Thursday, October 17, 2024

If You Don’t Know Who Ken Griffin Is, You Should | The Nation

If You Don’t Know Who Ken Griffin Is, You Should | The Nation


Economy / October 10, 2024

If You Don’t Know Who Ken Griffin Is, You Should


How the press keeps us in the dark about the new Gilded Age.
Michael Massing


CNBC’s Andrew Ross Sorkin interviews Kenneth C. Griffin, the founder and CEO of Citadel, at the CNBC Institutional Investor Delivering Alpha conference on July 18, 2018, in New York City.(Heidi Gutman / CNBC / NBCU Photo Bank / NBCUniversal via Getty Images)

“AHedge Fund Chief Shakes Up the Industry” ran the headline over a front-page article in The Wall Street Journal in mid-August that anointed Ken Griffin as the nation’s most successful hedge fund manager. According to the Journal, the 55-year-old founder and chief executive of Citadel took an industry long dominated by star traders like George Soros and David Tepper and instead set up “scores of teams that semiautonomously manage their own portfolios.” Such diffuse investing factories are now “ascendant” in the United States, accounting for more than a quarter of hedge-fund jobs and 30 percent of the industry’s stock-market footprint. “We made more money than any firm has ever made in the history of capital markets,” Griffin told reporter Peter Rudegeair. “This is where people come when they want to change the world of finance.”


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Drawing on conversations with more than two dozen people familiar with Griffin and his fund, the article recited his many superlatives: an estimated net worth of $42 billion; $75 million in contributions to conservative candidates and causes in the current election cycle; donations of hundreds of millions more to the Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center and Harvard University, his alma mater (including a $300 million gift last year to its Faculty of Arts and Sciences ); a sprawling real estate portfolio; and the weeks Griffin spends each year “personally reviewing the impact that thousands of employees have had on the firm.” Rudegeair writes that portfolio managers who otherwise would have opened their own funds “have increasingly accepted offers from Citadel and its peers to run their own teams inside its walls.” In 2023, Citadel’s flagship fund notched a return of 15.3 percent, trumping such competitors as Millennium and Point72.

There was, however, an important fact missing from the piece. That 15.3 percent return on Citadel’s flagship, while indeed beating the competition, badly lagged the S&P 500, which rose 24 percent for the year. Had Citadel’s investors instead placed their money in a low-cost index fund tracking the broad stock market, they would have earned much more. Several readers derisively noted this in the comments section. “What lunatic invests in a hedge fund?” wrote Anthony P. “These folks can’t beat the market and get beat by retirees that have their own investing clubs.”

Wondering about the absence of such a significant data point, I wrote to Rudegeair, requesting an interview. He wrote back to say that he preferred to let the story speak for itself.

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Left to conjecture, I can only assume that including the S&P 500 figure would have diminished Griffin’s glow. The article was accompanied by a color photo of Griffin showing him looking tanned and triumphant in his office in Miami. (Founded in Chicago in 1990, Citadel had long been based in that city, but in 2022 it moved to southern Florida because of Griffin’s concern over the level of violent crime in that city.) The Journal article exemplifies a certain genre of Wall Street reporting, in which world-bestriding financial and corporate figures are lionized for their wealth, acumen, and generous give-backs to society—a species that seems all the more jarring at a time when the top 1 percent of Americans own as much wealth as the bottom 90 percent and when more than a third of families say they would have trouble coming up with $400 in the event of an emergency.

Most people reading this article probably haven’t heard of Griffin and have little idea of what hedge funds are. They are pools of money entrusted by wealthy people and institutions to investment managers who promise them alpha—a return superior to that of industry benchmarks. There are around 3,800 such funds in the United States, managing $4.7 trillion. The sector is known for its swagger, secrecy, egotism, and ostentation. Prominent practitioners include Steve Cohen, Ray Dalio, Izzy Englander, David Shaw, and the late Jim Simons. (Others, such as Bill Ackman, Carl Icahn, and Paul Singer, belong to a subcategory known as hedge-fund activists.) They are pivotal figures in our new Gilded Age, in which the .01 percent have enriched themselves at the expense of wage-earning America and converted their fortunes into political influence, social status, and cultural capital. More Money Than God is the apt title of Sebastian Mallaby’s book about these men—and they are almost all men. And Griffin has outpaced them all. Every year, Institutional Investor compiles a list of the top 25 hedge-fund earners, and in 2022 Griffin placed first with a staggering $4.1 billion—the most in the list’s 22-year history.

In describing him and the industry, the Journal article left out some essential details. In its telling, Griffin created scores of teams to manage their own portfolios. Over time, Citadel came to look “less like a traditional hedge fund,” with a single manager overseeing all investments, “and more like a nesting doll of mini-hedge funds.” Griffin “opened additional stock-picking units, each composed of separate teams that were dedicated to certain sectors and managed their own positions.” By 2018, such multimanager funds “were growing faster than the rest of the industry and starting to account for its biggest launches.” With the proliferation of “copycat firms” mirroring Citadel’s strategies, Griffin “is now focused on maintaining his edge,” tending to even such minor matters as trade-processing errors. “Once a firm makes it clear they tolerate complacency anywhere,” Griffin observed, “it’s pretty easy for it to spread everywhere.”

The Journal, however, failed to note a critical factor in the firm’s competitive edge: its technology. Citadel uses superfast computers and advanced statistical models to guide its investment strategies. Though many hedge funds today operate in this way, Griffin was in the forefront, as another Journal reporter, Scott Patterson, chronicled in his 2010 book, The Quants. In contrast to Warren Buffett and other old-school investors who picked stocks based on their personal assessment of a company’s growth potential and other “fundamentals,” Patterson wrote, Griffin was among the best and brightest of a new breed of math-whiz technocrats who used a data-driven, algorithmic approach to detect small fluctuations, price discrepancies, and emerging market trends in a fraction of a second. As trading became increasingly automated, Citadel and other Wall Street firms scooped up mathematicians, physicists, engineers, and data scientists. These technologists have worked closely with portfolio managers, investment analysts, traders, and risk managers to develop complex investment strategies in equities, fixed income, credit, and commodities.


Today, there’s a steady flow of technologists from Silicon Valley to Wall Street, where they can earn millions or even tens of millions of dollars a year. Citadel employs more than 250 PhDs in 60 fields ranging from statistics and bioinformatics to aeronautics and atmospheric science. By many accounts, however, Citadel is a grueling place at which to work, thanks to Griffin’s unforgiving management style and Darwinian focus on performance.

Another ingredient in Citadel’s success is its fee structure. Most hedge funds have traditionally used a “2-and-20” structure, charging the fund’s outside investors a management fee of 2 percent of all assets and a performance fee of 20 percent of all profits. Citadel, by contrast, charges all of its expenses to its investors, including compensation, rent, research, and technology, amounting to around 7 percent of total assets. Such sky-high fees enable Citadel to invest more in computers, programmers, and portfolio managers than most other funds.


Parallel to his hedge fund, Griffin operates a separate market-making division called Citadel Securities. When an investor places an order with an investment manager like Fidelity or a brokerage like Charles Schwab to buy or sell stock, those companies send it to a market-maker like Citadel Securities to execute it. The firm operates banks of computers that—located on the premises of NASDAQ and other exchanges around the world—can buy and sell stocks at speeds a hundred times faster than the blink of an eye, allowing it to get a jump on the competition. Today, Citadel Securities is the largest such executor of stock orders in the country, accounting for a remarkable 35 percent of all daily retail trades. The profit on each transaction is a fraction of a cent, but with Citadel Securities executing more than $450 billion in trades every day, the aggregate total is massive, and Citadel Securities is now a major source of Griffin’s wealth.

To be fair, Citadel’s flagship fund over the years has handily outperformed the S&P 500. Since January 1, 2020, its cumulative rate of return has been more than double that of the S&P. But most hedge funds have fallen woefully short of that benchmark, and some pension funds—disappointed with their returns—have abandoned them. Warren Buffett has long criticized hedge funds as a terrible investment. In 2007, he bet that a low-fee Vanguard S&P 500 index fund would, over a 10-year period, outperform a portfolio of hedge funds selected by an independent advisory firm. In the end, he collected: The index fund increased by 85 percent and the hedge funds by just 22 percent.

