and how the Ministry of Defense uses popular culture and the moe that it engenders to shape domestic and international perceptions.[43]

An alternative term to describe the interdependence between the military-industrial complex and the entertainment industry is coined by James Der Derian as "Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment-Network".[44]

See also[edit]

File:Eisenhower's "Military-Industrial Complex" Speech Origins and Significance.webm
From the National Archives
Literature and media

References[edit]

Citations[edit]

  1. ^ "military industrial complex". American Heritage Dictionary. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 2015. Archived from the original on March 6, 2016. Retrieved March 3, 2016.
  2. ^ "definition of military-industrial complex (American English)". OxfordDictionaries.com. Retrieved March 3, 2016.
  3. ^ "Definition of Military–industrial complex". Merriam-Webster. Retrieved March 3, 2016.
  4. ^ Roland, Alex (June 22, 2009). "The Military-Industrial Complex: lobby and trope". In Bacevich, Andrew J. (ed.). The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II. Columbia University Press. pp. 335–70. ISBN 9780231131599.
  5. ^ "What is the Military-Industrial Complex?". Retrieved February 5, 2017.
  6. ^ "Ike's Warning Of Military Expansion, 50 Years Later". NPR. January 17, 2011. Retrieved March 27, 2019.
  7. ^ "SIPRI Year Book 2008; Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security" Oxford University Press 2008 ISBN 9780199548958
  8. ^ "The Military–Industrial Complex; The Farewell Address of Presidente Eisenhower" Basements publications 2006 ISBN 0976642395
  9. ^ Held, David; McGrew, Anthony G.; Goldblatt, David (1999). "The expanding reach of organized violence". In Perraton, Jonathan (ed.). Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Stanford University Press. p. 108. ISBN 9780804736275.
  10. ^ Higgs, Robert (May 25, 2006). Depression, War, and Cold War : Studies in Political Economy: Studies in Political Economy. Oxford University Press, USA. pp. ix, 138. ISBN 9780195346084. Retrieved March 3, 2016.
  11. ^ "Long-term Historical Reflection on the Rise of Military-Industrial, Managerial Statism or "Military-Industrial Complexes"". Kimball Files. University of Oregon. Retrieved June 21, 2014.
  12. ^ "President Dwight Eisenhower Farewell Address". C-Span. January 17, 1961.
  13. ^ John Milburn (December 10, 2010). "Papers shed light on Eisenhower's farewell address". Associated Press. Retrieved January 28, 2011.
  14. ^ Jump up to:a b c Ledbetter, James (January 25, 2011). "Guest Post: 50 Years of the "Military–Industrial Complex"". Schott's Vocab. New York Times. Retrieved January 25, 2011.
  15. ^ Brinkley, Douglas (September 2001). "Eisenhower; His farewell speech as President inaugurated the spirit of the 1960s". American Heritage. 52 (6). Archived from the original on March 23, 2006. Retrieved January 25, 2011.
  16. ^ Giroux, Henry (June 2007). "The University in Chains: Confronting the Military–Industrial–Academic Complex". Paradigm Publishers. Archived from the original on August 20, 2007. Retrieved May 16, 2011.
  17. ^ Griffin, Charles "New Light on Eisenhower's Farewell Address," in Presidential Studies Quarterly 22 (Summer 1992): 469–79
  18. ^ Riefler, Winfield W. (October 1947). "Our Economic Contribution to Victory". Foreign Affairs. 26 (1): 90–103. doi:10.2307/20030091. JSTOR 20030091.
  19. ^ Hayek, F. A., (1976) "The Road to Serfdom", London: Routledge, p. 146, note 1
