Balthassar Jozef Paul "Bas" van Bavel (born 24 June 1964) is a Dutch historian. He has held the chair of Transitions of Economy and Society at Utrecht University since 2011, and has been professor of Economic and Social History since 2007. His research has mostly focused on pre-industrial Northwestern Europe. He was one of the winners of the 2019 Spinoza Prize, the highest award in Dutch science.
Between 2001 and 2008 he led a research project on 'The organisation of markets in late medieval Holland', and between 2007 and 2012 he led a project on 'Economic growth and stagnation in the pre-industrial era: Iraq, Italy and the Low Countries, 600-1700', both at Utrecht University and funded by the NWO.[3]He was appointed as professor of Economic and Social History of the Middle Ages by Utrecht University in 2007.
Furthermore, in 2007 he became the academic coordinator for the Utrecht University focus area “Origins and Impacts of Institutions”, which developed into the Utrecht University strategic theme Institutions for Open Societies in 2012, for which he became the programme director. Between 2011 and 2014 he served as head of the section Economic and Social History of the Department of History. In 2014 he was appointed as professor Transitions of Economy and Society and started directing a research team for the project 'Coordinating for life. Success and failure of Western European societies in coping with rural hazards and disasters, 1300–1800'.[4]
Van Bavel was active for football club NAC Breda from 2002 onwards. Between April 2010 and April 2011 van Bavel was its board chairman.[5][6][7]
The majority of van Bavel's research has focused on pre-industrial Northwestern Europe especially on the divergent development of societies and the influence of institutions on this process. In more recent research he has also included other parts of Europe and the Middle East, while also including more recent history.[8]
Van Bavel has argued that gross domestic product is a subjective manner of representing economic growth and strength, and is not an objective analysis. He also criticizes using it, as it only shows a partial view of the quality of life experienced.[9] He has argued for the encompassing of social factors - such as equity and welfare, and the resilience to shocks and disasters - and ecological factors - such as sustainable use of resources.[8]
In an article published in Past & Present in 2009, van Bavel and Oscar Gelderblom disagreed with British historian Simon Schama on the origins of historic Dutch cleanliness. While Schama argued that it was founded in Calvinism and patriotism, van Bavel and Gelderblom argued that it originated for economic reasons, hygiene being necessary for the production of cheese and butter.[10]
In 2014 van Bavel contributed to a report on economic disparity published by the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy.[11] He called the increased disparity in personal capital between 2008 and 2013 "quite shocking" (the capital of the wealthiest 1% had increased from about the same as the least owning 20%, to around 25%).[12]
In 2001 van Bavel was awarded a VIDI grant from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for the research project 'The organisation of markets in late medieval Holland'.[3] In 2006 van Bavel won a VICI grant from the NWO for the research project 'Economic Growth and Stagnation in the Pre-Industrial Era: Iraq, Italy and the Low Countries, 600-1700'.[2] In 2013 van Bavel was awarded a European Research Council Advanced grant for the research project 'Coordinating for life. Success and failure of Western European societies in coping with rural hazards and disasters, 1300–1800'.[13][14]
Chapter 1 | Introduction to Market Society and Its Historical Context
Chapter 2 | The Rise of Market Economies in Pre-Industrial Europe
Chapter 3 | Dynamic Market Systems - Benefits and Pitfalls
Chapter 4 | The Role of Institutions in Shaping Market Societies
Chapter 5 | Patterns of Market Dominance - Comparative Study of Historical Societies