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As awareness has spread that you can’t beat the market, trillions of dollars have moved from actively managed funds like hedge funds into passive funds that try to mirror the market. Yet many universities, foundations, and high-net-worth individuals continue to pile into hedge funds. In 2023, Harvard placed a whopping 31 percent of its $50-billion-plus endowment in such funds. Its overall return for the year was a paltry 2.9 percent—about one-eighth the increase in the S&P 500. Harvard’s average annual return for the 10 years through June 2023 was 8.6 percent, second from the bottom of Ivy League universities. Yet N.P. Narvekar, the head of its endowment committee, continues to pull down more than $6 million a year, making him Harvard’s highest-paid employee. Why endowment committees continue to favor hedge funds despite their abysmal performance reflects the heavy presence on those committees and their advisory boards of executives from hedge funds and private equity firms, who dole out business to their Wall Street contacts—a glaring form of favoritism that journalists rarely explore.

Nor do journalists spend much time examining the power of hedge-fund billionaires like Griffin and the distorting and destabilizing effect their wealth has on American society. In the political sphere, Griffin belongs to a class of financier megadonors who since Citizens United—the 2010 Supreme Court decision that struck down many limits on campaign contributions—have flooded the political system with money. In 2014, when Citadel was still based in Chicago and Griffin was the richest man in Illinois, he backed the gubernatorial candidacy of his friend Bruce Rauner, a private-equity executive who shared Griffin’s resolutely free-market views and support for charter schools. The $5.5 million he gave Rauner’s campaign helped him eke out a narrow victory. As governor, Rauner pushed for deep cuts in social services and higher education that made him deeply unpopular, and, despite the astounding $20 million that Griffin donated to his 2018 reelection campaign, Rauner was trounced by his Democratic opponent, J.B. Pritzker, who, as a billionaire, was able to outspend him.

When in 2018 Ron DeSantis ran for governor of Florida, Griffin contributed $5.75 million to his campaign, making him its largest backer. He donated another $5 million to his 2022 reelection bid, helping him to outspend his Democratic opponent. Griffin’s cash thus played a key role in electing two conservative governors. In the current election cycle, he is the second-largest donor in the country, with most of his money going to support Republican House and Senate candidates, including $10 million to back the senatorial bid of Larry Hogan in Maryland. (Griffin backed Nikki Haley during the Republican primaries.) “I’ve never seen anything like it,” a Republican fundraiser told the Financial Times about Griffin’s giving. “The amount of power he has is unbelievable.”

Griffin’s philanthropic donations are even more colossal. As with many in his bracket, he favors elite institutions and insistently seeks naming rights to help advertise his generosity. In Chicago, one can visit the Griffin Halls of Evolving Planet and Sue the T. Rex at the Field Museum; the Renzo Piano–designed Griffin Court at the Art Institute of Chicago; the Griffin Galleries at the Museum of Contemporary Art Chicago; and the Kenneth C. Griffin Museum of Science and Industry, to which he gave $125 million. In 2017, Griffin gave another $125 million to the economics department of the University of Chicago, which was renamed the Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics. At Harvard, not only the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences but also its financial aid office (to which he gave $150 million) are named after him.


In New York, there’s a Griffin Hall at the Whitney Museum of American Art, a Griffin Building at the Museum of Modern Art, a Griffin Theater at the performance space The Shed at Hudson Yards, and the Griffin Exploration Atrium at the newly expanded American Museum of Natural History. Citadel’s representatives (who patiently responded to my many questions) made sure I knew about the $30 million that Griffin gave last year to the National Medal of Honor Museum Foundation in Arlington, Texas, to underwrite a leadership institute, now known as the Griffin Institute. Griffin has also supported children’s hospitals, neuroscience research and cancer care, K-12 education (public, private, and charter), and Miami Dade College ($20 million to establish a Griffin Scholarship Fund for low-income students). Over the years, Griffin has contributed $35 million to Success Academy, the controversially strict charter network that operates nearly 50 schools in New York. Without the support of ultrarich hedge-fund executives like Griffin, Success and other charter schools would have a hard time surviving.

In all, Griffin has given away more than $2 billion. Most of that money qualifies for tax deductions, which for someone in Griffin’s bracket could total around $600 million in federal taxes alone—money that is diverted from the public treasury. Taxpayers are thus helping to subsidize his philanthropy without having any say in where it goes. (ProPublica found that from 2013 to 2018, Griffin paid 29.2 percent of his earnings in federal income tax—the fourth-highest rate among the 15 highest income-earners in those years.)

Griffin has also spent lavishly on art. He is one of a small group of collectors whose outlandish payouts for trophy works have driven up their prices, helping to make even our wealthiest museums dependent on their whims and goodwill. In 2015, Griffin bought Willem de Kooning’s Interchange for $300 million and Jackson Pollock’s Number 17A for $200 million from fellow multibillionaire David Geffen—the most expensive art deal ever. Those and other Griffin purchases had for years hung in the Art Institute of Chicago, but when Griffin decided to move Citadel to Florida, he had the works taken down and moved to the Norton Museum in West Palm Beach. Every year, Griffin makes the ARTnews list of the top 200 collectors, which confers prestige and acclaim in a phenomenon known as art-washing.


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In no area has Griffin spent more obsessively than real estate. Just to list the properties in his portfolio is to provide a snapshot of a society that seems profoundly unwell. They include a luxury penthouse apartment in Chicago, for which he paid $58.75 million in 2017 (the most ever for a residence in that city); an oceanfront property at the Four Seasons Hualalai resort in Hawaii; a pair of adjacent homes in Aspen, Colorado, with a combined total of 12 bedrooms; two penthouse apartments in a luxury condo in Miami Beach; a collection of lots in Palm Beach for which he paid $350 million and on which he plans to build a grand estate; a seven-acre oceanfront estate in Southampton that he bought from fashion designer Calvin Klein for $84.45 million; a Georgian mansion near Buckingham Palace in London that cost $122 million; and a three-floor penthouse at 220 Central Park South in New York for which he paid $238 million—still the highest price paid for a residence in the United States. When asked about this, Citadel (as part of an eight-page fact sheet) provided this statement: “Ken has mostly purchased one of a kind, iconic properties and oceanfront lots which are inherently of limited supply, and therefore likely to be sustainably valued. One of those Palm Beach properties has a house in progress for his mother.”


Sad to say, Griffin is not an isolated case. Hedge-fund and private-equity billionaires typically own four, five, six, or even more premier residences in prime locales in a stomach-turning case of competitive consumption. At a time when an estimated 650,000 Americans are homeless and the nation faces a housing shortfall of several million units, such gluttony seems a good advertisement for a robust wealth tax.

The scale of Griffin’s fortune and the influence it brings raises a broader issue that business reporters rarely broach: How much social utility do hedge funds have? The evidence suggests they have very little. The universities and retirement funds that have poured billions into these funds have in most cases gotten much poorer returns than they could have by shunning them. During the recent wave of protests on college campuses, hedge-fund executives (along with their private-equity colleagues) used their power as major donors to oust Ivy League presidents. (In January, Griffin said that he was pausing his gifts to Harvard, calling its students “whiny snowflakes” and chastising elite universities in general for being “lost in the wilderness of microaggressions” and pursuing “a DEI agenda that has no real endgame.”) With their superfast trading, hedge funds have fed the short-term mindset that has so eroded the long-term productivity and prosperity of American companies. And all those highly trained engineers, mathematicians, and physicists that are helping firms like Citadel reap billions could be more productively employed developing new treatments for chronic diseases, improving the nation’s transportation system, and creating a more efficient energy grid.

Above all, these funds have widened the gulf between the ultrarich and the rest of us. A few years ago, The Washington Post calculated that the top 25 top hedge-fund earners together made more than the nation’s 158,000 kindergarten teachers combined. Not since the days of the robber barons has such a small group controlled such vast wealth, and the SEC should appoint a panel to explore ways to constrict these funds so that people like Griffin have less income than God. Maybe then journalists would start paying more attention to them.

