Venezuela's Cooperative Revolution
An economic experiment is the hidden story behind Chávez's 'Bolivarian Revolution.'
Betsy Bowman and Bob Stone
July 01 2006
Zaida Rosas, a woman in her fifties with 15 grandchildren, works in the newly constructed textile co-op Venezuela Avanza in Caracas. The co-op's 209 workers are mostly formerly jobless neighborhood women. Their homes on the surrounding steep hillsides in west Caracas were almost all self-built.
Zaida works seven hours a day, five days a week, and is paid $117 a month, the uniform income all employees voted for themselves. This is much less than the minimum salary, officially set at $188 a month. This was "so we can pay back our [government start-up] loan," she explained. Venezuela Avanza cooperativistas have a monthly general assembly to decide policy. As in most producer co-ops, they are not paid a salary, but an advance on profits. Workers paying themselves less than the minimum wage in order to make payments to the state was, Zaida acknowledged, a bad situation. "We hope our working conditions will improve with time," she said.
To prepare the co-op's workers to collectively run a business, the new Ministry of Popular Economy (MINEP) had given them small scholarships to train in cooperativism, production, and accounting. "My family is a lot happier--I've learned to write and have my 3rd grade certificate," she said.
Zaida is now also part of a larger local web of cooperatives: her factory is one of two producer co-ops, both built by a local bricklayers' cooperative, that, along with a clinic, a supermarket co-op, a school, and a community center, make up a so-called "nucleus of endogenous development." These nucleos are at the core of the country's plan for fostering egalitarian economic development.
U.S. media coverage of Venezuela tends to center around the country's oil and the--not unrelated--war of words between President Hugo Chavez and the White House. Chavez, for example, likes to refer to George W. Bush as "Mr. Danger," a reference to a brutish foreigner in a classic Venezuelan novel. Somewhat more clumsily, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently compared Chavez to Hitler. While this makes for entertaining copy, reporters have missed a major story in Venezuela--the unprecedented growth of cooperatives that has reshaped the economic lives of hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans like Zaida Rosas. On a recent visit to Caracas, we spoke with co-op members and others invested in this novel experiment to open Venezuela's economy from the bottom up.
Explosion of Cooperatives
Our first encounter with Venezuela's co-op movement was with Luis Guacaran, a taxi co-op member who drove us to the outskirts of Caracas. Settled into the rainy trip, we asked Luis what changes wrought by the Chavez government had meant for him personally. Luis replied that he now felt that as a citizen he had a right to share in the nation's oil wealth, which had always gone to an "oligarchy." The people needed health, education, and meaningful work; that was reason enough for Chavez to divert oil revenues in order to provide these things. Two of Luis's five sons are in the military, a daughter is studying petroleum engineering, another has a beauty shop. All were in vocational or professional studies.
Almost everyone we met during our visit was involved in a cooperative. The 1999 constitution requires the state to "promote and protect" co-ops. However, it was only after the passage of the Special Law on Cooperative Associations in 2001 that the totals began to skyrocket. When Chavez took office in 1998 there were 762 legally registered cooperatives with about 20,000 members. In 2001 there were almost 1,000 cooperatives. The number grew to 2,000 in 2002 and to 8,000 by 2003. In mid-2006, the National Superintendence of Cooperatives (SUNACOOP) reported that it had registered over 108,000 co-ops representing over 1.5 million members. Since mid-2003, MINEP has provided free business and self-management training, helped workers turn troubled conventional enterprises into cooperatives, and extended credit for start-ups and buy-outs. The resulting movement has increasingly come to define the "Bolivarian Revolution," the name Chavez has given to his efforts to reshape Venezuela's economic and political structures.
Now MINEP is trying to keep up with the explosion it set off. While pre-Chavez co-ops were mostly credit unions, the "Bolivarian" ones are much more diverse: half are in the service sector, a third in production, with the rest divided among savings, housing, consumer, and other areas. Cooperativists work in four major sectors: 31% in commerce, restaurants, and hotels; 29% in transport, storage and communications; 18% in agriculture, hunting, and fishing; and 8.3% in industrial manufacture. Cooperativism is on the march in Venezuela on a scale and at a speed never before seen anywhere.