Chapter 6 | Lessons from the Past - Implications for Modern Market Economies
Chapter 7 | The Invisible Hand? Review
The Invisible Hand?: How Market Economies have Emerged and Declined Since AD 500 Hardcover – 29 June 2016 by van Bavel (Author) 4.9 4.9 out of 5 stars 10 ratings
Edition: 1st See all formats and editions The Invisible Hand offers a radical departure from the conventional wisdom of economists and economic historians, by showing that 'factor markets' and the economies dominated by them -- the market economies -- are not modern, but have existed at various times in the past. They rise, stagnate, and decline; and consist of very different combinations of institutions embedded in very different societies. These market economies create flexibility and high mobility in the exchange of land, labour, and capital, and initially they generate economic growth, although they also build on existing social structures, as well as existing exchange and allocation systems. The dynamism that results from the rise of factor markets leads to the rise of new market elites who accumulate land and capital, and use wage labour extensively to make their wealth profitable. In the long term, this creates social polarization and a decline of average welfare. As these new elites gradually translate their economic wealth into political leverage, it also creates institutional sclerosis, and finally makes these markets stagnate or decline again. This process is analysed across the three major, pre-industrial examples of successful market economies in western Eurasia: Iraq in the early Middle Ages, Italy in the high Middle Ages, and the Low Countries in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period, and then parallels drawn to England and the United States in the modern period. These areas successively saw a rapid rise of factor markets and the associated dynamism, followed by stagnation, which enables an in-depth investigation of the causes and results of this process. Read less
Review Bas Van Bavel has given both public policy and comparative institutional history a great boost by asking big questions about where we are in the history of economic development, looking at contemporary quandaries through the lens of long-term historical patterns. ― Hilton L. Root, Independent Review
Starting from a sharp focus on fundamental problems -- the long-term effects of society on market economies, the management of catastrophes -- Bas van Bavel tests existing theories and clearly formulates his innovative insights. ― Wim Blockmans, Emeritus professor of medieval history, Leiden University
Bavel is excellent in providing numerical estimates... It is not only the plausibility of the mechanism of decline that gives strength to Bavel's thesis; it is also that he lists the manifestation of the decline ― Branko Milanovic, globalinequality
A brief review...cannot do justice to wealth of material in this important new book, other than by noting that anyone interested in these issues should not miss it. ― Gene Callahan, Cardiff University, History: Reviews of New Books
This a beautifully written book, easy to read, which makes it adequate for a wide audience. Above all, it is an original and intellectually challenging piece of scholarly work that breaks new historical grounds. Van Bavel is one of the few scholars alive who is equally an expert on history, economics, politics. This characteristic enables him a truly subtle analysis of texts and ideas. I want to make clear at the outset that economists and economic historians neglect this book at their peril, since it represents a methodological challenge to research as usual ... this book is going to be a vital contribution to the advancement of economic discourse as well as a crucial intervention in current political debate. ― Stefano Zamagni, Journal of Economics
Van Bavel's deep expertise in the subject matter weaves an intricate web of connections of cultural, economic, and social aspects across time and space, and seamlessly draws the reader into a wonderful account ― Mauricio Drelichman, Journal of Economic Literature