Monday, October 14, 2024

Daron Acemoglu - Wikipedia

Daron Acemoglu - Wikipedia

Daron Acemoglu
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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



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Daron Acemoglu

Acemoglu in 2016
Born
Kamer Daron Acemoğlu
September 3, 1967 (age 57)

Istanbul, Turkey
Citizenship Turkey and United States
Education University of York (BA)
London School of Economics (MSc, PhD)
Spouse Asu Ozdaglar

Academic career
Field Political economy
Economic growth
Development economics
Labour economics
Institution
London School of Economics (1989–1993)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1993–present)
School or
tradition New institutional economics
Doctoral
advisor Kevin W. S. Roberts
Doctoral
students Robert ShimerMark AguiarPol AntràsGabriel CarrollMelissa DellBenjamin JonesUfuk Akcigit
Influences Joel MokyrKenneth SokoloffDouglass NorthSeymour Martin LipsetBarrington Moore
Awards
John Bates Clark Medal (2005)
John von Neumann Award (2007)
Erwin Plein Nemmers Prize in Economics (2012)
BBVA Foundation Frontiers of Knowledge Award (2016)
Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences (2024)
Information at IDEAS / RePEc


Kamer Daron Acemoğlu (Turkish: [daˈɾon aˈdʒemoːɫu]; born September 3, 1967) is a Turkish American economist who has taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology since 1993, where he is currently the Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics, and was named an Institute Professor at MIT in 2019.[1] He received the John Bates Clark Medal in 2005, and the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2024.[1][2]

Born to Armenian parents in Istanbul, Acemoglu received a BA from the University of York in 1989, and a PhD from the London School of Economics (LSE) in 1992. He lectured at LSE for a year before joining the Department of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was awarded the John Bates Clark Medal in 2005. Acemoglu is best known for his work on political economy. He has authored hundreds of papers, many of them with his long-time collaborators Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson. With Robinson, he co-authored the books Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2006) and Why Nations Fail (2012). The latter, an influential book on the role that institutions play in shaping nations' economic outcomes, received wide scholarly and media attention. Described as a centrist, he believes in a regulated market economy. He regularly comments on political issues, economic inequality, and a variety of specific policies.

Acemoglu ranked third, behind Paul Krugman and Greg Mankiw, in the list of "Favorite Living Economists Under Age 60" in a 2011 survey among American economists. In 2015, he was named the most cited economist of the past 10 years per Research Papers in Economics (RePEc) data. According to the Open Syllabus Project, Acemoglu is the third most frequently cited author on college syllabi for economics courses after Greg Mankiw and Paul Krugman.[3]

In 2024, Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, and Simon Johnson were awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for their comparative studies in prosperity between nations.[4] The trio was recognized for their studies on how political and economic institutions impact a nation's development, highlighting the distinction between inclusive institutions, which promote widespread economic participation and growth, and extractive institutions, which concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a few. Their work, notably encapsulated in the book Why Nations Fail, argues that the institutional frameworks established during colonization continue to play a pivotal role in the long-term economic trajectories of countries, explaining significant disparities in global prosperity.


Life[edit]

Kamer Daron Acemoğlu[5][6][a] was born in Istanbul to Armenian parents on September 3, 1967.[9][10][11] His father, Kevork Acemoglu (1938−1988), was a commercial lawyer and lecturer at Istanbul University. His mother, Irma Acemoglu (d. 1991), was the principal of Aramyan Uncuyan, an Armenian elementary school in Kadıköy,[12][13][14] which Daron attended, before graduating from Galatasaray High School in 1986.[15][16][17] He became interested in politics and economics as a teenager.[14] He was educated at the University of York, where he received a BA in economics in 1989, and at the London School of Economics (LSE), where he received an MSc in econometrics and mathematical economics in 1990, and a PhD in economics in 1992.[18] His doctoral thesis was titled Essays in Microfoundations of Macroeconomics: Contracts and Economic Performance.[9][6] His doctoral advisor was Kevin W. S. Roberts.[19] James Malcomson, one of his doctoral examiners at the LSE, said that even the weakest three of the seven chapters of his thesis were "more than sufficient for the award of a PhD."[20] Arnold Kling called him a wunderkind due to the age at which he received his PhD (25).[21]

Acemoglu is a naturalized U.S. citizen.[22] He is fluent in English and Turkish,[23] and speaks some Armenian.[24] He is married to Asuman "Asu" Ozdağlar, a professor of electrical engineering and computer science at MIT,[14][25] who is the daughter of İsmail Özdağlar, a former Turkish government minister. Together, they have authored several articles.[26][27] As of 2015, they live in Newton, Massachusetts with their two sons, Arda and Aras.[28]

Academic career[edit]Acemoglu in 2009Acemoglu in his office, January 2020

Acemoglu was a lecturer in economics at the LSE from 1992 to 1993.[1] He was appointed an assistant professor at MIT in 1993, where he became the Pentti Kouri Associate Professor of Economics in 1997, and was tenured in 1998.[1][29] He became a full professor at MIT in 2000, and served as the Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics there from 2004 to 2010.[1][30] In 2010, Acemoglu was appointed the Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics at MIT.[9] In July 2019, he was named an Institute Professor, the highest faculty honour at MIT.[31]

As of 2019, he has mentored over 60 PhD students.[31] Among his doctoral students are Robert Shimer, Mark Aguiar, Pol Antràs, and Gabriel Carroll.[19] In 2014, he made $841,380, making him one of the top earners at MIT.[32]

Acemoglu is a research associate at the NBER, and was elected a Fellow of the Econometric Society in 2005.[18][1][33] He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2006, and to the National Academy of Sciences in 2014.[34][35] He is also a Senior Fellow at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, and a member of several other learned societies.[18][36][37] He edited Econometrica, an academic journal published by the Econometric Society, from 2011 to 2015.[38]

Acemoglu has authored hundreds of academic papers.[39] He noted that most of his research has been "motivated by trying to understand the sources of poverty."[22] His research includes a wide range of topics, including political economy, human capital theory, growth theory, economic development, innovation, labor economics,[18][40] income and wage inequality, and network economics, among others.[41] He noted in 2011 that most his research of the past 15 years concerned with what can be broadly called political economy.[42] He has made contribution to the labor economics field.[22]

Acemoglu has extensively collaborated with James A. Robinson, a British political scientist, since 1993.[29] Acemoglu has described it as a "very productive relationship." They have worked together on a number of articles and several books, most of which on the subject of growth and economic development.[22] The two have also extensively collaborated with economist Simon Johnson.[43]

Research and publications[edit]

Acemoglu is considered a follower of new institutional economics.[44][45][46] His influences include Joel Mokyr, Kenneth Sokoloff,[47] Douglass North,[48] Seymour Martin Lipset,[49] and Barrington Moore.[49]

Books[edit]

Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy[edit]

Published by Cambridge University Press in 2006, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy by Acemoglu and Robinson analyzes the creation and consolidation of democratic societies. They argue that "democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization."[50]

Romain Wacziarg praised the book and argued that its substantive contribution is the theoretical fusion of the Marxist dialectical materialism ("institutional change results from distributional struggles between two distinct social groups, a rich ruling class and a poor majority, each of whose interests are shaped primarily by economic forces") and the ideas of Barry Weingast and Douglass North, who argued that "institutional reform can be a way for the elite to credibly commit to future policies by delegating their enactment to interests that will not wish to reverse them."[51] William Easterly called it "one of the most important contributions to the literature on the economics of democracy in a long time." Edward Glaeser described it as "enormously significant" work and a "great contribution to the field."[52]

Why Nations Fail[edit]Why Nations Fail was included in the Shortlist of the 2012 Financial Times Business Book of the Year Award.

In their 2012 book, Why Nations Fail, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that economic growth at the forefront of technology requires political stability, which the Mayan civilization (to name only one) did not have,[53] and creative destruction. The latter cannot occur without institutional restraints on the granting of monopoly and oligopoly rights. They say that the Industrial Revolution began in Great Britain, because the English Bill of Rights 1689 created such restraints.