Most cooperatives are small. Since January 2005, however, when the government announced a policy of expropriation of closed industrial plants, MINEP has stood ready to help workers take control of some large factories facing bankruptcy. If the unused plant is deemed of "public utility," the initiation of expropriation proceedings often leads to negotiation with the owners over compensation. In one instance, owners of a shuttered Heinz tomato processing plant in Monagas state offered to sell it to the government for $600,000. After factoring in back wages, taxes, and an outstanding mortgage, the two sides reached an amicable agreement to sell the plant to the workers for $260,000, with preferential loans provided by the government. In a more typically confrontational example, displaced workers first occupied a sugar refinery in Cumanacoa and restarted it on their own. The federal government then expropriated the property and turned it over to cooperatives of the plant's workers. The owners' property rights were respected inasmuch as the government loaned the workers the money for the purchase, though the price was well below what the owners had claimed. Such expropriated factories are then often run by elected representatives of workers alongside of government appointees.
There are strings attached. "We haven't expropriated Cumanacoa and Sideroca for the workers just to help them become rich people the day after tomorrow," said Chavez. "This has not been done just for them--it is to help make everyone wealthy." Take the case of Cacao Sucre, another sugar mill closed for eight years by its private owners, leaving 120 workers unemployed in a neighborhood of grinding poverty. The state's governor put out a call for the workers to form a co-op. After receiving training in self-management, the mill co-op integrated with the 3,665-strong cane growers' co-op. In July 2005, this large cooperative became the first "Social Production Enterprise." The new designation means that the co-op is required to set aside a portion of its profits to fund health, education, and housing for the local population, and to open its food hall to the community as well.
With only 700 plants on the government's list of closed or bankrupt candidates for expropriation, cooperativization of existing large-scale facilities is limited, and so far a bit slow. Unions are identifying more underproducing enterprises. But there is a long way to go.
Cooperatives are at the center of Venezuela's new economic model. They have the potential to fulfill a number of the aims of the Bolivarian revolution, including combating unemployment, promoting durable economic development, competing peacefully with conventional capitalist firms, and advancing Chavez's still-being-defined socialism.
Not Your Grandfather's WPA
Capitalism generates unemployment. Neoliberalism aggravated this tendency in Venezuela, producing a large, stable group of over-looked people who were excluded from meaningful work and consumption. If not forgotten altogether, they were blamed for their plight and made to feel superfluous. But the Bolivarian revolution is about demanding recognition. In March of 2004 Chavez called Venezuelans to a new "mission," when MINEP inaugurated the "Mision Vuelvan Caras" program--Mission About-Face. Acting "from within themselves and by their own powers" to form cooperatives, the people were to "combat unemployment and exclusion" by actually "chang[ing] the relations of production."
In Venezuela, "vuelvan caras" evokes an insurgent general's command to his troops upon being surrounded by Spaniards in the war of independence. In effect: stop playing the role of the pursued; turn and attack the enemy frontally. The new enemy is unemployment, and the goal of full employment is to be achieved by groups--especially of the unemployed--throwing in their lot with each other and setting to work together. Vuelvan caras teaches management, accounting, and co-op values to hundreds of thousands of scholarship students. Graduates are free to seek regular jobs or form micro-enterprises, for which credit is offered; however, co-ops get priority for technical assistance, credits, and contracts. But the original spark--the collective entrepreneurship needed for cooperativization--is to come from the people. Over 70% of the graduates of the class of 2005 formed 7,592 new co-ops.
Vuelvan Caras seems to be paying off. Unemployment reached a high of 18% in 2003 but fell to 14.5% in 2004, and 11.5% in 2005. MINEP is planning a "Vuelvan Caras II," aiming to draw in 700,000 more of the jobless. But with a population of 26 million, Venezuela's battle against structural causes of unemployment has only begun.
Economic Development from Within
Cooperatives also advance the Chavez administration's broader goal of "endogenous development." Foreign direct investment continues in Venezuela, but the government aims to avoid relying on inflows from abroad, which open a country to capitalism's usual blackmail. Endogenous development means "to be capable of producing the seed that we sow, the food that we eat, the clothes that we wear, the goods and services that we need, breaking the economic, cultural and technological dependence that has halted our development, starting with ourselves." To these ends, co-ops are ideal tools. Co-ops anchor development in Venezuela: under the control of local worker-owners, they don't pose a threat of capital flight as capitalist firms do.