  20. ^ Kennan, George Frost (1997). At a Century's Ending: Reflections 1982–1995. W.W. Norton and Company. p. 118. ISBN 9780393316094.
  21. ^ Kurth 1999.
  22. ^ Johnson, Chalmers (2004). The sorrows of empire: Militarism, secrecy, and the end of the republic. New York: Metropolitan Books. p. 39.
  23. ^ Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003.
  24. ^ "War Crimes and Imperial Fantasies, Noam Chomsky interviewed by David Barsamian". chomsky.info.
  25. ^ In On Power, Dissent, and Racism: a Series of Discussions with Noam Chomsky, Baraka Productions, 2003.
  26. ^ Thompson Reuters Streetevents, 8 December 2015, "L-3 Communications Holding Inc. Investors Conference," p. 3, http://www.l-3com.com/sites/default/files/pdf/investor-pdf/2015_investor_conference_transcript.pdf
  27. ^ Jump up to:a b c The Intercept, 19 August 2016, "U.S. Defense Contractors Tell Investors Russian thread is Great for Business," https://theintercept.com/2016/08/19/nato-weapons-industry/
  28. ^ U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 11 May 2016, Testimony of M. Thomas Davis, Senior Fellow, National Defense Industrial Association, "U.S. Industry Perspective on the Department of Defense's Policies, Roles and Responsibilities for Foreign Military Sales," http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS06/20160511/104900/HHRG-114-AS06-Bio-DavisT-20160511.pdf
  29. ^ Shindler, Michael (June 22, 2018). "The Military Industrial Complex's Assault on Liberty". The American Conservative. Retrieved June 26, 2018.
  30. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e f g Lynn III, William (2017). "The End of the Military-Industrial Complex". Foreign Affairs. 93: 104–110 – via EBSCOhost.
  31. ^ Jr., Charles C. Moskos (April 1974). "The Concept of the Military-Industrial Complex: Radical Critique or Liberal Bogey?". Social Problems. 21 (4): 498–512. doi:10.1525/sp.1974.21.4.03a00040. ISSN 0037-7791.
  32. ^ Pilisuk, Marc; Hayden, Thomas (July 1965). "Is There a Military Industrial Complex Which Prevents Peace?: Consensus and Countervailing Power in Pluralistic Systems". Journal of Social Issues. 21 (3): 67–117. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1965.tb00506.x. ISSN 0022-4537.
  33. ^ Gholz, E. (January 6, 2011). "Eisenhower versus the Spin-off Story: Did the Rise of the Military-Industrial Complex Hurt or Help America's Commercial Aircraft Industry?". Enterprise and Society. 12 (1): 46–95. doi:10.1093/es/khq134. ISSN 1467-2227.
  34. ^ "Arms production | SIPRI".
  35. ^ Trends in World Military Expenditure Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
  36. ^ Plumer, Brad (January 7, 2013), "America's staggering defense budget, in charts", The Washington Post
  37. ^ Gpoaccess.gov Archived 2012-01-07 at the Wayback Machine
  38. ^ Robert Higgs. "The Trillion-Dollar Defense Budget Is Already Here". Retrieved March 15, 2007.
  39. ^ "America, arms-dealer to the world," Salon, January 24, 2012.
  40. ^ Jen DiMascio. "Defense goes all-in for incumbents - Jen DiMascio". POLITICO.
  41. ^ Pursell, C. (1972). The military–industrial complex. Harper & Row Publishers, New York, New York.
  42. ^ Jump up to:a b Steven Best; Richard Kahn; Anthony J. Nocella II; Peter McLaren, eds. (2011). "Introduction". The Global Industrial Complex: Systems of Domination. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. xvi. ISBN 978-0739136980.
  43. ^ Diplomat, Matthew Brummer, The. "Japan: The Manga Military". The Diplomat. Retrieved January 22, 2016.
  44. ^ "Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment-Network". Routledge & CRC Press. Retrieved July 12, 2021.