Acemoglu and Robinson insist that "development differences across countries are exclusively due to differences in political and economic institutions, and reject other theories that attribute some of the differences to culture, weather, geography or lack of knowledge about the best policies and practices."[54] For example, "Soviet Russia generated rapid growth as it caught up rapidly with some of the advanced technologies in the world [but] was running out of steam by the 1970s" because of a lack of creative destruction.[55]

The book was written for the general audience.[54] It was widely discussed by political analysts and commentators.[56][57][58][59] Warren Bass wrote of it in The Washington Post: "bracing, garrulous, wildly ambitious and ultimately hopeful. It may, in fact, be a bit of a masterpiece."[60]

Clive Crook wrote in Bloomberg News that the book deserves most of the "lavish praise" it received.[61] In his review in Foreign Affairs Jeffrey Sachs criticized Acemoglu and Robinson for systematically ignoring factors such as domestic politics, geopolitics, technological discoveries, and natural resources. He also argued that the book's appeal was based on readers' desire to hear that "Western democracy pays off not only politically but also economically."[62] Bill Gates called the book a "major disappointment" and characterized the authors' analysis as "vague and simplistic."[63] Ryan Avent, an editor at The Economist, responded that "Acemoglu and Robinson might not be entirely right about why nations succeed or fail. But at least they're engaged with the right problem."[64]

The Narrow Corridor[edit]

In The Narrow Corridor. States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty (2019), Acemoglu and Robinson argue that a free society is attained when the power of the state and of society evolved in rough balance. [65]

Power and Progress[edit]

Published in 2023, Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity is a book by Acemoglu and Simon Johnson on the historical development of technology and the social and political consequences of technology.[66] The book addresses three questions, on the relationship between new machines and production techniques and wages, on the way in which technology could be harnessed for social goods, and on the reason for the enthusiasm around artificial intelligence.

Power and Progress argues that technologies do not automatically yield social goods, their benefits going to a narrow elite. It offers a rather critical view of artificial intelligence (AI), stressing its largely negative impact on jobs and wages and on democracy.

Acemoglu and Johnson also provide a vision about how new technologies could be harnessed for social good. They see the Progressive Era as offering a model. They also discuss a list of policy proposals for the redirection of technology that includes: (1) market incentives, (2) the break up of big tech, (3) tax reform, (4) investing in workers, (5) privacy protection and data ownership, and (6) a digital advertising tax.[67]

Papers[edit]Social programs and policies

In a 2001 article, Acemoglu argued that the minimum wage and unemployment benefits "shift the composition of employment toward high-wage jobs. Because the composition of jobs in the laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficiently biased toward low-wage jobs, these labor market regulations increase average labor productivity and may improve welfare."[68] Furthermore, he has argued that "minimum wages can increase training of affected workers, by inducing firms to train their unskilled employees."[69]Democracy and economy

Acemoglu et al. found that "democracy has a significant and robust positive effect on GDP" and suggest that "democratizations increase GDP per capita by about 20% in the long run."[70] In another paper, Acemoglu et al. found that "there is a significant and robust effect of democracy on tax revenues as a fraction of GDP, but no robust impact on inequality."[71]Social democracy and unions

Acemoglu and Philippe Aghion argued in 2001 that although deunionization in the US and UK since the 1980s is not the "underlying cause of the increase in inequality", it "amplifies the direct effect of skill-biased technical change by removing the wage compression imposed by unions."[72]

According to Acemoglu and Robinson, unions historically had a significant role in creating democracy, especially in western Europe, and in maintaining a balance of political power between established business interests and political elites.[73]Nordic model

In a 2012 paper titled "Can't We All Be More Like Scandinavians?", co-written with Robinson and Verdier, he suggests that "it may be precisely the more 'cutthroat' American society that makes possible the more 'cuddly' Scandinavian societies based on a comprehensive social safety net, the welfare state and more limited inequality." They concluded that "all countries may want to be like the 'Scandinavians' with a more extensive safety net and a more egalitarian structure," however, if the United States shifted from being a "cutthroat [capitalism] leader", the economic growth of the entire world would be reduced.[74] He argued against the US adopting the Nordic model in a 2015 op-ed for The New York Times. He again argued: "If the US increased taxation to Denmark levels, it would reduce rewards for entrepreneurship, with negative consequences for growth and prosperity." He praised the Scandinavian experience in poverty reduction, creation of a level playing field for its citizens, and higher social mobility.[75] This was critiqued by Lane Kenworthy, who argues that, empirically, the US's economic growth preceded the divergence in cutthroat and cuddly policies, and there is no relationship between inequality and innovation for developed countries.[76]Colonialism

"The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development", co-written by Acemoglu, Robinson, and Simon Johnson in 2001, is by far his most cited work.[39] Graham Mallard described it as an "excellent example of his work: an influential paper that has led to much debate."[30] They argue that Europeans set up extractive institutions in colonies where they did not settle, unlike in places where they did settle and that these institutions have persisted. They estimated that "differences in institutions explain approximately three-quarters of the income per capita differences across former colonies."[77][78] Historical experience dominated by extractive institutions in these countries has created a vicious circle, which was exacerbated by the European colonization.[79]

A critique of modernization theory[edit]

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, in their article "Income and Democracy" (2008) show that even though there is a strong cross-country correlation between income and democracy, once one controls for country fixed effects and removes the association between income per capita and various measures of democracy, there is "no causal effect of income on democracy."[80] In "Non-Modernization" (2022), they further argue that modernization theory cannot account for various paths of political development "because it posits a link between economics and politics that is not conditional on institutions and culture and that presumes a definite endpoint—for example, an 'end of history'."[81]

Views[edit]

Journalists and economists have described Acemoglu as a centrist.[b] Why Nations Fail was well received by both liberal and conservative economists.[85] Acemoglu's and Robinson's long-time collaborator Simon Johnson suggests that their "point is not just about how things may become awful when the government goes off track (a right-leaning point). They are also more deeply concerned about how powerful people fight to grab control of the state and otherwise compete to exert influence over the rest of society (a left-leaning perspective)."[43]

Acemoglu has praised the successes of the Progressive Era, and argued in favor of its replication.[86] Acemoglu argues that the market economy is the only system that creates prosperity. He believes in finding an appropriate balance between "incentivizing creativity, hard work and risk-taking and creating the essential public services, social safety nets and equality of opportunity."[87] For Acemoglu, markets work only with regulations and predictable laws and that all markets are regulated to some extent; it is only a matter of degree.[29] He suggests that free markets are not unregulated markets.[88]Wall Street

In September 2008, Acemoglu signed a petition condemning the Bush administration's bailout plan of the U.S. financial system.[89] As the main cause of the financial crisis of 2007–2008, he stated that policy makers were "lured by ideological notions derived from Ayn Rand’s novels rather than economic theory" and opined: "In hindsight, we should not be surprised that unregulated profit-seeking individuals have taken risks from which they benefit and others lose."[88] In an early analysis of the Great Recession, Acemoglu wrote: "When channeled into profit-maximizing, competitive, and innovative behavior under the auspices of sound laws and regulations, greed can act as the engine of innovation and economic growth. But when unchecked by the appropriate institutions and regulations, it will degenerate into rent-seeking, corruption, and crime."[29] He argues that the heavy overrepresentation from the financial sector in the top 1% "has been an outcome of the political processes that have removed all of the regulations in finance, and so created the platform for 40 percent of U.S. corporate profits to be in the financial sector."[42] He argues that a platform, particularly in Wall Street, has been created "where the ambition and greed of people, often men, has been channeled in a very anti-social, selfish and socially destructive direction."[90]Inequality

Acemoglu has voiced concerns regarding the increasing inequality in the US, which in his view turns into political inequality, in turn undermining the inclusiveness of US institutions.[57] In 2012 he identified societal polarization, caused by economic inequality, as the biggest problem for the US.[91] He argues that "democracy ceases to function because some people have so much money they command greater power."[84] He states that he is comfortable with economic inequality which comes through different social contributions as it is a "price that we pay for providing incentives for people to contribute to prosperity." However, high levels of inequality create problems as the rich who control significant portions of the societal resources use them to create an "unequal distribution of political power."[90] He sees the solution in increasing social mobility by "providing an opportunity for the bottom to become rich, not forcing the rich to become poor."[84]