Democracy: Economic and Political
Alongside the co-op movement, Venezuelans are engaged in building a new form of local political democracy through so-called Communal Councils. Modeled on Brazil's innovative participatory budgeting process, these councils grew out of the Land Committees Chavez created to grant land titles to the many squatters in Caracas's barrios. If a community of 100 to 200 families organizes itself and submits a local development plan, the government grants land titles. Result: individuals get homes, and the community gets a grassroots assembly.
The councils have budgets and make decisions on a range of local matters. They delegate spokespersons to the barrio and the municipality. Today, a few thousand Communal Councils exist, but within five years the government plans to bring all Venezuelans into local counsels. In conjunction with cooperativization in the economy, the Community Council movement may portend the creation of a new decentralized, democratic polity.
The need for endogenous development came home to Venezuelans during the 2002 oil strike carried out by Chavez's political opponents. Major distributors of the country's mostly imported food also supported the strike, halting food deliveries and exposing a gaping vulnerability. In response, the government started its own parallel supermarket chain. In just three years, Mercal had 14,000 points of sale, almost all in poor neighborhoods, selling staples at discounts of 20% to 50%. It is now the nation's largest supermarket chain and its second largest enterprise overall. The Mercal stores attract shoppers of all political stripes thanks to their low prices and high-quality merchandise. To promote "food sovereignty," Mercal has increased its proportion of domestic suppliers to over 40%, giving priority to co-ops when possible. Venezuela still imports 64% of the food it consumes, but that's down from 72% in 1998. By cutting import dependence, transport costs, and middlemen while tapping local suppliers, Mercal aims to wean itself from its $24 million-a-month subsidy.
Displacing Capitalism and Building Socialism
Another reason the architects of the so-called "Bolivarian revolution" are vigorously pushing the co-op model is their belief that co-ops can meet needs better than conventional capitalist firms. Freed of the burdens of supporting costly managers and profit-hungry absentee investors, co-ops have a financial buoyancy that drives labor-saving technological innovation to save labor time. "Cooperatives are the businesses of the future," says former Planning and Development Minister Felipe Perez-Marti. Not only are they non-exploitative, they outproduce capitalist firms, since, Perez-Marti holds, worker-owners must seek their firm's efficiency and success. Such a claim raises eyebrows in the United States, but a growing body of research suggests that co-ops can indeed be more productive and profitable than conventional firms.
To test whether co-ops can beat capitalist firms on their own terms, a viable co-op or solidarity sector must be set up parallel to the securely dominant capitalist one. Today Venezuela is preparing this "experiment." More than 5% of the labor force now works in cooperatives, according to MINEP. While this is a much larger percentage of cooperativistas than in most countries, it is still small relative to the size of a co-op sector that would have a shot at out-competing Venezuela's capitalist sector. Chavez's supporters hope that once such a sector is launched, cooperativization will expand in a "virtuous circle" as conventional workforces, observing co-ops, demand similar control of their work. Elias Jaua, the initial Minister of Popular Economy, says, "The private sector can understand the process and incorporate itself into the new dynamic of society, or it will be simply displaced by the new productive forces which have a better quality production, a vision based much more on solidarity than consumption." One could claim that MINEP's credits, trainings, and contracts prejudice the outcome in favor of co-ops. But Vuelvan Caras graduates are free to take jobs in the capitalist sector. And MINEP's policy of favoring employee-owned firms is not that different from U.S. laws, subsidies, and tax benefits that favor investor-owned ones.
Finally, by placing the means of production in workers' hands, the co-op movement directly builds socialism. Cooperativization, especially of idle factories occupied by their workforces, promotes "what has always been our goal: that the workers run production and that the governments are also run by the workers," according to Labor Minister Maria Cristina Iglesias. Co-ops, then, are not just means to what Chavez calls "socialism for the 21st century": they actually constitute partial realizations of it.