Sources[edit]

  • DeGroot, Gerard J. Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War, 144, London & New York: Longman, 1996, ISBN 0-582-06138-5
  • Eisenhower, Dwight D. Public Papers of the Presidents, 1035–40. 1960.
  • Eisenhower, Dwight D. "Farewell Address." In The Annals of America. Vol. 18. 1961–1968: The Burdens of World Power, 1–5. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1968.
  • Eisenhower, Dwight D. President Eisenhower's Farewell Address, Wikisource.
  • Hartung, William D. "Eisenhower's Warning: The Military–Industrial Complex Forty Years Later." World Policy Journal 18, no. 1 (Spring 2001).
  • Johnson, Chalmers The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004
  • Kurth, James. "Military–Industrial Complex." In The Oxford Companion to American Military History, ed. John Whiteclay Chambers II, 440–42. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
  • Nelson, Lars-Erik. "Military–Industrial Man." In New York Review of Books 47, no. 20 (Dec. 21, 2000): 6.
  • Nieburg, H. L. In the Name of Science, Quadrangle Books, 1970
  • Mills, C. Wright."Power Elite", New York, 1956

Further reading[edit]

  • Adams, Gordon, The Iron Triangle: The Politics of Defense Contracting, 1981.
  • Andreas, Joel, Addicted to War: Why the U.S. Can't Kick Militarism, ISBN 1-904859-01-1.
  • Cochran, Thomas B., William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, Milton M. Hoenig, U.S. Nuclear Warhead Production Harper and Row, 1987, ISBN 0-88730-125-8
  • Cockburn, Andrew, "The Military-Industrial Virus: How bloated budgets gut our defenses", Harper's Magazine, vol. 338, no. 2029 (June 2019), pp. 61–67. "The military-industrial complex could be said to be concerned, exclusively, with self-preservation and expansion.... The defense budget is not propelled by foreign wars. The wars are a consequence of the quest for bigger budgets."
  • Cockburn, Andrew, "Why America Goes to War: Money drives the US military machine", The Nation, vol. 313, no. 6 (20-27 September 2021), pp. 24–27.
  • Colby, Gerard, DuPont Dynasty, New York, Lyle Stuart, 1984.
  • Friedman, George and Meredith, The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the 21st Century, Crown, 1996, ISBN 0-517-70403-X
  • Hossein-Zadeh, Ismael, The Political Economy of US Militarism. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006.
  • Keller, William W., Arm in Arm: The Political Economy of the Global Arms Trade. New York: Basic Books, 1995.
  • Kelly, Brian, Adventures in Porkland: How Washington Wastes Your Money and Why They Won't Stop, Villard, 1992, ISBN 0-679-40656-5
  • Lassman, Thomas C. "Putting the Military Back into the History of the Military-Industrial Complex: The Management of Technological Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1945–1960," Isis (2015) 106#1 pp. 94–120 in JSTOR
  • Mathews, Jessica T., "America's Indefensible Defense Budget", The New York Review of Books, vol. LXVI, no. 12 (18 July 2019), pp. 23–24. "For many years, the United States has increasingly relied on military strength to achieve its foreign policy aims.... We are [...] allocating too large a portion of the federal budget to defense as compared to domestic needs [...] accumulating too much federal debt, and yet not acquiring a forward-looking, twenty-first-century military built around new cyber and space technologies." (p. 24.)
  • McCartney, James and Molly Sinclair McCartney, America's War Machine: Vested Interests, Endless Conflicts. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2015.
  • McDougall, Walter A., ...The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, Basic Books, 1985, (Pulitzer Prize for History) ISBN 0-8018-5748-1
  • Melman, Seymour, Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War, McGraw Hill, 1970
  • Melman, Seymour, (ed.) The War Economy of the United States: Readings in Military Industry and Economy, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971.
  • Mills, C Wright, The Power Elite. New York, 1956.
  • Mollenhoff, Clark R., The Pentagon: Politics, Profits and Plunder. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1967
  • Patterson, Walter C., The Plutonium Business and the Spread of the Bomb, Sierra Club, 1984, ISBN 0-87156-837-3
  • Pasztor, Andy, When the Pentagon Was for Sale: Inside America's Biggest Defense Scandal, Scribner, 1995, ISBN 0-684-19516-X
  • Pierre, Andrew J., The Global Politics of Arms Sales. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982.
  • Sampson, Anthony, The Arms Bazaar: From Lebanon to Lockheed. New York: Bantam Books, 1977.
  • St. Clair, Jeffery, Grand Theft Pentagon: Tales of Corruption and Profiteering in the War on Terror. Common Courage Press, July 1, 2005.
  • Sweetman, Bill, "In search of the Pentagon's billion dollar hidden budgets – how the US keeps its R&D spending under wraps", from Jane's International Defence Review, online
  • Thorpe, Rebecca U. The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of Military Spending. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014.
  • Watry, David M., Diplomacy at the Brink, Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden in the Cold War, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2014.
  • Weinberger, Sharon, Imaginary Weapons, New York, Nation Books, 2006.

External links[edit]

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마르크스는 자본론에서 “산업에서 최고 사령이 자본의 속성인 것은 봉건시대에 전쟁과 재판에서의 최고 사령이 토지소유의 속성인 것과 마찬가지”(자본론 1권 제11장 협업장 참고)라며, 기업가 집단을 산업의 사령관이라 칭했다. 물론 마르크스는 이 사령관들의 행태가 지극히 전제적專制的이라 맹렬하게 비판하기는 했으나, 그들의 사령관으로서 노동자를 지휘하고 산업을 조직하는 능력은 매우 높게 평가하였다. 그러나 한국 자본주의의 전개 과정 속에서 이 사령관들의 행태는 상당히 실망스러운 것이었다. 그들은 산업을 조직하는 사령관이 아니라 국가라는 사령관의 명령을 받는 졸병에 지나지 않았으며, 박정희의 죽음 이후 국가의 감시가 느슨해지자 그 밑에서 온갖 욕구를 충족시키기 바빴던 조잡한 무리들이었다.