Acemoglu has praised the American tradition of vibrant protest movements dating back to the Populists and the Progressives.[92] He has also praised Occupy Wall Street for "putting the question of inequality on the agenda, but also for actually standing up for political equality."[93] He notes that Occupy Wall Street brought the 1% to the attention of the wider public, and to the attention of academia by Tony Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez.[90]Specific policies

Acemoglu is in favor of raising and indexing the minimum wage.[94]

Acemoglu believes that universal basic income is "expensive and not generous enough" and that a "more efficient and generous social safety net is needed."[95] He further called it a "flawed idea" and a "poorly designed policy." He instead advocates for a "guaranteed-income program [that] would offer transfers only to individuals whose monthly income is below $1,000, thereby coming in at a mere fraction of a UBI's cost." He calls for "universal health care, more generous unemployment benefits, better-designed retraining programs, and an expanded earned income tax credit (EITC)."[96] Acemoglu supports a negative income tax, calling it a "more sensible" alternative to UBI.[97]

Acemoglu believes that nation-building by the West is no longer possible around the world because the West now lacks the resources and commitment that were present in post-World War II Germany and Japan, and because countries, such as in the Muslim- and Arab-majority countries, where such work is required today do not trust the West.[98] He views the US war on drugs as a "total and very costly failure",[99] and supported the 2013 ballot referendum Colorado Amendment 64, a successful popular initiative that legalized the sale of recreational marijuana.[100]

In a 2016 interview with NPR, he opined that the US infrastructure is in a "pitiful state, with negative consequences for US economic growth."[101]Socialism, communism, and Marxism

Acemoglu argues that socialist states have not been successful in creating prosperity.[87] He wrote that socialist regimes "from Cuba to the eastern bloc have been disastrous both for economic prosperity and individual freedom."[102]

In a review written with James A. Robinson, he argues that Thomas Piketty and Karl Marx are "led astray" due to their disregard for "the key forces shaping how an economy functions: the endogenous evolution of technology and of the institutions and the political equilibrium that influence not only technology but also how markets function and how the gains from various different economic arrangements are distributed."[103]Social democracy and unions

In 2019, Acemoglu argued in favor of social democracy. He stated: "[Social democracy, when practiced by competent governments] is a phenomenal success. Everywhere in the west is to some degree social democratic, but the extent of this varies. We owe our prosperity and freedom to social democracy." However, he qualified this statement by arguing that social democracy "did not achieve these things by taxing and redistributing a lot. It achieved them by having labor institutions protecting workers, encouraging job creation and encouraging high wages."[102] Following from this, Acemoglu opined that the economists of US presidential candidate Bernie Sanders, who is an advocate of democratic socialism along the lines of the Nordic model, "don't understand basic economics. They are not just dangerous, they are clueless."[102]

Acemoglu argued that a "tradition of strong labor movement or social democratic party, by constraining the actions of the social planner, can act as a commitment device to egalitarianism, inducing an equilibrium in which the country in question becomes the beneficiary from the asymmetric world equilibrium."[74]Donald Trump

In an op-ed in Foreign Policy, Acemoglu claimed that President Donald Trump shared political goals and strategies of Hugo Chávez, Vladimir Putin, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, such as "little respect for the rule of law or the independence of state institutions, ... a blurred vision of national and personal interests, ... little patience with criticism and a long-established strategy of rewarding loyalty, which can be seen in his high-level appointments to date. This is all topped by an unwavering belief in his abilities."[92] In a 2019 interview with Der Spiegel, Acemoglu stated that he sees similarities between Trump and the Republican Party and the Nazis: "Surely, Trump and the Republicans are no Nazis. But they are exploiting the same political sentiment." He argues that Trump "poses a great risk to U.S. democracy" because he is "looking for a new order with elements of anti-liberalism, misinformation and a lax attitude to corruption. If he is re-elected next year, it will be the beginning of the end of American democracy."[104]Authoritarian countries

According to Acemoglu, the three obstacles for economic growth under authoritarian regimes are the tendency of authoritarian regimes to become more authoritarian, their tendency to use power to halt "Schumpeterian creative destruction, which is key to sustaining growth" and the instability and uncertainty caused by internal conflicts.[29] He believes that Saudi Arabia would be like a poor African country without the oil, while the "only thing that is keeping [Russia] going is a big boom in natural resources and a clever handling of the media."[105]

He believes that China has managed to achieve significant economic growth because it "sort of picked up the low hanging fruit from the world technology frontier, but that sort of growth is not going to last until China goes to the next step, which is harnessing innovation," which he argues will be impossible "unless economic institutions become even more open and the extractive political institutions in China will be a barrier to that."[91] He and Robinson wrote for the HuffPost that the "limited rights [China] affords its citizens places major restrictions on the country’s longer-term possibilities for prosperity."[106]Turkey

Acemoglu opined that the Republic of Turkey, formed in 1923 by Atatürk, "is very continuous with the Ottoman Empire." Although the shift from empire to republic brought some positive changes, he argues, the model was largely maintained by the reformers who took power, citing a persistent concentration of power and economic activity.[107] He suggests that the Republican period has been characterized by an unwillingness to accept ethnic minorities.[108] In 2014, Acemoglu condemned the widespread anti-Armenian rhetoric in Turkish textbooks, and demanded that the books be pulled from circulation.[13]

Acemoglu has criticized Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his government for its authoritarian rule.[109] In a 2013 op-ed in The New York Times, following the crackdown of Gezi Park protests, Acemoglu wrote that "Even before the brutal suppression of the demonstrations, the belief that Turkey was on its way to becoming a mature democracy — a role model for the rest of the Middle East — had already become untenable."[110] In a May 2014 op-ed in Foreign Affairs, Acemoglu wrote that the drift from democracy by Erdogan is lamentable, but an "almost predictable, stage of Turkey’s democratic transition."[111] In the late 2010s, Acemoglu often criticized Turkey's economic policies and consequently became popular with the opposition.[112]Armenia

In a 2015 interview with the Armenian service of Voice of America, Acemoglu stated that he has always been interested in economic, political, and social developments in Armenia.[16] Talking via video, Acemoglu partook in the Armenian Economic Association's annual conference in October 2013 held at the Yerevan State University, during which he argued that Armenia's problem is political, and not geographic, cultural, or geopolitical. He called for the Armenian government to be "more responsive to the wishes of its citizens so that through that political process Armenia ceases to be an oligarchy."[113] In a September 2016 conference in Toronto, Acemoglu criticized the Armenian diaspora for legitimizing the successive governments in Armenia, especially when the rights of its citizens are violated and a wrong economic and political line is being followed for the country.[114] In an April 2017 conference held by the USC Institute of Armenian Studies, Acemoglu stated that while "Armenia could have looked much more like the Czech Republic or Estonia and what we got instead is a country that looks much more like Azerbaijan or Uzbekistan, which is a real shame." He suggested that in the immediate post-Soviet years Armenia was "stronger and it's been getting worse and worse." He criticized the level of corruption of the government, which has systematically closed the political system.[115]Other countries

In an op-ed for The Globe and Mail following the 2014 Ukrainian revolution, Acemoglu advocated Ukraine "to break with its past as quickly as possible. It needs to move away from Russia, politically and economically, even if that means an end to the natural-gas subsidies Russia has used to keep it in the position of a client state. Even more important is for Ukraine’s leaders to spread political power and economic benefits to the maximum number of its people, including Russian speakers."[116]

Acemoglu argued that the Greek government-debt crisis was caused by the "terrible state of Greek institutions, and the clientelistic nature of its politics",[117] and stated that the country's problems are "political not just macroeconomic."[118] He identified lack of political integration within the EU as Greece's problem, and said that "the only way forward for Europe is to have greater fiscal and banking integration or to abandon monetary integration."[117]

Political involvement[edit]

Turkey[edit]Acemoglu in 2018[24]

In March 2011, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu offered to appoint Acemoglu Turkey's permanent representative to the OECD in Paris, a post he turned down in order to continue his academic career.[119][120][121][122]