Managing the Experiment's Risks
Cooperativization is key to achieving the aims of the Bolivarian revolution. But the revolution's leaders acknowledge that a long struggle lies ahead. Traditional capitalist enterprises still dominate Venezuela's economy. And even if all of the country's current cooperativization programs succeed, will that struggle--and it will be a struggle--result in socialism? Michael Albert of Z Magazine grants that co-ops may be more productive, and he strongly supports Venezuela's experiment. But in the absence of plans for de-marketization, he has doubts that it will reach socialism. For the effect on cooperatives themselves of "trying to out-compete old firms in market-defined contests may [be to] entrench in them a managerial bureaucracy and a competitive rather than a social orientation," leading to a market socialist system "that still has a ruling managerial or coordinator class." Albert's concern is well founded: the history of co-ops from the Amana colonies of Iowa to the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation in the Basque country shows that even when they start out with a community-service mandate, individual co-ops, or even networks of co-ops, tend to defensively re-internalize capitalist self-seeking and become indistinguishable from their competitors when made to compete alone against an array of capitalist firms in a capitalist economy.
Disarmingly, members of Chavez's administration acknowledge these risks. Juan Carlos Loyo, deputy minister of the popular economy, noting that community service has been part of the cooperative creed since its beginning, asks for patience: "We know that we are coming from a capitalist lifestyle that is profoundly individualistic and self-centered." Marcela Maspero, a national coordinator of the new, Chavista UNT labor federation, acknowledges "the risk of converting our comrades into neo-liberal capitalists." In Venezuela's unique case, however, construction of a viable co-op sector is the goal of a government with considerable financial resources, and its aim of thereby building socialism is also a popular national project. In Venezuela, success is therefore a plausible hope. A loose analogy would hold with May 1968 if both the de Gaulle government and the French Communist Party had been in favor of student-worker demands for "auto-gestion" or self-management.
There are problems, of course. Groups may register as "phantom co-ops" to get start-up grants, then simply walk away with the money. And since co-ops are favored in awarding government contracts, there is a significant amount of fraud. "There are cooperatives that are registered as such on paper," Jaua, the former head of MINEP, reports, "but which have a boss who is paid more, salaried workers, and unequal distribution of work and income." SUNACOOP admits that its enforcement is spotty. Many of the new cooperatives have also suffered as a result of inadequate self-management training. Government authorities are attempting to address these problems by increasing visits to local co-ops, augmenting training and support services, and decentralizing oversight to local councils.
Despite the obstacles, the new co-ops, with government support, are building a decentralized national movement with its own momentum and institutions. This May, the National Executive Cooperative Council (CENCOOP) was launched. The council is made up of five co-op members from each of Venezuela's 25 states, elected by their State Cooperative Councils, which are in turn elected by Municipal Councils composed of local cooperativists. CENCOOP will represent Venezuela at the International Cooperative Alliance--the global body embracing 700 million individual members in hundreds of thousands of cooperatives in 95 countries.
The pre-Bolivarian co-op movement at first felt left out, and criticized hasty cooperativization. But its advice was sought at each stage of the planning for CENCOOP, and it finally joined the council, sharing its valuable experience with the new movement. The new state and municipal co-op councils are part of a plan to decentralize MINEP's functions. Having helped organize CENCOOP, MINEP Superintendent Carlos Molina says his office will adopt a hands-off approach to assure the cooperative movement's increasing autonomy. Today, however, many of the new co-ops remain dependent on MINEP's support.
A Movement's Opponents
Whatever success cooperativization achieves carries its own risks, both internal and external. So far, the Chavez government has compensated capitalists for expropriations and has targeted for co-op conversion only firms that are in some sense in trouble. But at a certain point, workers in healthy firms, seeing their cooperativist neighbors enjoying newfound power in the workplace and a more equal distribution of income, may want to cooperativize their firms too. And having for years had profit extracted as a major portion of the value their labor has created--in many cases enough to cover their firm's market value many times over--won't they have grounds to demand transfer without compensation? In short, to further expand and strengthen revolutionary solidarity before new counter-revolutionary efforts take root, won't the revolution have to start a real redistribution of productive wealth--to cooperativize firms directly at the expense of Venezuela's capitalists? Sooner or later, Venezuela's cooperative experiment will have to address this question.