 한국의 경제개발기간동안의 투자율 추계를 보면 60~70년대에는 20, 30%라는 놀라운 수치를 보여주는 수준이었다. 당연하게도 이런 높은 투자율은 국내의 저축률로는 감당할 수 없는 것이었기에 수많은 해외자금들이 유입될 수밖에 없었다. 박정희기에 있었던 수많은 외채위기는 바로 이런 상황을 전제로 한 것이었는데, 1980년대 후반에 이르러서는 저축률이 투자율을 앞지르면서 해외로의 자본수출이 이뤄지게 된다. 자본의 유입에서 수출로의 전환이 이뤄지는 기간동안의 금융시장의 성장이란 놀라운 것이었다. 예컨대 금융관련비율(=금융자산스톡/명목국민소득)은 1960년대 1 전후에서 1993년에 4.9로 엄청나게 증가하여 금융자산이 꽤나 많이 축적되었고, 80년대 경제정책의 기조가 안정화로 바뀌면서 물가 안정에 힘쓴 결과 물가가 안정되어감에 따라 실질금리가 상승해 저축률은 1980년 23%에서 1987년 38%로 상승할 수 있었다. 그에 따라 금융시장 또한 크게 발전하였다.

 금융시장이 발달한 결과 앞서 말했던 
기업들의 높은 투자에서 정부의 자금공급이 차지하는 비중은 1970년 36.8%에서 1993년 4.4%로 크게 감소한데 반해 
은행 등의 금융시장이 차지하는 비중은 동기간에 30.4%에서 77.2%로 엄청나게 증가하였다. 
외국자본의 비중도 동기간동안 21.6%에서 5.0%로 크게 감소하였다. 

은행자본의 상당 부분이 정부의 정책적 수단이었다는 점을 고려한다면 70년대의 금융시장이란 사실상 제대로 된 기능을 하지 않았다는 걸 알 수 있다. 이것이 90년대에 이르면 나름대로 기능하게 되지만 과대평가할 필요는 없다.

 자본시장이라 할 수 있는 증권시장을 통한 자금공급은 1970년 11.2%에서 1993년 13.4%로 사실상 거의 불변에 가까웠으며, 대부분 국공채의 거래나 주관하는 수준이었다. 은행 등을 포함한 금융시장의 전체적인 기조는 역시나 국가의 정책금융이었으며, 총여신에서 정책금융이 차지하는 비중은 논자에 따라 다르기는 하나 중화학공업화와 함께 급증하기 시작하여 1975~1985년의 10년동안 50.8%에서 70.5%로 한다. 이런 상황에서 1987년 이후부터는 대기업에 대한 정책금융을 줄이는 기조가 나타나 중소기업을 주요 대상으로 삼는 방향으로 옮겨가기는 하지만 여전히 그 비중은 1990년 당시 67%로 높았다. 기업가들은 국가가 정책적으로 분배해주는 금융지대를 안전한 지지대로 여기고 천지분간 못하는 망아지처럼 날뛰었다. 금융시장은 1987년 이후에 개방되어 대외채무의 급증(1992년 450억에서 1997년 1197억 달러)하게 되는데 기업들은 정부를 믿고 대출을 남발하고 있었다. 30대 재벌의 부채 비율은 1994년 355%에서 1997년 518%로 계속해서 상승하는데 주식의 수익률은 3저호황의 해소와 반도체, 철강 등의 주요제품의 국제시세 하락으로 이윤이 낮아지면서 계속 하락해서 1994년 7.28%에서 1996년 1.69%로 급격하게 낮아지고 있었다. 
 정부는 이런 상황에서도 원화가 고평가되는 게 경제에도 좋고 민심에도 좋다는 식으로 계속해서 고평가 정책을 사용하고 있었다. 기업들은 그런 정부를 믿고 투자를 무턱대고 늘려나갔다. 한보그룹에서 볼 수 있듯이 자본금 900억짜리의 기업이 3조원짜리 사업을 위해 무려 5조 7천억이라는 엄청난 규모의 은행대출을 받았던 것이다. 그런데도 아무도 몰랐다. 몰랐다는 게 가당키나 한 일인가. 이런 상황에서 대체 무슨 기업운용이 가능한가. 국가는 세계화니 선진화니 하면서 기업들을 관리감독하려 하지 않고 그들의 무분별한 투자와 대출을 경기를 위한다는 명목 하에 조장하였다. 자본시장이 질낮아서 금융시장의 자연스러운 생리대로 이것을 감독할 수도 없었고 기업들도 딱히 금융시장으로부터의 견제를 고려하지 않았다. 투자와 대출을 안 하면 되려 손해라는 생각으로 공격적으로 자금을 충당했다. 국가는 5년짜리 정권이었기에 장기적인 관점에서 한국경제와 사회를 조망할 능력을 갖추지 못했고 노동자들 또한 별다른 생각이 없었다. 노조는 기업의 경영권을 통해 자신의 기득권이나 챙기려 하거나 기업에 적대적인 입장만 보이고 있었을 뿐이다. 국민도 국가도 자본을 견제하지 않고 되려 자본이 함부로 움직일 수 있게 도와주고 있었으니 97년 외환위기의 도래는 예견된 일이었는지도 모른다.