Acemoglu met with Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, leader of the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) in October 2022.[123][124] In December 2022 Kılıçdaroğlu appointed Acemoglu, among others, as his economic adviser.[125] Pro-Erdogan circles criticized the move. One pro-government columnist said: "The Armenian Daron Acemoğlu, praised by FETÖ, prepared Kılıçdaroğlu's vision program, (resembling his own roots)." In response, finance professor Özgür Demirtaş defended Acemoglu. "This tweet is both racist and presumptuous. The influence of Daron Acemoğlu on world’s economy-finance professors is greater than the number of cells in your body. It's terrible that you talk like this about a professor who made us proud and is going for the Nobel prize."[126] Yeni Şafak, a pro-government newspaper, ran the headline: "Daron Acemoğlu, one of the new economic advisors of the CHP, could not solve the economic crisis of Armenia."[127]

Armenia[edit]

Following the 2018 Armenian revolution, opposition leader-turned-Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan wrote on his Facebook page that Acemoglu told him that he is ready to help Armenia to "restore and develop" its economy.[128][129] Pashinyan and Acemoglu talked via the internet in June 2018.[130] Acemoglu met with Deputy Prime Minister Tigran Avinyan in Boston in July 2019.[131][132]

Recognition[edit]

According to data collected by Research Papers in Economics (RePEc), Acemoglu was the most cited economist of the decade leading to 2015.[133][11][13] According to Google Scholar, his works (including co-authored works) have been cited more than 200,000 times as of January 2023.[39] In a 2011 survey of 299 economics professors in the U.S. Acemoglu ranked third, behind Paul Krugman and Greg Mankiw, in the list of "Favorite Living Economists Under Age 60".[134]

He was listed 88th in Foreign Policy's 2010 list of Top 100 Global Thinkers "for showing that freedom is about more than markets."[135] Acemoglu was voted by the readers of Prospect Magazine as the world’s top thinker for 2024.[136]

Francis Fukuyama has described Acemoglu and his long-time collaborator James A. Robinson as "two of the world's leading experts on development."[137] Clement Douglas wrote in the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis publication that the "scope, depth and sheer volume of [his] scholarship are nothing short of breathtaking, verging on implausible."[42] Angus Deaton called him a "young superstar" and noted that Acemoglu is "a very good example of the way things ought to be going, which is you do history but you know enough mathematics to be able to model it too."[138]

Acemoglu was awarded Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2024.[139][140][141][142][143]

Awards[edit]Economics awardsJohn Bates Clark Medal (2005) by the American Economic Association[144][14]
John von Neumann Award (2007) by Rajk László College for Advanced Studies[145]
Erwin Plein Nemmers Prize in Economics (2012) by Northwestern University "for fundamental contributions to the understanding of political institutions, technical change and economic growth"[146]
BBVA Foundation Frontiers of Knowledge Award (2016) "for proving the influence of institutions over economic development"[147][148]
Jean-Jacques Laffont Prize, Toulouse School of Economics (2018)[149][150][151]
Global Economy Prize, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (2019)[31]
Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy (2021)[152]State orders and awardsPresidential Culture and Arts Grand Award in Social Sciences (2013) by Turkish President Abdullah Gül[153]Honorary degrees

Acemoglu has been awarded honorary degrees from the following universities: Utrecht University (2008),[42] Boğaziçi University (2011), the University of Athens (2014),[18] Bilkent University (2015),[154] University of Bath (2017),[155] ENS Paris-Saclay (2017), London Business School (2018), and the University of Glasgow (2024).[156]OtherCarnegie Fellow (2017)[157]

Selected bibliography[edit]Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521855266.
Acemoglu, Daron (2008). Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Princeton University Press. ISBN 9781400835775.
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. (2012). Why Nations Fail. Crown Business. ISBN 978-0307719218.
Acemoglu, Daron; Laibson, David and List, John (2014). Principles of Economics, Pearson, New York.
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. (2019). The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty. Penguin Press. ISBN 978-0735224384. Description, arrow-searchable preview, & reviewers' comments (at bottom).
Acemoglu, Daron, and Simon Johnson (2023). Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity. New York: PublicAffairs.

References[edit]

Notes[edit]
^ Western Armenian: Տարօն Աճէմօղլու.[7][8] Acemoğlu is the Turkified version of the Armenian last name Ajemian (Աճէմեան). Its root derives from the Arabic term ajam, used for non-Arabs, especially Persians. Most of Turkey's Armenians changed their last names due to the 1934 Surname Law. His first name is the Western Armenian version of Taron, a male given name from a historic region.
^ "... the middle-of-the-roaders Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson ..."[82]
"Daron Acemoglu, a more centrist economist at MIT ..."[83]
"... Acemoglu, who aligns more with the center than with the populists."[84]