any social scientist interested in "big think" questions will benefit greatly from reading The Invisible Hand? While it presents only a piece of the "great divergence" puzzle, it is an understudied piece that is an important complement to existing theories based on institutions, culture, and governance. ― Jared Rubin, EH.net From the Publisher Bas van Bavel is distinguished professor of Transitions of Economy and Society at Utrecht University. He acts as the academic director of the Utrecht University interdisciplinary priority area -- Institutions for Open Societies -- and he is a member of the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences. His research activities focus on reconstructing, analyzing, and explaining economic development and social change, emphasizing long-term transitions and regional diversity, and using comparative analysis -- both over time and across regions -- as the main tool. More specifically, he aims to find out why some societal arrangements are successful in generating wealth, equity and resilience, and others not, and what drives the formation of these arrangements. Read more
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Top reviews from other countries Translate all reviews to English gjk 5.0 out of 5 stars Shadow side of free marketsReviewed in Germany on 22 October 2020 Verified Purchase
A fascinating book with a disturbing message: our current form of society is inherently unstable. This is the consequence of a free market for all sources of our existence: labor, capital, land and other property. The book is the result of a research program of more than ten years by Bas van Bavel's group at the University of Utrecht. The group has studied economic developments in a number of historical societies, and from these selected three that at a certain stage of development had free markets for land, labor and capital. For these three detailed data were available. Analysis of these societies, Iraq (500-1100), Italy (1000-1500) and the Low Countries (1100-1800) revealed the same pattern of rise, growth and decline, even though they differed in many ways. There is a compelling logic in this pattern (for this reader), which greatly enhances credibility. Below I try to briefly describe this pattern; unfortunately, this does not do justice to the wealth of historical and economic information in the book. The periods described often started with unrest (uprisings, riots, etc.) which resulted in the societies becoming somewhat more egalitarian. Professional and interest groups, or cooperatives, played an important role in this. With the enforced regulations that affirmed and protected this greater equality (and some luck) further economic growth was possible in which a large part of the population shared. Surpluses of grown or manufactured products were traded in markets that grew with further development. Even more growth turned out to be possible when labor, capital and land also became readily available through suitable markets. For the initial period of this market development, the researchers from Utrecht still found positive effects for broad sections of the population, but these quickly diminished as soon as the markets were further liberalized. This liberalization was achieved by making the existing restrictive (protective) regulations less strict or even eliminating them. This created an uneven playing field on which already wealthy persons could easily (and legally) enrich themselves further. Their head start allowed them to hire expertise and perform all financial transactions on a larger scale. Even though total wealth was apparently still increasing, that was no longer the case for the common man. In the long run this led to the emergence of an elite that gained more and more influence through lobbying and sponsorship of political parties. This resulted in more regulations that favored this elite, gradually even succeeding in making the protection of their interests more and more paid by common