After joining in the World Social Forum in Caracas in last January, we caught some glimpses of the "Bolivarian revolution" moving at full speed, and we've followed it since then. We are convinced that for those around the world who believe "another world is possible," the stakes of this experiment are enormous. Predictably, then, it faces genuine external threats. The short-lived coup in April of 2002 and the destructive strike by oil-industry managers that December were the works of a displaced and angry elite encouraged by the United States at every step. And the campaign continues: State Department-linked groups have been pumping $5 million a year into opposition groups that backed the coup. Yet the democratizing of workplaces proceeds relentlessly, bringing ever more Venezuelans into the revolutionary process. This inclusion is itself a defense since it expands, unites, and strengthens the resistance with which Venezuelans would greet any new effort to halt or divert their revolution.
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Betsy Bowman and Bob Stone
Betsy Bowman and Bob Stone are on the editorial collective of GEO. They are among the cofounders of the bilingual Center for Global Justice in San Miguel de Allende, Mexico, where they serve as researchers
제공된 문서 "Venezuela's Cooperative Revolution 2006"은 벳시 보먼(Betsy Bowman)과 밥 스톤(Bob Stone)이 작성한 기사로, 우고 차베스 정권 하의 베네수엘라에서 일어난 협동조합 운동의 급격한 성장을 다루고 있습니다. 다음은 기사의 내용을 약 800단어 분량으로 요약한 것입니다.
베네수엘라의 협동조합 혁명 (2006)
1. 서론: 볼리바르 혁명의 숨겨진 이야기
미국 언론은 주로 베네수엘라의 석유 문제나 우고 차베스 대통령과 백악관 사이의 설전에 초점을 맞추지만, 베네수엘라 내부에서는 경제 생활을 근본적으로 재편하는 거대한 변화가 일어나고 있다
2. 협동조합의 폭발적 증가와 법적 기반
차베스 대통령 취임 전인 1998년, 베네수엘라에는 약 762개의 협동조합과 2만 명의 조합원만이 존재했다
3. 산업 구조의 재편: 공장 점거와 사회적 생산 기업
대부분의 협동조합은 소규모이지만, 정부는 폐쇄된 대형 공장을 노동자들이 인수하여 운영하도록 돕고 있다
4. 미션 부엘반 카라스: 실업과의 전쟁
"미션 부엘반 카라스(Mission Vuelvan Caras, 방향 전환)"는 실업과 배제를 타파하기 위한 핵심 프로그램이다
5. 내발적 발전과 식량 주권
협동조합은 외부 자본에 의존하지 않고 자체적인 역량으로 경제를 꾸려가는 <내발적 발전>의 핵심 도구이다
6. 위험 요소와 과제
이 실험에는 여러 위험이 따른다. 마이클 앨버트(Michael Albert)와 같은 비평가들은 시장 경쟁 속에서 협동조합이 생존을 위해 기존 자본주의 기업처럼 이기적으로 변질될 수 있다고 경고한다
7. 결론: 사회주의를 향한 실험
그럼에도 불구하고 베네수엘라 정부는 건전한 협동조합 부문을 육성하여 자본주의 부문을 대체하고 사회주의를 건설하려는 목표를 가지고 있다
이 글(2006년 7월 1일, Betsy Bowman·Bob Stone)은 차베스의 ‘볼리바르 혁명’에서 상대적으로 덜 조명된 핵심 실험으로 <협동조합(cooperatives)의 폭발적 확대>를 다룹니다. 서두는 카라카스의 섬유 협동조합 ‘Venezuela Avanza’에서 일하는 자이다 로사스의 사례로 시작합니다. 209명의 노동자(대부분 실업 상태였던 동네 여성들)가 공장을 공동으로 운영하며, 매달 총회에서 정책을 결정하고, 이익 배당의 ‘선지급’ 형태로 수입을 받습니다. 이들은 정부의 창업 대출을 상환하기 위해 법정 최저임금보다 낮은 월 117달러를 스스로 합의해 받는 상황까지 감수합니다. 동시에 정부(대중경제부 MINEP)가 협동조합 운영·생산·회계 교육을 장학금 형태로 지원했고, 자이다는 문해와 학력(3학년 인증) 같은 개인적 변화도 경험합니다. 이 공장은 벽돌공 협동조합이 지은 다른 생산 협동조합, 클리닉, 협동조합 슈퍼마켓, 학교, 커뮤니티 센터와 함께 ‘내생적 발전의 핵(nucleus of endogenous development)’을 이루며, 빈곤 지역을 기반으로 한 분권적 발전 모델의 거점으로 설명됩니다.