Citations[edit]
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^ "The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2024". NobelPrize.org. Retrieved 2024-10-14.
^ "Arşaluys Acemoğlu". Milliyet (in Turkish). 14 May 1985. Archived from the original on October 13, 2010. ...Kevork ve İrma Acemoğulları...Kamer Daron Acemoğlu...
^ Jump up to:a b Acemoglu, Kamer Daron (1992). Essays in microfoundations of macroeconomics : contracts and macroeconomic performance (Ph.D). British Library Board. Archived from the original on 13 October 2017.
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^ Jump up to:a b c "Curriculum Vitae Daron Acemoglu". economics.mit.edu. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Archived from the original on 2021-07-28. Retrieved 2017-09-16. (archived)
^ Sorman, Guy (2013). Economics Does Not Lie: A Defense of the Free Market in a Time of Crisis. Encounter Books. p. 31. ISBN 978-1594032547. ...Daron Acemoğlu, an Armenian from Turkey...
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^ "Daron Acemoğlu kimdir? Kaç yaşında, nereli, mesleği ne? Prof. Dr. Daron Acemoğlu'nun hayatı ve biyografisi!". haberler.com (in Turkish). Archived from the original on 20 August 2021. İlköğrenimini İstanbul Kadıköy'deki Aramyan Uncuyan Ermeni İlkokulu'nda tamamladıktan...
^ Jump up to:a b Tarjimanyan, Arman (2 April 2015). "Տարոն Աճեմօղլու. "Արտագաղթը սարսափելի վտանգ է Հայաստանի համար"". azatutyun.am (in Armenian). Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (via Voice of America). Archived from the original on 28 December 2019. «Ծնվել ու մեծացել եմ հայկական ընտանիքում, ավարտել Ստամբուլի հայկական տարրական դպրոցը, և, իհարկե, ինձ միշտ հետաքրքրել են տնտեսական, քաղաքական և սոցիալական զարգացումները Հայաստանում», - ասաց պրոֆեսորը։
^ "Galatasaray Ödülü Daron Acemoğlu'na". Agos (in Turkish). 16 December 2011. Archived from the original on 17 March 2020.
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"CEO Club Toplantısı – Daron Acemoğlu "Global Ekonomi 2016"" (in Turkish). Capital Dergisi. 15 April 2016. Archived from the original on 2021-09-24.
^ Jump up to:a b "Հայաստանը թեւակոխեց զարգացման նոր փուլ՝ Տարոն Աճեմօղլու" [Armenia entered a new stage of development: Daron Acemoglu] (in Armenian). Voice of America Armenian Service. May 31, 2018. Archived from the original on 4 January 2023. Retrieved 4 January 2023.
^ Hardesty, Larry (18 June 2013). "Gaming the System". MIT Technology Review. ...Ozdaglar and her husband, the MIT economist Daron Acemoglu...
^ "Asuman Ozdaglar". National Bureau of Economic Research.
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^ Jump up to:a b Mallard, Graham (2012). The Economics Companion. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 265. ISBN 9780230356450.
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^ Keefer, Philip; Knack, Stephen (2005). "Social capital, social norms and the New Institutional Economics". Handbook of New Institutional Economics. pp. 700–725.
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^ Why Nations Fail, "Acknowledgments", p. 209 "Two people played a particularly significant role in shaping our views and encouraging our research, and we would like to take this opportunity to express our intellectual debt and our sincere gratitude to them: Joel Mokyr, and Ken Sokoloff...
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^ "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy". Cambridge University Press.
^ Wacziarg, Romain (15 September 2006). "Determinants of Democratization". Science. 313 (5793): 1576–1577. doi:10.1126/science.1131936. JSTOR 20031295. S2CID 154213515.
^ Drazen, Allan (February 2007). "Review: Four Reviews of "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy"". The Economic Journal. 117 (517): F162–F183. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02031_1.x. JSTOR 4625479.
^ e.g., p. 143
^ Jump up to:a b Radelet, Steven (12 October 2012). "Why Nations Fail by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson". United States Agency for International Development. Archived from the original on 16 September 2017.
^ p. 150.
^ "Creating economic wealth: The big why". The Economist.
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^ Sachs, Jeffrey (2012). "Government, Geography, and Growth: The True Drivers of Economic Development". Foreign Affairs. 91 (5): 142–150. JSTOR 41720868.
^ Gates, Bill (26 February 2013). "Good Ideas, but Missing Analysis". gatesnotes.com.
^ R.A. (6 March 2013). "Institutions matter, a lot". The Economist.
^ Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty. New York: Penguin, 2019.
^ Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity. New York: PublicAffairs, 2023.
^ Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity. New York: PublicAffairs, 2023, Ch. 11.
^ Acemoglu, Daron (January 2001). "Good Jobs versus Bad Jobs". Journal of Labor Economics. 19 (1): 1–21. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.687.4806. doi:10.1086/209978. JSTOR 10.1086/209978. S2CID 2316641.
^ Acemoglu, Daron; Pischke, Jörn-Steffen (2003). Minimum Wages and On-the-job Training (PDF). Vol. 22. pp. 159–202. doi:10.1016/S0147-9121(03)22005-7. hdl:1721.1/63851. ISBN 978-0-7623-1026-5. ISSN 0147-9121. {{cite book}}: |journal= ignored (help)
^ Acemoglu, Daron; Naidu, Suresh; Restrepo, Pascual; Robinson, James A. (March 2014). "Democracy Does Cause Growth". NBER Working Paper No. 20004. doi:10.3386/w20004. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
^ Acemoglu, Daron; Naidu, Suresh; Restrepo, Pascual; Robinson, James A. (December 2013). "Democracy, Redistribution and Inequality". NBER Working Paper No. 19746. doi:10.3386/w19746. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
^ Acemoglu, Daron; Aghion, Philippe (2001). "Deunionization, technical change and inequality". Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy. 55: 229–264. doi:10.1016/s0167-2231(01)00058-6. S2CID 17495766. Archived from the original on 2018-08-10. Retrieved 2017-11-24.
^ Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. (2013). "Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice". Journal of Economic Perspectives. 27 (2): 173–192. doi:10.1257/jep.27.2.173. hdl:1721.1/82599. Archived from the original on 2020-01-25. Retrieved 2019-12-01.
^ Jump up to:a b Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A.; Verdier, Thierry (October 2012). "Can't We All Be More Like Scandinavians? Asymmetric Growth and Institutions in an Interdependent World". National Bureau of Economic Research. doi:10.3386/w18441. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
^ Acemoglu, Daron (20 October 2015). "A Scandinavian U.S. Would Be a Problem for the Global Economy". The New York Times.
^ "Will everyone be worse off if the United States turns social democratic?". Lane Kenworthy. 2012-09-29. Retrieved 2020-10-17.
^ Acemoglu, Daron; Johnson, Simon; Robinson, James A. (June 2000). "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation". Working Paper Series. National Bureau of Economic Research. doi:10.3386/w7771. Retrieved 12 March 2022. This quote is from a subsequent abstract, appearing before page 1, to their article but NOT in the abstract to their original article. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
^ Acemoglu, Daron; Johnson, Simon; Robinson, James A. (2001). "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation". The American Economic Review. 91 (5): 1369–1401. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.475.6366. doi:10.3386/w7771. JSTOR 2677930.
^ Levitt, Steven D. (20 April 2012). "Acemoglu and Robinson Answer Your Questions". Freakonomics. Archived from the original on 6 November 2017.
^ Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared, "Income and Democracy." American Economic Review 98(3) 2008: 808-42.
^ Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, "Non-Modernization: Power–Culture Trajectories and the Dynamics of Political Institutions." Annual Review of Political Science 25(1) 2022: 323-339, p. 324.[1][permanent dead link]
^ McCloskey, Deirdre (January 2015). "It was ideas and ideologies, not interests or institutions, which changed in Northwestern Europe, 1600–1848". Journal of Evolutionary Economics. 25 (1): 57. doi:10.1007/s00191-015-0392-x. S2CID 154238344.
^ Edsall, Thomas B. (28 January 2014). "Capitalism vs. Democracy". The New York Times.
^ Jump up to:a b c Keller, Bill (22 December 2013). "Inequality for Dummies". The New York Times.
^ Abrams, Paul (5 June 2012). "Romney-Ryan's Why Nations Fail Economy vs. Obama's Built to Last Economy". HuffPost.
^ Acemoglu, Daron; Johnson, Simon (15 August 2017). "It's Time to Found a New Republic". Foreign Policy.
^ Jump up to:a b "Is democratic socialism the right path for America?". CNN. 28 October 2015. (archived)
^ Jump up to:a b Acemoglu, Daron (5 January 2009). "The Crisis of 2008: Lessons for and from Economics". Hoover Institution.
^ Shea, Christopher (24 September 2008). "Anti-bailout economists". The Boston Globe.
^ Jump up to:a b c Roell, Sophie (December 2011). The best books on Inequality recommended by Daron Acemoglu. {{cite book}}: |website= ignored (help)
^ Jump up to:a b Korones, Sarah (2 April 2012). "Q&A: Daron Acemoglu, economist, on why nations fail". ZDNet. Archived from the original on 13 October 2017.
^ Jump up to:a b Acemoglu, Daron (18 January 2017). "We Are the Last Defense Against Trump". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 8 November 2017. (, )
^ Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. (11 March 2012). "The Problem With U.S. Inequality". HuffPost. (cached)
^ "Over 600 Economists Sign Letter In Support of $10.10 Minimum Wage". Economic Policy Institute. 14 January 2014. Archived from the original on 9 October 2017.