means. The real economy suffered as a result, and investing in it became less profitable. The wealthy invested in places where a higher return could be achieved, e.g. in the financial sector, or in new markets abroad. In the end, the stagnation led to a return of society to where they started (for the common man, but usually not for the rich). This is what happened in the three extensively studied cases. In Chapter 5, van Bavel also looks at developments in England, the United States and Western Europe (1500-2000). I'm not going to tell his conclusions; you may guess them, just like our current place in the cycle. Although the book is definitely clear in terms of explanation, the readability could have been a little better for my taste. It is unfortunate that the message of the book receives so little attention in the press or public debate, it deserves an Old Testament thunder prophet, but the scientist van Bavel is anything but that. Although the author is pessimistic, I hope that this time the tide can still be turned. Read the book! Read more Report Herman Schippers 5.0 out of 5 stars Wie neu und schnell gelieferdReviewed in Germany on 1 December 2016 Verified Purchase
Very interesting historical research on the development and decline of markets. Markets aren't new to our age. They are born, live, grow and die. Thit has been going on for centuries. Report
Günther Gerber 5.0 out of 5 stars Super BookReviewed in Germany on 21 April 2017 Verified Purchase
Very well worth reading. One of the many good economic history books of the last 10 years. Should be compulsory reading along with works by Werner Abelshauser for all WiWIs and VWlers. Report
동북아 3국에서 19세기 위기를 해결하기 위해 고안한 해법이다. 쌍둥이처럼 닮은 방법이기에 수능 역사문제에서 짝짓기, 연관주제로 자주 나온다. 19세기 사람들도 사람이다. 다 지능이 있고 눈이 있고 귀가 있다. 당연히 서양의 총과 대포, 함선의 위력을 잘 알았고, 부러워했다. 총과 대포, 함선을 갖고 싶어 했고, 배우고 싶어 했다. 제너럴셔먼호 사건 때 흥선대원군은 대동강에 가라앉은 배를 건져내어 증기기관을 복제하려 했었다. 조선이라고 해서 훌륭한 장인이 왜 없었겠는가? 기본적인 증기기관의 원리는 이미 청나라에서 수입한 서적에도 기록이 되어 있었다. 그러나 이 시도는 당연히 실패했다. 일설에 의하면 아주 느리게 움직였다고 한다. ---- 화혼양재, 중체서용, 동도서기는 피상적인 해법이다. 애초부터 중요한 건 총과 대포와 함선을 만드는 ‘무형의 시스템’이지 ‘겉으로 보이는 총, 대포, 함선’이 아니었기 때문이다. 총과 대포, 함선을 만들기 위해서는 산업이 필요하고, 노동자가 필요하고, 분업이 필요하고, 기술의 축적이 필요하고, 경쟁이 필요하고, 많은 자본이 필요하다. 이를 위해 소유권의 보호와 주식회사 제도가 필수적이다. 도무지 훌륭한 장인, 천재적인 기술자 몇 명이 할 수 있는 성질의 일이 아니다. 국부론은 이미 18세기 말에 유럽에서 대히트를 쳤고, 이후 각종 경제사조가 등장해 백가쟁명했다. 19세기 프랑스와 독일에서 성문 민법이 정비되었으며, 영국과 미국의 관습 민법은 그 이전부터 훌륭했다. 17세기에 네덜란드 동인도회사가 설립되었었고, 이후 유럽 각국에서 주식시장이 널리 퍼지며, 투기와 탐욕의 광풍이 불었다. 총과 대포, 함선은 그 광풍 속에서 탄생한 결과물일 뿐이다. 지도자들이 진정 중요한 본질을 파악하지 못했던 우리나라와 중국은 결국 산업화에 뒤처져 민족 전체가 무지막지한 수난을 당했다. ---- 어떻게 된 영문인지 상황은 현재도 똑같다. 다른 나라의 뛰어난 빅테크, 플랫폼 기업들, 소프트웨어와 IT 경쟁력, 하루가 다르게 발전하는 인공지능, 전기차, 로봇, 바이오, 우주 기술을 보고 부러워한다. 그러나 이런 기술이 등장하는 본질을 보지 못하고, 뛰어난 장인이나 천재적인 과학자가 있으면 해결될 것처럼 생각한다. 그래서 과거 황우석 사태가 있었고, 불과 일 년 전 초전도체에 열광하며, 현재도 반도체, 바이오, 배터리 등에서 뭐라도 등장하기를 바라는 국뽕 유튜버와 간사한 마음을 이용한 주가조작 사기꾼들이 판을 치는 것이다. ---- 진정 만들어내야 하는 것은 훌륭한 자본시장 그 자체지 GPT-4보다 뛰어난 인공지능이 아니다. 훌륭한 자본시장 없이는 잠시 그런 걸 만들어 보았자 금방 따라잡히게 되어 있다. 훌륭한 자본시장을 위해서는 우리나라의 재벌과 승계구조, 이를 위해 주주의 돈을 약탈하고, 환원을 하지 않고, 각자도생하며, 승자독식하는 소프트웨어, 법, 제도를 개혁해야 한다. ---- 다시 한번 화혼양재, 중체서용, 동도서기의 숨은 의미를 잘 음미해 보시라. ‘화혼’, ‘중체’와 ‘동도’ 따위의 말에는 당시 사회의 뿌리 깊은 기득권과 모순, 억압과 수탈 구조는 하나도 개혁하지 않겠다는 이기적인 마음이 담겨 있다. 그래서 망했다.
좋은 글 잘 봤습니다. 자유주의와 민주주의, 자본시장의 중요성을 강조하는 견해에 동의하지만, 미국식 혁신의 진짜 핵심이 ‘자본시장’인지는 더 생각해볼 지점이라고 봅니다. 가장 중요한 것은 <규모의 경제>가 아닌가 싶습니다. <규모의 경제>는 시장, 자본, 기업 모두에게 적용됩니다. 대규모 시장, 대규모 자본유입 시스템, 대규모 기업입니다. 몇년 전 ‘사후적 규제’와 ‘포지티브 규제’ 시스템이 한창 이야기됐는데, 유럽 대부분의 선진국도 해당하지 않고, 오직 미국과 중국만 해당합니다. 두 나라의 공통점은 거대시장, 거대자본, 거대기업이 작동하는 <규모의 경제>입니다.
이런 관점에서 저는 늘 궁금했던 것이 일본은 비교적 서구화 역사가 다른 아시아 국가에 비해 길기도 하고, 자본주의에 입각한 다양한 회사 제도를 어쨌든 자신들의 방식으로 발전시켜 온 역사도 길며, 심지어는 산업 구조에서도 세계 최강의 자리에 어쨌든 30년 넘게 있어 본 나라인데, 왜 결국 이 구조가 지속가능하지 않은 것처럼 보이는가에 대한 것이었습니다. 물론 지금도 일본의 산업 구조는 튼튼하고 충분히 경쟁력 있으며 특히 자본 시장 역시 다른 아시아 국가에 비해 여전히 경쟁력 있다고 생각합니다만, 그럼에도 불구하고 첨단 산업에서 밀려나는 이유가 무엇일까 궁금했었습니다. 잘 알려진 여러 요인들은 충분히 각각 의미가 있긴 하겠지만, 결국 일본 역시 심선생님께서 말씀하신 훌륭한 자본시장 구축에 충분히 성공을 거두지 못 했기 때문에 이렇게 되는 것일까요? 똑같은 논리를 따른다면, 중국 같이 국가가 자본의 흐름을 관제하는 시스템에서는 결국 산업이든, 혁신이든, 자본이든 일정 수준 이상을 넘기 어렵다는 이야기가 되는 것일까요?