 지금도 마찬가지이다. 금융시장이 이전보다 나아졌다고 하지만 제대로 기능하고 있다고 보기는 여전히 어렵다. 2010년부터 2018년 현재까지 은행들(국책은행 및 14개의 일반은행을 기준으로 삼는다)의 대출 유형을 살펴보면 총대출 중 기업대출이 차지하는 비중은 2010년 48.8%에서 2013년 49.5%로 증가했다가 하락세로 돌아서서 2017년 말 46.7%로 주저앉았다. 2018년 현재는 그나마 다소 2017년에 비해서는 늘었다. 그러나 이러한 증가도 반가운 일이 아니다. 개인대출을 제외한 법인 기업대출의 비중을 따져보면 2010년 말 34.3%에서 2017년 말 26.3%까지 하락하면서 하락폭은 2010년 대비 8.0%로 크게 증가한다. 게다가 대출의 내용도 여전히 담보대출이 큰 비중을 차지하고 있고 게다가 그 비중이 점점 더 커지는 추세를 보여주고 있다. 기업대출 중 담보대출이 차지하는 비중은 2010년 48.3%에서 2017년 65.2%로 16.9%나 증가한다. 이런 담보대출 편중은 중소기업뿐만 아니라 대기업에서도 보이는 추세이다. 2010년 말 20.6%의 비중을 보여주던 대기업에 대한 담보대출은 2017년 말 30.1%로 10%정도 올랐다. 

 생산자금의 생산유발 효과를 고려하면 상황은 더욱 심각해진다. 2010년 말 45.4%에서 2017년 말 37.1%로 8.3%나 줄어들었으며, 생산유발 효과가 상대적으로 적은 부동산업의 대출 비중이 증가하고 전자, 철강 등의 생산유발 효과가 큰 분야의 대출은 계속해서 감소하고 있다. 당연하게도 생산자금의 일자리창출 효과도 하락할 수밖에 없다. 신용대출 자체도 감소세를 보이면서 2010년 신용대출 잔액은 208.9조원에서 2017년 198.1조로 10.8조나 줄어들었다. 은행의 기업부문에 대한 자금공급 능력이 약화되었고 부동산 등에 대출되는 비중은 늘어났으며 담보대출이 큰 비중을 차지함에 따라 금융시장의 질이 높아졌다고 보기도 어렵다. 금융이 리스크를 환산하고 생산적인 부문에 대출을 해줘서 투자가 늘어나는 선순환이 아니라 담보를 잡아놓고 대출해주는 전당포 수준을 벗어나고 있지 못한 것이다. 국가는 이런 상황을 해결할 의지도 없고 능력도 갖출 생각을 하지 않는다.

 자본시장이 제대로 기능하지도 않으니 기업들의 투자도 예전 같지 않다. 국가의 거시적인 정책 방향에 맞춰 산업정책, 금융정책 등이 유기적으로 통합되어야 하는데 전혀 그러지를 못하고 있다. 어느모로 보아도 한국의 기업가들은 제대로 기능하고 있지 못한 것이다. 상황이 이러니 최장집이 한국형 부르주아를 외치며 기업가들에게 국가로부터 독립하라고 외치는 것도 이해가 간다. 기업가들이 산업을 조직하고 노동자들을 지휘하는 능력을 전혀 갖추고 있지 못한 것이다. 당연하게도 자본주의 생산양식을 이끄는 기업가들이 이런 상태이니 사회가 제대로 운영될 수가 없다. 사회를 보다 높은 수준에 이를 수 있도록 조직할 정치집단이 정말 절실하게 필요하다. 어느모로 보아도 한국사회는 질낮은 수준을 벗어나지 못하고 있으며 그 유산으로 인해 너무나 크게 고통받고 있다. 이런 상황에서 자본에 대한 비판은 사실 별다른 유의미한 효과를 가져올 수가 없다. 되려 사태만 악화시킨다. 어디서 그런 정치집단을 찾을 수 있나.

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