^ Schiller, Ben (17 February 2017). "Economists Are Not Very Enthusiastic About The Idea Of A Universal Basic Income". Fast Company. Archived from the original on 7 November 2017.
^ Acemoglu, Daron (June 7, 2019). "Why Universal Basic Income Is a Bad Idea". Project Syndicate.
^ "Why Universal Basic Income is a Bad Idea | by Daron Acemoglu". 7 June 2019.
^ Giridharadas, Anand (26 August 2011). "For Libya, a Light Hand May Be Best". The New York Times.
^ "Drug Use Policies". Initiative on Global Markets. 12 December 2011.
^ "A Letter of Support From the Academic Community: Yes on Amendment 64". Colorado Campaign to Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol. 2012. Archived from the original on March 4, 2013. Retrieved February 28, 2013.
^ Jiang, Jess (26 February 2016). "Economists On Candidates' Proposals: Mostly Bad". NPR.
^ Jump up to:a b c Edsall, Thomas B. (April 24, 2019). "Bernie Sanders Scares a Lot of People, and Quite a Few of Them Are Democrats". The New York Times.
^ Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. (2015). "The Rise and Decline of General Laws of Capitalism". Journal of Economic Perspectives. 29 (1): 3–28. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.687.2487. doi:10.1257/jep.29.1.3. hdl:1721.1/113636. S2CID 14001669. Archived from the original on 2017-02-13.
^ Sauga, Michael (12 October 2019). "Political Economist Daran Acemoglu: 'Trump Poses a Great Risk to U.S. Democracy'". Der Spiegel.
^ Freeland, Chrystia (1 March 2012). "Dignity and the Wealth of Nations". The New York Times.
^ Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. (2012-03-21). "Will China Rule the World?". HuffPost. Archived from the original on 6 November 2017.
^ Laidler, John (28 April 2015). "Understanding Turkey". Harvard Gazette. Harvard University. Archived from the original on 15 September 2017.
^ "Inside Turkey's Economy – Interview with Daron Acemoglu". GEDProject. Bertelsmann Stiftung. 22 August 2016. Archived from the original on 2021-09-24. 11:40 "The overall, sort of, unwillingness to come to grips with this, sort of, multiethnicity has, of course, characterized much of the Republican period."
^ Freeland, Chrystia (6 June 2013). "The perils of authoritarian overreaction". The Globe and Mail.
^ Acemoglu, Daron (5 June 2013). "Development Won't Ensure Democracy in Turkey". The New York Times.
^ Acemoglu, Daron (22 May 2014). "The Failed Autocrat: Despite Erdogan's Ruthlessness, Turkey's Democracy Is Still on Track". Foreign Affairs. (archived)
^ Erciyes, Cem (December 30, 2019). "How will Turkey enter the 'Narrow Corridor'?". Gazete Duvar.
^ "Acemoglu's Advice to Armenia – Abolish the Oligarchy". civilnet.am. 24 October 2013. Archived from the original on 17 September 2017.
^ Balyan, Varduhi (22 September 2016). "Acemoğlu'ndan Ermenistan ve Diaspora yorumu". Agos (in Turkish). Archived from the original on 16 September 2017. (, )
^ "Daron Acemoglu: Armenia's Problems Within Its Own Political System". civilnet.am. 10 April 2017. Archived from the original on 17 September 2017.
^ Acemoglu, Daron (14 March 2014). "Ukraine's legacy of serial oligopoly". The Globe and Mail.
^ Jump up to:a b Kurtaran, Gokhan (4 August 2015). "EU needs political and economic integration: Acemoglu". Anadolu Agency.
^ "Greece". Initiative on Global Markets. 24 February 2015.
^ Gürcanlı, Zeynep (30 March 2011). "İlk Ermeni kökenli Türk büyükelçi Paris'e". Hürriyet (in Turkish). Archived from the original on 16 September 2017.
^ Düven, Alparslan (30 March 2011). "Paris'e Ermeni asıllı Büyükelçi atanacak iddiası" (in Turkish). Doğan News Agency. Archived from the original on 16 September 2017.
^ Moraitis, Stratos (30 March 2011). "Ethnic Armenian in Turkey rejects diplomatic post". Greek Reporter. Archived from the original on 16 September 2017.
^ "Armenian Declines Davutoglu Appointment". Asbarez. 30 March 2011.
^ Kılıçdaroğlu, Kemal (October 11, 2022). "ABD'deki vizyon programımız kapsamında, dünyaca ünlü ekonomist Daron Acemoğlu ile bir araya geldik". Twitter (in Turkish). Archived from the original on 6 December 2022.
^ "Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, Daron Acemoğlu ile görüştü". Gazete Duvar. 11 October 2022. Archived from the original (tr) on 23 October 2022.
^ "Turkish main opposition leader unveils new vision to overcome economic crisis: Structural changes needed". duvarenglish.com. Duvar. 3 December 2022. Archived from the original on 4 December 2022.
^ "Turkish pro-gov't columnist targets economist Acemoğlu, says 'I am his master'". Duvar. December 5, 2022. Archived from the original on 6 December 2022.
^ "CHP'nin yeni ekonomi danışmanlarından Daron Acemoğlu Ermenistan'ın ekonomik krizini çözememişti". Yeni Şafak (in Turkish). 4 December 2022. Archived from the original on 6 December 2022.
^ "Հենց նոր հեռախոսազրույց ունեցա հայազգի աշխարհահռչակ տնտեսագետ Դարոն Աճեմօղլուի հետ" (in Armenian). Nikol Pashinyan on Facebook. 13 May 2018. Archived from the original on 2022-02-26.
^ "Economist Daron Acemoglu to Advise Armenian Government, Says PM Pashinyan". Hetq. 13 May 2018.
^ "Nikol Pashinyan holds videoconference with Daron Acemoglu". primeminister.am. Prime Minister of Armenia. 11 June 2018.
^ "We had an interesting discussion with Professor Daron #Acemoglu and entrepreneur Noubar #Afeyan in Boston. The socio-economic situation in Armenia, investments, new jobs, public administration #reform, women empowerment were among the topics discussed". AvinyanTigran on Twitter. July 22, 2019. Archived from the original on 13 April 2022.
^ Arkun, Aram (August 1, 2019). "Deputy Prime Minister Avinyan Speaks at Armenian Business Network Cambridge Event". Armenian Mirror-Spectator.
^ "Top 10% Authors (Last 10 Years Publications), as of September 2015". ideas.repec.org. Archived from the original on 5 September 2015.
^ Davis, William L.; Figgins, Bob; Hedengren, David; Klein, Daniel B. (May 2011). "Economics Professors' Favorite Economic Thinkers, Journals, and Blogs (along with Party and Policy Views)" (PDF). Econ Journal Watch. 8 (2): 139. (archived)
^ "The FP Top 100 Global Thinkers". Foreign Policy. 23 November 2010. p. 92. JSTOR 29764933
^ Clark, Tom (January 24, 2024). "Daron Acemoglu: the opportunity economist". Prospect Magazine. Archived from the original on 24 January 2024.
^ "Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty". Barnes & Noble.
^ Pilling, David (30 September 2016). "Crash and learn: should we change the way we teach economics?". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 2022-12-11.
^ Template:Https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2024/summary/
^ Kihara, David (6 October 2016). "NYU accidentally announces one of its professors wins Nobel Prize". Politico. Archived from the original on 20 July 2021. Some other economists who have been touted as possible Nobel winners include William Baumol, William Nordhaus, Esther Duflo and Daron Acemoglu.
^ "Paul Romer and William Nordhaus – why they won the 2018 'economics Nobel'". The Conversation. October 8, 2018. Archived from the original on 20 August 2021. Other economists followed this line of thinking (Robert Barro, Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion – all prize candidates for a few years now)...
^ Smith, Noah (October 11, 2019). "Five Economists Whose Work Is Worthy of a Nobel". BloombergQuint. Archived from the original on 20 August 2021. No. 5. Daron Acemoglu
^ "Clarivate Reveals Citation Laureates 2022 – Annual List of Researchers of Nobel Class". London: Clarivate. September 21, 2022. Archived from the original on 3 October 2022. Economics: Daron Acemoglu [...] For far-reaching analysis of the role of political and economic institutions in shaping national development
^ Shimer 2007.
^ "John von Neumann Award". Rajk László College for Advanced Studies. Archived from the original on 2014-12-15. Retrieved 2018-08-12. 2007 Daron Acemoglu (MIT)
^ Tremmel, Pat Vaughan (16 April 2012). "Nemmers Prizes Announced". northwestern.edu. Archived from the original on 16 June 2021.
^ "Daron Acemoglu earns the Frontiers of Knowledge award for proving the influence of institutions over economic development". bbva.com. 21 February 2017. Archived from the original on 18 October 2020.
^ Dizikes, Peter (21 February 2017). "Daron Acemoglu wins BBVA Foundation Frontiers of Knowledge Award". news.mit.edu. MIT News Office. Archived from the original on 5 June 2021.
^ "Daron Acemoglu talk & prize". Toulouse School of Economics. 3 October 2018.
^ "2018 Jean-Jacques Laffont prize". jjlaffont.org. L’Association Jean-Jacques Laffont.
^ "The Narrow Corridor to Liberty: Daron Acemoglu". civilnet.am. 16 February 2019. Archived from the original on 11 July 2019.
^ "Professor Daron Acemoglu FBA". thebritishacademy.ac.uk. British Academy. Archived from the original on 23 November 2021.
^ "2013 'Presidential Culture and Arts Grand Awards' conferred". Anadolu Agency. 24 December 2013.
^ "Bilkent Honorary Doctorate Conferred Upon Daron Acemoğlu". bilkent.edu.tr. 7 September 2015. Archived from the original on 19 September 2018. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
^ "Professor Daron Acemoglu – Honorary Degree, Public Lecture and Workshop". bath.ac.uk. 21 March 2017.
^ "University of Glasgow Honorary Degrees 2024". www.gla.ac.uk. Retrieved 2024-05-15.
^ "Daron Acemoglu". carnegie.org. Carnegie Corporation of New York. Archived from the original on 20 March 2019.

Sources[edit]Shimer, Robert (2007). "Daron Acemoglu: 2005 John Bates Clark Medalist". Journal of Economic Perspectives. 21 (1): 191–208. doi:10.1257/jep.21.1.191. JSTOR 30033707.


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