권석준 혁신에 대한 경영학 문헌들을종합해 보면 대략 답이 나올 것 같은 데, 일단 일본은 기초 기술 기반은 있지만 이것이 연구개발 클러스터에서 외부 혹은 외국에서 온 기술들과 융복합이 어려울 것 같구요. 그나마 교토계 기업들이 주목할 만한 성과를 거둔 것 같기는 한데요. 사회 전반적인 풍토가 점진적 혁신을 강조 하지 파괴적 혁신은 그다지 장려하지 않는 것 같습니다. 전자 쪽 대기업을 보면 출발부터 남달랐던 소니, 학습과 핵심 역량의 귀감이 된 캐논이 있지만 이 회사들도 진정한 내부의 국제화가 이루어지지 않은 탓인지 성장의 한계를 확실히 보이고 있죠(그나마 소니는 좀 낫긴 합니다). 두서 없이 답을 써 놓았는데, 시간 되면 나중에 좀 더 연구해서 제 담벼락에 올리겠습니다.
권석준 AI이나 전기자동차의 케이스를 보면 아시아 3국만 문제가 있는 것은 아니고 미국, 그것도 실리콘 밸리라는 와해성 혁신의 산실과 미국의 금융시시템의 융합 클러스터가 독주하는 양상이고 세계 모든 국가들과 지역의 공통적인 문제가 아닌가 합니다. 즉, 문제의 본질이 여하히 실리콘 밸리의 혁신 문화와 미국의 금융시스템 클러스터와 경쟁할 수 있는 체제를 갖추는 것이라 할 수 있을 것 같습니다. 미국의 금융시스템은 과거에는 월 스트리트였으나 요새는 실리콘 밸리에 있는 수 많은 벤처 펀드들이 더 중요한 역할을 하고 있고요. 보통 이 문제를 국가적인 과제로 인식하고 접근을 하는데 사실 실리콘 밸리의 마인드는 아나키스트, 무정부주의자들이 주역으로 정부의 역할을 필요 최소로 요구하고 있고 개개인의 자유로운 사고와 선택을 가장 중요한 가치로 생각하고 있고요. 과거에는 일본이 다음에는 한국이 뒤늦은 산업화에는 성공을 했으나 차기 산업혁명에 대해서는 적어도 실리콘 밸리의 동향을 보면서 발맞추어 우리에 맞는 전략을 수립하고 실행을 했어야 했는데 대기업들의 모습을 봐도 게임을 바꾸는 기술혁신에 대해서는 레퍼런스가 없어서 경영진이 퇴자를 놓는 상황이니 넘어설 수가 없는거죠. 이번에는 중국이 도전을 하고 있는데 막강한 자국 시장을 무기로 새로운 산업혁명을 시도는 하고 있으나 기본적으로 피라밋 조직형태를 장착하고 있는 중국 공산당이 탑다운 방식으로만 일을 할 수 밖에 없으니 이 역시 성공 가능성이 높지 않죠. 저는 한국의 기회가 오히려 중국과 일본보다 더 높다고 생각하는데 이유가 일본과 중국의 집단주의적인 성향과는 한국인들의 민주적이고 역동적인 성향에 기대를 겁니다. 물론 한국에 여전히 강고한 대기업들과 정부가 갖고 있는 피라밋 조직의 관료화된 체제를 깨 부셔야 가능하겠지만요…
동의합니다.. 그러나 대통령 한놈(?)이 국가 R&D를 말아먹을수 있는 시스템과 국가철학 하에서는 쉽지 않을것 같습니다.. 사실 지금은 난리가 난 ‘인공지능’ 분야도 처음엔 붐이 있었지만 중간에 분위기 쎄~해서 연구비 중단되고 난리였던 것으로 알고 있습니다.. 그래도외국에선 최소한으로 명맥은 유지하면서 연구하는데요, 한국은 ’선택과 집중‘이란 미명으로 싹까지 자르죠.. 이번 ’과학자 카르텔 혁파‘로 인해 중간관리 포닥들이 먹고 살기위해 외국으로/다른 분야로 흩어지면 안그래도 박약한 한국의 기초과학은.. ㅠㅡㅠ