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
본론에서 저자들은 미국 언론이 주로 석유와 미·베네수엘라의 설전에 집중하는 사이, 현장에서는 “사람들의 경제적 삶을 바꾼” 협동조합 확산이 진행됐다고 주장합니다. 제도적 배경으로는 1999년 헌법의 협동조합 보호·진흥 조항과 2001년 ‘협동조합 특별법’(Special Law on Cooperative Associations)을 제시합니다. 차베스 취임 전인 1998년 등록 협동조합은 762개(약 2만 명)였으나, 2002년 2,000개, 2003년 8,000개로 늘고, 2006년 중반에는 국가협동조합감독기구(SUNACOOP)가 10만8천 개 이상, 150만 명 이상 회원을 등록했다고 보고합니다. 2003년 중반 이후 MINEP는 무상 교육(비즈니스·자기관리), 부실기업의 협동조합 전환 지원, 창업·인수 대출을 제공했고, 협동조합은 서비스·생산·저축·주거·소비 등으로 다변화됩니다.
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
특히 2005년부터 정부가 ‘문 닫힌 공장’의 수용·전환을 정책화하면서, 파산·폐업 공장을 노동자 협동조합이 인수해 재가동하는 사례가 등장합니다. 토마토 가공공장(하인즈) 사례에서는 보상·체불임금·세금 등을 따져 정부 융자로 노동자들이 인수하는 식의 협상이 소개되고, 설탕정제소(쿠마나코아)처럼 노동자 점거·재가동 후 정부가 수용해 협동조합에 넘긴 사례도 나옵니다. 다만 차베스는 “노동자만 부자가 되는” 방식이 아니라, 지역사회 전체의 부를 늘리는 목적임을 강조하며, ‘사회적 생산기업(Social Production Enterprise)’ 같은 제도를 통해 이익 일부를 지역의 보건·교육·주거에 의무 배분하게 합니다.
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
글은 협동조합을 ‘완전고용’과 ‘배제의 해소’라는 정치적 목표와 연결합니다. 2004년 ‘미션 부엘반 카라스(Misión Vuelvan Caras, About-Face)’는 실업자 등에게 경영·회계·협동조합 가치를 교육하고, 협동조합을 만들면 기술지원·대출·계약에서 우선권을 줍니다. 2005년 수료자 다수가 7,592개 신규 협동조합을 만들었다고 하며, 실업률이 2003년 18%에서 2005년 11.5%로 하락했다는 수치도 제시합니다. 또 ‘내생적 발전(endogenous development)’ 개념을 통해 외국자본 의존과 자본도피(블랙메일)를 피하고, 씨앗·식량·의복·필수재를 “우리 내부에서” 생산하는 방향을 제시합니다.
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
경제 민주주의는 정치 민주주의 실험과도 연결됩니다. 브라질의 참여예산을 참조한 ‘코무날 카운슬(Communal Councils)’은 토지위원회 경험을 바탕으로 공동체 개발계획을 제출하면 토지권을 부여받고, 지역 예산과 의사결정을 수행하는 구조로 설명됩니다. 2002년 석유파업과 유통망 중단이 식량 취약성을 드러내자, 정부는 빈곤 지역 중심의 유통망 ‘메르깔(Mercal)’을 구축해 20~50% 할인 공급을 확대하고, 국내 공급 비율을 높이며 협동조합 공급자를 우대합니다.
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
마지막으로 저자들은 위험과 반대세력도 정리합니다. 시장 경쟁 속에서 협동조합이 관료화·관리자 계층을 만들 수 있다는 비판(마이클 알버트)을 소개하고, ‘유령 협동조합’ 등록, 보조금 사기, 정부 계약을 노린 편법, 부실한 자기관리 교육 같은 내부 문제를 지적합니다. 이를 보완하려고 현장 점검·교육 강화·지역 شورا로 감독 분권화를 추진하며, 전국 단위 대표기구 CENCOOP(국가협동조합집행위원회)도 출범합니다. 외부적으로는 2002년 쿠데타와 석유파업, 그리고 미국과 연계된 단체의 야권 지원(연 500만 달러 주장)을 언급하며, 협동조합을 통한 “포함”이 오히려 방어력(대중적 결속)을 키운다고 결론짓습니다.
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
아래 평론은 <2006년 기사 ‘Venezuela’s Cooperative Revolution’>이 보여주는 <협동조합 붐의 설계 방식>과, 이후 연구들이 지적한 <구조적 병목>을 함께 놓고 “왜 지속적 성공으로 이어지기 어려웠나”를 정리한 것입니다.
1) 기사 자체가 이미 경고한 ‘취약한 고리’
이 기사는 차베스 집권 이후 협동조합이 폭발적으로 늘었다고 전합니다. 1998년 762개(약 2만 명) 수준에서, 2006년 중반 SUNACOOP 등록 기준 10만8천 개, 150만 명 이상으로 커졌고, 국가가 훈련·대출·전환 지원을 붙였다고 합니다.
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
하지만 같은 기사 안에 <실패의 씨앗>도 분명히 있습니다.
<유령(phantom) 협동조합>, <보조금·계약을 노린 사기>, <감독 역량의 한계>, <부실한 자치·경영훈련>을 기사 자체가 인정합니다.
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
또한 “시장 경쟁에서 이기려는 압력”이 협동조합 내부에 <관리자(코디네이터) 계층/관료화>를 재도입할 수 있다는 우려도 싣습니다.
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
그리고 많은 신규 협동조합이 여전히 MINEP(대중경제부) 지원에 <의존>하고 있다고 덧붙입니다.
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
즉, “대중적 동원 + 국가 지원”으로 양적 팽창은 만들었지만, 그 구조가 지속가능성에 불리한 방향으로 설계된 측면이 이미 드러납니다.
2) 왜 ‘계속 성공’이 어려웠나: 핵심 요인 7가지
(1) <속도>가 너무 빨라 ‘품질 관리’가 붕괴
협동조합이 몇 년 사이 기하급수로 늘면, 정부·연합조직·회계감사·교육·분쟁조정 같은 인프라가 따라갈 수 없습니다. 기사도 감독이 “spotty(군데군데 비어 있다)”고 인정합니다.
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
후속 연구는 더 노골적입니다. Piñeiro-Harnecker는 등록된 협동조합 중 실제 운영 중인 비율이 대략 17~34% 정도로 추정되며, “대출을 받고 사라진 협동조합이 얼마나 되는가”가 핵심 질문이 된다고 말합니다. ResearchGate
이 수치 하나만으로도 “붐”이 “지속 가능한 생태계”로 굳지 못했음을 보여줍니다.
(2) <인센티브 왜곡>: ‘협동’이 아니라 ‘지원금/계약’이 목표가 되기 쉬움
기사에서 “협동조합이 정부 계약에서 유리하니 사기가 생긴다”는 대목은 결정적입니다.
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
지원과 계약을 당근으로 쓰면 초기 확산은 빠르지만, 일부 집단에겐 협동조합이 ‘공동 경영의 윤리’가 아니라 ‘법인 껍데기’가 됩니다. 이때 실패는 도덕성 문제라기보다 <설계 문제>입니다. 제도가 그렇게 행동하도록 유도했기 때문입니다.
(3) <국가 의존 구조>: 자율성이 약하면 시장·정치 충격에 취약
Piñeiro는 많은 협동조합이 자본 접근과 판매 계약을 국가 기관에 의존하고, 이것이 지속가능성을 위협한다고 지적합니다. journals.sagepub.com+1
기사도 “많은 신규 협동조합이 여전히 MINEP 지원에 의존”한다고 못 박습니다.
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
의존이 크면 두 가지가 동시에 생깁니다.
정부 재정이 흔들리면 협동조합도 같이 흔들림
협동조합이 ‘아래로부터의 경제민주주의’라기보다 ‘국가 프로그램의 하청’처럼 굳어질 위험
(4) <역량·거버넌스 문제>: 회계·생산·민주적 운영의 결합은 생각보다 어렵다
기사는 자치경영·회계 훈련이 주어졌다고 소개하면서도, 신규 협동조합 다수가 “부적절한 self-management training” 때문에 어려움을 겪었다고 말합니다.
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
Piñeiro 역시 협동조합이 장부를 쓰고 생산을 관리할 행정·기술 역량을 갖추는 것이 가장 큰 난제라고 말합니다. ResearchGate+1
여기서 중요한 건 “의지가 부족해서”가 아니라, <실업·빈곤 배제층을 빠르게 조직화>했기 때문에 초기 구성원의 경험·교육 격차가 클 수밖에 없었다는 점입니다(정책 목표의 역설).
(5) <시장 환경의 압력>: ‘협동조합답게’ 운영할수록 불리해지는 구간
기사는 “시장 경쟁에서 이기려는 압력”이 협동조합 내부에 관리자 계층과 경쟁 지향을 재도입할 수 있다는 우려를 실습니다.
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
이 문제는 협동조합의 고전적 딜레마입니다. 단일 협동조합이 고립된 채 시장에서 싸우면, 생존을 위해 임금·고용·의사결정을 점점 ‘일반 기업’처럼 만들 유인이 커집니다.
그래서 지속 가능하려면, 개별 조합이 아니라 <연합·공동 구매·공동 금융·공동 유통> 같은 ‘협동의 2층 구조’가 필요합니다. 베네수엘라는 붐에 비해 그 속도가 늦었습니다(기사의 CENCOOP 언급은 바로 그 공백을 메우려는 시도였습니다).
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
(6) <거시경제·투입재 병목>: 외환·가격·신용 제약이 “작은 생산조직”에 더 치명적
협동조합이 생산을 하려면 원자재·부품·설비·운송·신용이 돌아야 합니다. 베네수엘라의 가격 고정, 신용 제약, 수요 붕괴, 생활필수품 부족 같은 제약은 “특히 작은 기업”에 폐업을 강요했다고 하버드 성장연구 자료가 정리합니다. Growth Lab
기사에서도 식량 수입 의존이 매우 컸음을 인정합니다. 2006년에도 식량의 64%를 수입했고(1998년 72%에서 감소), MerCal은 보조금 의존을 줄이려 했다고 합니다.
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
이 조건에서 ‘내생적 생산’을 맡은 협동조합은 투입재·물류·외환 병목에 계속 걸립니다.
(7) <정치·제도 리스크>: 국가가 밀어줄수록 ‘정치 파도’도 함께 탄다
협동조합 전환이 “국가의 재정·규정·임명직 관리”와 결합할수록, 정권 내부의 우선순위 변화·관료적 지연·부패 유인·정치적 편가르기 등 ‘정치의 파도’를 함께 탑니다.
기사에 나오는 사례처럼, 일부 국유화/전환 공장은 “노동자 선출 대표 + 정부 임명자”가 함께 운영하는 구조였고,
Venezuela's Cooperative Revolut…
이는 공동 책임을 만들 수도 있지만, 반대로 현장 자율성과 투자 의사결정의 일관성을 약화시킬 수도 있습니다(특히 실적이 나쁘면 서로 책임을 떠넘기기 쉬움).
여기에 2014년 이후의 심각한 거시 위기(재정·통화 악순환, 2017년 무렵 하이퍼인플레이션 국면 등)가 겹치면, 협동조합 생태계는 더 버티기 어렵습니다. Economics Observatory 또한 제재 국면은 외환·수입·금융 경로를 더 어렵게 만들어 경제 전반(특히 수입 의존 부문)의 충격을 키울 수 있습니다. congress.gov
3) 평론: “협동조합 정책”이 아니라 “렌티어 국가의 동원 정책”으로 기울었던 순간들
제가 보기에 베네수엘라 실험의 가장 큰 약점은 <협동조합을 ‘새로운 생산체제’로 키우기보다, ‘배제층 통합·고용·분배’의 빠른 수단>으로 사용한 비중이 컸다는 점입니다. 그 선택은 단기 성과(조직화, 교육, 참여 경험)를 만들었지만, 동시에 (1) 유령조합/사기 (2) 국가 의존 (3) 역량 공백 (4) 시장 압력 (5) 거시 병목을 한꺼번에 키웠습니다.
다만 이것이 “협동조합이 실패했다”는 단정으로 끝나면 안 됩니다. 같은 시기에도 일부 오래된 연합형 협동조합(예: 유통·보건·서비스 연합)은 상대적으로 안정적 성과를 보여 왔고, 그래서 논점은 “협동조합 vs 시장”이 아니라 “<어떤 제도 설계와 어떤 생태계>가 협동을 지속시키는가”로 옮겨가야 합니다.
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